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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2009 there were 3.28 million non-fatal occupational injuries and illnesses 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). Of these injuries and illnesses, 965,000 resulted in 
lost days from work. In addition there were 4,340 workplace fatalities. Given the 
number of occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities, and the associated direct and 
indirect costs, organizations have sought to improve safety at work. Safety climate and 
safety motivation are two variables hypothesized to affect safety behaviors and safety 
outcomes. Safety climate refers to the shared perceptions of workgroup members, of 
the organizations’ commitment to safety as evidenced by heir immediate supervisors’ 
pattern of implementing safety policies and procedures (Zohar, 2003). Therefore, the 
workgroup supervisor plays an major role in the development of safety climate. Social 
exchange theory and previous studies of leadership styles and safety suggest that 
supervisors who convey concern for subordinates’ well-being increase workers’ 
motivation to reciprocate by increasing their safe behaviors at work. However, no 
research to date has examined the relationship between supervisors’ personality and 
workers perceptions of safety climate, or the effect of Big Five trait-level variables on 
workers safety motivation. In this study I hypothesize that supervisors’ proactive 
personality and three Big Five traits will be positively related to workers’ safety 
climate perceptions. In addition, I hypothesize that four Big Five traits in workers will 
be positively related to workers safety motivation. Finally, I hypothesize that group-
ii  
level safety climate will be significantly related to individual-level safety motivation 
after controlling for workers’ personality.  
Participants in this study were maintenance and construction workers from a 
municipal city bureau, in 28 workgroups, totaling 146 workers and 28 supervisors. 
Workgroup sizes vary but averaged 6.21 members, including the supervisor. The data 
were collected in small groups (paper-and-pencil) and electronically (on-line); workers 
and supervisors answered questionnaire items on personality variables, safety climate, 
safety motivation, safety behaviors, and safety outcomes. In addition, archival data on 
safety outcomes were collected. The data were analyzed using a combination of 
multiple regression, multi-level modeling, and path analysis to test hypotheses and 
answer research questions. 
Both proactive personality and Big Five traits in supervisors accounted for 
incremental variance in aggregated workgroup safety climate over controls. In 
addition, workgroup safety climate and individual workers’ cautiousness were 
significant predictors of workgroup safety motivation in a hierarchical linear model. 
At the individual level of the model, only the traits of cautiousness and morality were 
significant predictors of individual safety motivation. Tests of the Neal and Griffin 
(2004) model showed that safety motivation partially mediated the relationship 
between individual safety climate and safety participation behaviors. In addition, 
safety motivation fully mediated the relationships between morality and both safety 
compliance and safety participation behaviors. Finally, safety motivation partially 
iii  
mediated the relationship between cautiousness and both safety compliance and safety 
participation behaviors. 
The results suggest that supervisor personality can have an effect on the on 
workgroup safety climate perceptions. In addition, this study provided evidence that 
Big Five traits are useful predictors of the antecedents of accidents and injuries. 
Suggestions for training managers and future research are also discussed. 
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Introduction 1 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
While occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities have long been a concern 
to organizations, they have become central organizational issues since the passage of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. In 2009 there were 3.28 million non-
fatal occupational injuries and illnesses (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). Of these 
injuries and illnesses, 965,000 resulted in lost days from work. The incidence rate for 
non-fatal injuries and illnesses was 3.6 per 100 workers, which is the lowest rate since 
2003. Occupational illnesses were much less common than injuries accounting for 
slightly more than 5% of the 3.28 million non-fatal occupational injuries and illnesses. 
In addition, there were 4,340 occupational fatalities in 2009, which represents a 
decrease from the 5,214 occupational fatalities in 2008.  
The Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety publishes the annual 
Workplace Safety Index which identifies the leading causes of the most disabling 
injuries in the United States, and estimates the direct costs of these injuries. In 2005, 
overexertion, falls, bodily reactions to slips and trips not involving falls, and being 
struck by an object accounted for nearly one-half of all disabling injuries (Liberty 
Mutual Research Institute for Safety, 2008). The direct costs of these injuries was 
estimated at $48.3 billion. Indirect costs are difficult to calculate, but they are 
generally considered to be four times greater than the direct costs (Neville, 1998). If 
that ratio continues to hold, indirect costs of these disabling injuries would be 
approximately $193 billion in 2005. Liberty Mutual has also tracked changes in injury 
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causes and costs from 1998 to 2005. During that time there was an 3.9% increase in 
inflation adjusted costs even though there was a 21% decrease in the frequency of 
injuries. Given the number of occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities, and the 
associated direct and indirect costs, it is easy to understand why organizations and 
society are motivated to improve safety at work. 
The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970 also motivated 
organizations to attend to safety. The act was intended to assure safe and healthful 
working conditions for all workers, to the extent possible (Cohen & Margolis, 1973). 
The act created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). OSHA is charged 
with promulgating and enforcing safety regulations, and providing organizations with 
training and assistance to achieve safety goals. Literally thousands of pages of safety 
regulations have been implemented by OSHA, and enforcement activities are ongoing. 
Despite these efforts, some have argued that OSHA is seriously hampered by a lack of 
inspectors and a budget that does not keep up with inflation (Peterson & Mayhew, 
2005). In addition, although fines for noncompliance with safety regulations can cost 
organizations tens of thousands of dollars, large companies with profits in the millions 
of dollars per year may not view these fines as a deterrent, but rather as a cost of doing 
business. Hopefully this occurs infrequently but there is no way of knowing for sure. 
In 1989 OSHA published voluntary safety and health program management 
guidelines which describe the four elements of effective safety and health programs. 
The first element is management commitment and employee involvement, which are 
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viewed as complimentary. Commitment from management provides the motivating 
force and resources for organizing and controlling safety activities, while employee 
involvement allows workers to develop and express their commitment to safety and 
health. Second is worksite analysis to identify existing hazards and conditions/work 
processes which could create hazards. Third is hazard prevention and control. Once 
identified, hazards should ideally be removed, but failing this engineering and 
administrative controls can reduce workers exposure to hazards. For example, placing 
guards on moving machine parts is an engineering control, while regulating the 
amount of time workers are exposed to toxic chemicals would be an administrative 
control. As a last resort, employees can be issued personal protective equipment (PPE), 
such as hard hats and safety glasses, to protect them from hazards. The final element is 
safety and health training which addresses the safety and health responsibilities of all 
personnel. Safety and health programs have resulted in significant reductions of 
injuries through engineering and work design interventions, but some safety 
professionals, after reaching a point of diminishing returns, began to focus on 
organizational influences on safety and health (Shannon, Mayr, & Haines, 1997). 
Researchers from around the globe have studied the effects of organizational, 
social, and psychological variables on safety and health. For example, Barling, 
Loughlin, and Kelloway (2002) reported on the positive effects of safety-specific 
transformation leadership on safety outcomes. Several studies have examined the 
effects of organizational safety culture on accidents (Cox & Flin, 1998; Havold, 2005; 
Mearns & Flin, 2001), while Zohar (1980, 2002, 2003a) is most often associated with 
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studies of the effect of work-group safety climate on accidents and injuries. A number 
of other studies have examined the relationship between a variety of workers’ 
individual differences and accidents/injuries, including demographic differences such 
as age and sex (Karson & O’Dell, 1974; Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003), job 
tenure (Cooper & Phillips, 2004), accident history (Cree & Kelloway, 1997) and 
personality traits (Arthur & Graziano, 1996; Wallace & Chen, 2006).  
While all of these studies have led to valuable insights and interventions to 
improve occupational safety (e.g. Zohar, 2002), the role of the unit-level supervisor 
appears to be especially important. According to Zohar (2000) it is the unit-level 
supervisor who is most responsible for conveying the importance of safety to his or 
her subordinates. However, I am unaware of any studies that have examined the 
personality characteristics of supervisors that are associated with the development of a 
positive safety climate at the work-group level. In addition, while several studies have 
examined the relationship between broad measures of workers’ personality (e.g. The 
Five Factor Model) and safety outcomes, I am unaware of any studies that have related 
workers’ trait-level personality to safety-related perceptions, motivation, behaviors, or 
accidents/injuries. Similarly, the effect of newer personality constructs such as 
proactive personality (Bateman & Crant, 1993) on safety outcomes have not been 
examined. The current study seeks to address these gaps in the literature. 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to test the influence of workgroup 
supervisors’ personality traits on workgroup safety climate. Specifically, it is posited 
that supervisors with a proactive personality will foster a stronger, more positive 
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group-level safety climate relative to supervisors without a proactive personality, if 
they perceive that safety is important to the organization. In addition, it is expected 
that three personality traits, friendliness, cheerfulness, and altruism will relate to 
supervisors’ ability to foster a strong, positive group-level safety climate. 
It is also expected that  personality traits of workers’ will have a direct effect 
on workers’ safety motivation. Specifically, two traits of conscientiousness (order and 
deliberation) and two traits of agreeableness (altruism and trust) are expected to affect 
safety motivation. Hypotheses will be tested with a multilevel model based on Neal 
and Griffin (2004). Figure 1 depicts the model. Level one of the model is at the 
individual worker level and encompasses individual safety motivation, two types of 
safety behaviors, and safety outcomes (accidents, injuries, near misses). Level two 
consists of safety climate perceptions at the workgroup level and supervisors’ 
personality.  
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Chapter II 
 
Safety Climate 
 
 In the quarter century since Zohar (1980) described the construct of safety 
climate there has been a plethora of research across the globe, and in several industrial 
sectors. A number of factors may account for this activity. First, while safety 
professionals had made great strides in reducing accidents and injuries through 
engineering and work design interventions, they began to reach a point of diminishing 
returns (Shannon, Mayr, & Haines, 1997). This prompted researchers to examine 
organizational influences on safety outcomes. In addition, a systems perspective began 
to replace the focus on accident-prone or careless individuals (Dekker, 2002). In this 
view human error and accidents are jointly caused by people, job tasks, and the work 
environment. Organizations began moving away from a control-oriented approach to 
accident reduction, which emphasized safety rule enforcement and punishment, to a 
more strategic approach which encourages workers to identify with the organizational 
goals and expend the effort needed to achieve them (Barling and Hutchinson, 2000). 
As such, safety climate has proved to be a powerful proactive management tool which 
can be used to focus interventions, establish benchmarks, and provide information on 
safety problems before accidents occur (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Seo, Torabi, 
Blair, & Ellis, 2004). 
 Safety climate also overcomes some of the limitations of traditional measures 
of safety performance such as lost time accidents, which occur too infrequently to 
provide information on safety conditions across work sites, do not evaluate risks to 
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workers, and often violate distributional assumptions of commonly used statistical 
methods (Seo, et al., 2004). Accidents and injuries are considered a lagging indicator 
of safety, which can only indicate the presence of dangers and failures of the safety 
system.  
 In contrast, safety climate is considered a leading indicator of safety which 
measures workers perceptions and attitudes about the level and priority of safety at 
work (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001). In other words, safety climate can alert 
organizations to potential safety problems before they occur. In a meta-analytic review 
of the relationship between safety climate and safety performance Clarke (2006a) 
found safety climate was strongly related to safety compliance and safety performance, 
and these safety behaviors showed small but reliable relationships with safety 
outcomes like accidents across different industrial settings. Safety climate also 
predicted accidents in prospective studies.  
This chapter will review safety climate research. I will begin by comparing and 
contrasting climate and culture, discussing definition and measurement issues 
involving safety climate and safety culture, and finally, review a model of safety 
behavior and outcomes in which safety climate is hypothesized to play a major role. 
Evidence for the importance of unit-level supervisors in the establishment of a positive 
safety climate will be highlighted throughout, as supervisors’ personality has not 
previously been related to the development of unit-level safety climate. 
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Culture and Climate 
 A number of authors have discussed the confusion in the literature between the 
constructs of culture and climate (e.g. Denison, 1996; Mearns & Flin, 2001) and how 
each should be measured. For example, Moran and Volkwein (1992) defined culture 
as the assumptions, expectations, and outlooks taken for granted by organizational 
members. Culture is not easily observable by outsiders, but can be inferred from the 
shared norms, values, and meanings of the group. In contrast, they define climate as 
attitudes and behaviors that are directly observable. Similarly, Denison (1996) 
suggests that culture reflects the evolved context in which the work situation is 
embedded. It is rooted in the history of the organization and difficult to manipulate 
directly. He defines climate as the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organizational 
members. Climate is more temporal and subjective, and can be manipulated by people 
with power and influence, such as immediate supervisors. Schneider and Gunnarson 
(1991) suggest that culture reflects the assumptions, values and philosophies about 
human nature and the role of work in life, while climate consists of practices, 
procedures, and reinforced behaviors at work. In their view, culture tells why things 
happen in an organization, and climate tells what happens in organizations. Finally, 
Mearns and Flin (2001) define culture as a complex, enduring trait of organizations 
which reflects fundamental values, norms, assumptions, and expectations. They define 
climate as employee’s perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about specific work-related 
behaviors. In summary, culture is a more abstract and implicit construct which applies 
to the organization as a whole, while climate tends to be more specific and explicit, 
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and applies to subgroups within the organization. However, as Denison (1996) notes, 
both culture and climate relate to the internal social environment of organizations, and 
the terms are often used interchangeably. The two constructs also tend to be measured 
differently. 
 Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, and Gibbons (2004) discuss two 
perspectives on organizational culture, the socioanthropological and organizational 
psychology perspectives. While the definitions of culture from each perspective are 
very similar, the methods and purpose of measuring culture differ. In the 
socioanthropological perspective culture is typically measured qualitatively through 
ethnographic approaches, observations, and employee interviews. The purpose is to 
describe the culture, which is considered too complex to manipulate. In the 
organizational psychology perspective culture is measured quantitatively using 
questionnaires, with the goal of manipulating the culture. In his review Denison (1996) 
concludes that culture tends to be measured using qualitative methods and climate 
tends to be measured using quantitative methods.  
Safety Culture and Safety Climate 
 Like culture and climate in general, the constructs safety culture and safety 
climate have often been used interchangeably and tend to be poorly defined. Mearns 
and Flin (2001) define safety culture as the values, beliefs, attitudes, social mores, 
norms, rules, practices, competencies, and behaviors related to safety in the 
organization. This is a broad definition which may have limited scientific utility (Cox 
& Cox, 1996).  In their review of safety culture literature, Wiegmann, et al. (2004) list 
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seven commonalities among safety culture definitions: 1) Safety culture is defined at 
the group level or higher (i.e. it refers to all group or organizational members); 2) 
Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues including management and 
supervisory systems; 3) Safety culture emphasizes contributions from all employees; 4) 
Safety culture impacts employees work behavior; 5) Safety culture is reflected in 
reward contingencies; 6) Safety culture reflects the willingness of the organization to 
develop and learn from errors, incidents, and accidents; and, 7) Safety culture is 
enduring, stable, and resistant to change. Even though these commonalities suggest 
that safety culture is on the same abstract level as organizational culture, they tend to 
be measured differently. 
 Wiegmann, et al. also suggest five indicators of the level of safety culture in an 
organization. The first is organizational commitment1 which comes from upper level 
management and refers to the degree to which safety is a core value or guiding 
principle in the organization. Second, management involvement refers to the extent to 
which both upper- and mid-level managers are personally involved in critical safety 
activities. Third, employee empowerment reflects employees’ power to make 
decisions and take responsibility for safety at work. Fourth is reward systems for safe 
behaviors. The final indicator is reporting systems which refers to having a reporting 
culture which encourages employees to report problems and learn from mistakes. In 
other words, there are no negative consequences or reprisals for reporting safety 
                                                 
1
 Organizational commitment in this case is not equivalent to the employee attitude of organizational 
commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). 
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problems. When considered from the perspective of the unit-level supervisor, these 
indicators of organizational safety culture could also be used to infer expected 
behaviors and outcomes for themselves and their subordinates. This process of ‘sense 
making’ occurs as new employees strive to determine which behaviors, attitudes, and 
perceptions tend to be important, required, and/or rewarded in the workplace. When 
upper management expresses commitment to safety and works to improve safety this 
tells unit-level supervisors that safety is important in the organization, and there are 
likely to be consequences for safety outcomes. Reporting systems and a culture of 
learning from mistakes also reinforces the importance of safety to the organization. 
Similarly, empowering workers and a reward system for safe behaviors rely directly 
on the attention and behavior of unit-level supervisors. These behaviors help workers 
to understand the importance of safety to the organization and their supervisor, and to 
act accordingly.  
The Definition of Safety Climate 
 Zohar (1980) defined climate as the “summary of molar perceptions that 
employees share about their work environments” (p. 96). An organization can have 
multiple climates, for example for safety or customer service, which tell employees 
what behaviors are expected and rewarded in their work unit. Specific climates are 
derived from the broader organizational climate as employees in discrete work units 
observe the implementation of organization-wide policies and procedures by their 
immediate supervisors. Climate perceptions come from the observation of practices as 
patterns, with pattern-level properties, rather than specific incidents, as the main 
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determinant (Zohar and Luria, 2005). Safety climate refers to workers perceptions of 
the relative priority of safety in their work unit. 
 According to Zohar (1980; 2000; 2003a) individual climate perceptions should 
be aggregated to the level of naturally occurring groups in the organization. For 
aggregation to the group level to be meaningful, there must be within-group 
homogeneity of climate perceptions. Zohar refers to this internal consistency as 
climate strength. On the other hand, climate level refers to the valence or direction of 
the climate perceptions (e.g. high or low priority for safety). Since there is variability 
between work unit supervisors in their implementation of organizational policies and 
procedures, it is likely that there will be between-unit variability in climate level. 
Researchers have used a variety of methods to justify aggregation of individual 
perceptions to the unit-level. 
 Bliese (2000) describes three criteria to determine the appropriateness of 
aggregating individual perceptions to the unit-level: Within-group homogeneity, 
between-group variance, and naturally occurring units of analysis (e.g. work-groups). 
To establish within-group agreement or homogeneity one must show that responses 
from group members are more similar than expected by chance (Klein, Dansereau, & 
Hall, 1994). Researchers have commonly used two methods to demonstrate within-
group agreement. First, they have compared within-group variance to a theoretical 
distribution of random variance by computing rwg (for single items) or rwg(j) (for 
multiple item scales; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984, 1993). Usually the comparison 
distribution is a rectangular distribution which assumes that all responses on the 
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response scale are equally likely. This ignores the likelihood of biased responding 
which occurs when individuals use a restricted range of the response scale. While 
most researchers continue to use the rectangular comparison distribution, other options 
have been discussed (James et al., 1984, 1993; Bliese, 2000). The second commonly 
used method is to use an ANOVA to contrast within- and between-group variances. 
For example, if we measured safety climate in five work-groups we can conduct a 
one-way ANOVA using work-group as a factor to make the comparison. From the 
results of the ANOVA we can calculate two types of intraclass correlations (ICC; 
Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) and determine if there is a significant between-groups effect. 
The ICC(1) reflects the proportion of total variance explained by group membership 
(Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), and if greater than zero suggests 
contextual (i.e. group) effects are present (Bliese, 2000). The ICC(2) estimates the 
reliability of the group means (Bliese, 2000). Both are used to establish within-group 
homogeneity of variance. In addition, a significant between-groups effect from the 
ANOVA demonstrates between-group variability on the measure of interest. There are 
numerous examples in the literature of researchers using rwg or rwg(j), ICC(1), ICC(2), 
and ANOVA results to justify aggregation of individual responses to the group level 
(e.g. Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996, 1998; Katz-Navon, Naveh, 
& Stern, 2005; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006; Zohar & Luria, 2005). The third 
criterion, naturally occurring units of analysis, is determined logically by the 
researcher. For example, it would make little sense to aggregate the individual 
perceptions of workers randomly selected from different work groups because of the 
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theoretical importance of managers’ behaviors at the unit-level in determining the 
level of safety climate. 
The Safety Climate Construct 
Since Zohar (1980) first developed a measure of safety climate, researchers 
have struggled to define a homogeneous factor structure for safety climate scales. 
Zohar reported the results of a principle components factor analysis (exploratory) of 
his initial scale which identified eight factors: importance of safety training programs, 
management attitudes toward safety, effects of safe conduct on promotion, level of 
risk at the workplace, effects of required work pace on safety, status of the safety 
officer, effects of safe conduct on social status, and status of the safety committee. He 
concluded that there were two main first-order factors for his scale which together 
accounted for 60% of the variance in safety climate scores: 1) Management attitudes 
about safety; and, 2) Relevance of safety in the production process. Brown and 
Holmes (1986) attempted to cross-validate the Zohar (1980) scale using a 
confirmatory factor analysis and found three factors: management concern for 
employee well-being, management safety activities, and employees’ perceptions of 
physical risk at work. Similarly, Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) found only two 
factors using a 9-item version of the Zohar (1980) scale: management commitment to 
safety and worker involvement in safety. 
Several studies in different industrial sectors and countries have reported 
different factor structures for safety climate scales (Cheyne, Oliver, Tomas, & Cox, 
2002; Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Diaz & Cabrara, 1997; Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, 
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Bowen & Ciaverelli, 2003; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 
2006; Lee & Harrison, 2000; Lu & Shang, 2005; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 
1998; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; Niskanen, 1994;  Seo, et al. 2004; Silva, Lima, 
& Baptista, 2004; Varonen & Mattila, 2000; Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 
1997; Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2006). However, most studies have found four to six 
factors (Fullarton & Stokes, 2007). Seo et al. (2004) suggest one possible reason for 
this myriad of factor structures is the common use of orthogonal extraction. They 
produced the first consistent factor structure across studies by allowing their two main 
factors (management commitment to safety and supervisor support for safety) to cross-
load using an oblique rotation after an orthogonal rotation showed that management 
commitment influences some of the indicators of supervisor support and vice versa. 
After reviewing the literature, a number of authors have proposed generic or 
core factors for safety climate scales. These include:  1) Management commitment to 
safety and employee well-being (Cox & Flin, 1998; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & 
Bryden, 2000; Lu & Shang, 2005; Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, & Cox, 2002),   
2) Management and organizational practices related to safety systems (Flin, et al., 
2000; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000), 3) Open communication and employee 
involvement in workplace safety and health (Lu & Shang, 2005; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 
2000), and 4) Production pressure (Flin et al., 2000). In addition, several authors have 
reported a higher-order safety climate factor that accounts for a variety of first-order 
factors (Barling, et al., 2002; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Neal & Griffin, 2004). In 
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their meta-analysis, Beus, Payne, Bergman, and Arthur (2010) found that perceived 
management commitment to safety was the most robust predictor of injuries. 
Zohar’s (1980, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005) definition of safety climate as 
shared perceptions of the relative importance of safety at work, as defined by practices 
as patterns, maps onto these generic or core safety climate scale factors. At both the 
organizational- and unit-levels, management/supervisor commitment to safety, and 
actions related to the safety and health of employees, and the level of production 
pressure, lead to patterns of behavior that indicate the relative priority of safety at 
work. Similarly, open communication between management and subordinates about 
safety issues, and employee involvement in workplace safety and health are practices 
that reflect the priority of safety as well as the social nature of most organizations.  
Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
 Zohar and colleagues (Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2003a; Zohar & Luria, 2003, 2005) 
take a slightly different approach with their multi-level model of climate. They focus 
on two levels of climate, the organizational level and unit- or workgroup level. In this 
model the unit-level climate partially mediates the effect of organizational climate on 
behavior-outcome expectancies. According to Zohar, climate reflects socially 
construed indicators of desired role behavior. Employees form climate perceptions 
from policies and procedures put in place by upper-level management, and from the 
actions of their immediate supervisor. Policies and procedures are the primary referent 
for organizational climate, while the practices of the immediate supervisor are the 
primary referent for unit-level climate. As hypothesized in the model, organizational 
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climate has a direct effect on behavior-outcome expectancies and unit-level safety 
climate. Safety climate also has a direct effect on behavior-outcome expectancies. 
Figure 2 shows a schematic of Zohar’s multilevel model. 
Additionally, organizational climate should be positively related to unit climate 
because policies and procedures set boundaries on supervisors’ discretionary 
behaviors. However, there will still be variability in unit-level climate perceptions 
because policies and procedures do not cover every conceivable situation. Therefore, 
supervisors will have some discretion in implementing policies and procedures. 
Similarly, conflicts between production and safety in different work groups, 
differences in relating to subordinates (e.g. LMX; Liden & Maslyn, 1989), and 
differences in supervisors beliefs and attributions regarding safe behavior, will also 
lead to different levels of unit safety climate between workgroups (Zohar & Luria, 
2005).  
For Zohar (1980; 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), safety climate refers to 
attributions about policies and procedures, and supervisory practices that indicate the 
priority of safety at work. Employees try to make sense of the workplace and 
determine what role behaviors are desirable. In this sense-making process workers 
tend to focus on patterns of behavior over time, rather than specific incidents of 
behavior, to determine which role behaviors are desired and rewarded by the 
organization. Since the immediate supervisor is the most proximate representative of 
the organization to most workers, patterns of supervisor behavior will be a major 
determinate of workers perceptions of the relative importance of safety at work.  
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Additionally, for policies and procedures to be effective they must be 
associated with consequences. In Zohar’s model, consequences for desirable behavior 
occur at both the organizational and unit levels. At the organizational level, 
consequences include annual performance evaluations, pay raises, and job transfers. 
At the unit level, consequences are related to the immediate supervisor’s frequency 
and intensity of monitoring safety behaviors and responding to safety issues. Unit-
level consequences include informal feedback from the supervisor, shift/job 
allocations, and formal commendations. Several studies suggest that unit-level 
consequences have a stronger effect on employee behavior than organizational-level 
consequences (Simard & Marchand, 1995, 1997; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997, 2001). 
Zohar has published three successful tests of the model. The first study (Zohar, 
2000) found support for safety climate as a group-level phenomenon among 53 work 
groups in a single manufacturing company using a newly developed measure of safety 
climate. He found within-group homogeneity of workers’ perceptions of their 
supervisor’s safety practices. In addition, he showed between-group variance in 
worker’s perceptions. In other words, Zohar demonstrated high safety climate strength 
and variations in safety climate level. He also developed a new outcome measure–
microaccidents–which are minor injuries requiring medical attention that do not result 
in lost workdays. Finally, he showed that unit-level safety climate scores predicted 
microaccidents.  
In the second study (Zohar & Luria, 2003), the authors attempted to improve 
safety by changing supervisors’ behavior. The intervention occurred at both the 
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organizational and unit levels. Unit-level supervisors received weekly feedback on the 
frequency of their safety-oriented interactions with their subordinates. In addition, 
higher-level managers received this same information as well as data on the frequency 
of workers’ safety behaviors in the different work groups. Stated differently, the 
authors attempted to improve safety climate at both the organizational and unit levels 
through the provision of safety-specific feedback. The intervention produced an 
increase in unit-level supervisors’ safety-oriented interactions with subordinates. 
Additionally, the intervention produced an increase in workers’ safety behaviors and 
in unit-level safety climate scores. This study highlights the importance of managers’ 
safety-related behaviors in improving safety behaviors in the workgroup. More 
specifically, this study shows the positive effects of increasing the frequency and 
intensity of managers’ monitoring of, and response to safety issues. 
In the final study (Zohar & Luria, 2005) the authors tested their multilevel 
model with over 400 workgroups in 36 manufacturing plants across several industrial 
sectors. The authors reported that the strengths and levels of safety climate at the 
organizational and unit levels were positively related. This illustrates the importance 
of procedural coherence, meaning that the goals and values espoused by the 
organization are congruent with the policies and procedures promulgated by upper 
management. Such procedural coherence creates a strong situation for unit-level 
supervisors and results in a positive relationship between the strengths and levels of 
organizational climate and unit-level climate. However, the relationship was stronger 
for climate levels than climate strengths. In addition, the authors found that the 
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relationship between the strengths of the organizational climate and the unit-level 
climate were moderated by the degree of routinization and formalization of work tasks. 
Specifically, as job tasks become more routine and formalized, direct supervisors have 
less discretion over how work is accomplished, and thus, organizational climate 
strength has a greater effect on unit-level climate strength. Between-group variability 
in unit-level safety climate strength was negatively related to both organizational 
climate strength and the amount or routinization and formalization of work tasks. In 
other words, a strong organizational climate and/or routine/formal job tasks results in 
less variability between work groups in safety climate strength (similarity of work 
group members’ perceptions). This study explicates the sense-making activities of 
workers as a group, showing that people pay attention to both the organizational-level 
(policy and procedures) and unit-level (supervisor behaviors) stimuli to detect 
practices as patterns and determine the relative priority of safety in their organization. 
Taken together these three studies provide good support for Zohar’s (2003a) 
model. As predicted, safety climate scores showed within-unit homogeneity and 
between-unit variance. In addition, Zohar demonstrated that organizational climate 
strength and the amount of routinization/formalization of work act as boundary 
conditions by decreasing immediate supervisors’ discretion when implementing safety 
policies and procedures.  
Importantly, these studies also show the effect of managers’ behaviors for 
safety in the workplace. When unit-level managers received feedback on their safety-
related behaviors with subordinates, and feedback from upper-level management on 
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safety outcomes and safety behaviors, safety-related interactions with subordinates 
and unit-level safety climate scores both increased. This suggests that unit-level 
supervisors also engage in sense-making activities to determine the relative priority of 
safety versus production. Finally, between-unit variability in safety climate level and 
strength also suggests that supervisors will vary in their ability to foster a coherent, 
positive safety climate. Zohar (2003a) discusses a number of variables that effect 
supervisor safety practices (superior’s goals, discretion level, job characteristics, and 
leadership style) all of which are likely to vary across unit-level supervisors within the 
same organization. Another variable that is also likely to vary across supervisors is 
personality, which is not presented in Zohar’s model. 
Safety Climate Literature Review 
In addition to the studies by Zohar and colleagues (Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2003; 
2005) discussed above, safety climate has been studied around the world and in 
several industrial sectors. These studies have produced consistent results across jobs, 
industrial sectors, and countries of origin. The majority of studies have been 
conducted on workers in the United States (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; DeJoy, Schaffer, 
Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciaverelli, 
2003; Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Hofmann & 
Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996, 
1998; Huang, Chen, Krauss, & Rodgers, 2004; Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 2006; 
Huang, Shaw, & Chen, 2004; Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 1995; McGovern, Vesley, 
Kochevar, Gershon, Rhame, & Anderson, 2000; Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003; Seo 
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et al., 2004; Smith, Huang, Ho, & Chen, 2006; Wallace & Chen, 2006; Wallace, Popp, 
& Mondore, 2006; Watson, Scott, Bishop, & Turnbeaugh, 2005). In addition, workers 
in several European countries have participated including those in the United 
Kingdom (Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & Tomas, 1998; Cheyne, Oliver, Tomas, & Cox, 
2002; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Mearns, Rundmo, Flin, Gordon, & 
Fleming, 2004; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001, 2003), France (Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, 
& Tomas, 1998; Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 1995), Spain (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997), 
Norway (Havold, 2005), Denmark (Nielsen, Carstensen, & Rasmussen, 2006), 
Portugal (Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004), and Finland (Varonen & Mattila, 2000). 
Filling out the list are participants from Australia (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; 
Fogarty, 2005; Fullarton & Stokes, 2007; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000), Israel (Katz-Navon, Neveh, & Stern, 2005; Naveh, Katz-
Navon, & Stern, 2005; Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003, 2005), Canada 
(Barling & Hutchinson, 2000; Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Kelloway, 
Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005), and Hong Kong (Siu, 
Phillips, & Leung, 2004). These studies are summarized in Table 1.  
 The types of industrial sectors studied shows similar diversity including 
manufacturing (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & Tomas, 1998; 
Cheyne, Oliver, Tomas, & Cox, 2002; Clarke, 2006b; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Griffin & Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Nielsen, Carstensen, & 
Rasmussen, 2006; Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003; Watson, Scott, Bishop, & 
Turnbeaugh, 2005; Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005; Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2002; 
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Zohar & Luria, 2005), construction (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Gillen, Baltz, 
Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002; Gillen, Faucett, Beaumont, & McLaughlin, 1997;  
Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003; Matilla, Rantanen, & Hytinnen, 1994; Siu, 
Phillips, & Leung, 2004), health care (Gershon, et al., 1998; Katz-Navon, Naveh, & 
Stern, 2005; Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 
2006; McGovern et al., 2000; Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005; Neal & Griffin, 
2006; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Schaefer & Moos, 1996), offshore oil rigs (Mearns, 
Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Mearns, Rundmo, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2004; 
Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001, 2003), shipping and transportation (Havold, 2005; 
Huang, Chen, Krauss, & Rodgers, 2004; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006), 
maintenance (Wallace & Chen, 2006; Zohar, 2002), high reliability industrial sectors 
such as naval pilots (Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 2003) and chemical 
processing (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), wood processing (Varonen & Mattila, 2000), 
airport ground handling (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997), utility workers (Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1998), clerical/service (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995), retail (DeJoy, Schaffer, 
Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004), road administration (Niskanen, 1994), military 
personnel (Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003), and several studies sampling across 
industrial sectors (Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 2006; Huang, Shaw, & Chen, 2004; 
Smith, Huang, Ho, & Chen, 2006; Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005). These 
studies are summarized in Table 2. The remainder of this review will focus on safety 
climate antecedents and outcomes. 
 
                                                                                                         Safety Climate 24 
Safety Climate Antecedents  
An examination of Zohar’s (2003a) multilevel model suggests that 
organizational climate and supervisory safety practices are the most proximal 
antecedents of unit-level safety climate. Distal antecedents include enforced safety 
policies, and characteristics of the job and supervisor, specifically, job tasks and 
technology, and supervisors’ goals, discretion, and leadership style. 
Organizational climate. Zohar and Luria (2005) showed that organizational 
climate and unit-level climate were positively related, but that the effect was 
moderated by the degree of routinization and formalization of work processes, which 
limits the discretion of unit-level supervisors. Several other authors have also 
documented the relationship between organizational climate and unit-level safety 
climate. DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, and Butts (2004) found that general 
organizational climate accounted for incremental variance in safety climate scores at 
the individual-level, after controlling for demographics. Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000) 
reported that organizational climate was positively related to safety climate at the 
individual-level. Wallace, Popp, and Mondore (2006) reported a strong relationship 
between foundation climates (organizational support and management-employee 
relations) and safety climate at the unit-level. Finally, Naveh, Katz-Navon, and Stern 
(2005) examined the relationships among four safety climate dimensions: suitability of 
safety procedures in daily work, safety information flow, managerial safety practices, 
and organizational priority for safety. They found that suitability of safety procedures 
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and safety information flow were directly related to the priority of safety, however, 
managerial safety practices were not.  
Supervisor safety practices. As discussed above, Zohar and Luria (2003) 
showed that increasing the frequency and intensity of manager’s monitoring of, and 
response to safety issues led to increases in unit-level safety climate. This study also 
showed the effect of safety-related feedback from upper level managers on unit-level 
managers’ behavior. Zohar and Luria showed that unit-level supervisors’ safety related 
interactions with workers increased when both the supervisors and the upper-level 
managers received feedback on the number of safety-related interactions and safety 
outcomes. 
Several other safety intervention studies also illustrate the effect of 
supervisors’ safety practices at the unit-level, and enforcement of safety policies at the 
organizational-level. Cooper and Phillips (2004) studied the effect of a behavioral 
safety initiative on safety climate and accidents. Workers were trained to monitor and 
record co-workers safe behaviors for one year. The initiative resulted in an increase in 
the level of safety climate perceptions and a reduction of accidents. Nielsen, 
Carstensen, and Rasmussen (2006) conducted a 3-year longitudinal study of the 
effects of an incident reporting scheme in two Danish metal production plants. 
Workers at the plants were required to report three types of incidents: lost-time 
injuries (more than one day of absence), minor injuries (less than one day of absence), 
and near misses. This information was then used to develop preventive measures. 
They found that the level of safety climate increased in both plants over the course of 
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the study. Finally, Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin (2001) used benchmarking as an 
intervention to improve the safety climate in nine North Sea oil and gas installations in 
a two-year longitudinal study. Safety climate levels showed considerable variability 
across installations during the first year, but then converged in the second year of the 
study.  
In summary, these studies suggest that a concern for safety by managers at all 
levels leads to improvements in safety climate. However, they do not detail the 
characteristics and behaviors of managers which lead to improvements in safety 
climate, or the specific mechanisms involved.  
Leadership style. Studies of the effect of leadership style on safety climate 
begin to fill these gaps. Barling, Loughlin, and Kelloway (2002) argued that each of 
the four components of transformational leadership (Bass, 1998) are relevant to 
occupational safety. Transformational leaders are high in idealized influence and can 
convey safety as a core value of the organization. Their ability to inspire others can 
motivate employees to work for the collective good. These leaders also provide 
intellectual stimulation which can lead to thinking in new ways and confronting old 
assumptions in order to improve safety. Lastly, individual consideration in their 
relationships with subordinates leads to active interest in employee welfare and well-
being.  They found that safety-specific transformational leadership by direct 
supervisors, safety consciousness (awareness of safety issues and knowledge of safe 
behaviors), and role overload all predicted safety climate at the individual-level. 
Similarly, Kelloway, Mullen, and Francis (2006) examined the effects of safety-
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specific leadership style (transformational vs. passive) in direct supervisors, and safety 
consciousness on safety climate at the individual level. As predicted, transformational 
leadership was positively associated with safety climate, and passive leadership was 
negatively associated with safety climate. Safety consciousness partially mediated 
these effects.  
Mullen and Kelloway (2009) found that safety-specific transformational 
leadership training had affected both leaders and workers. Leaders showed an increase 
in safety attitudes, intentions to promote safety, and in self-efficacy related to their 
ability to improve safety. Workers showed an increase in safety participation 
behaviors and safety climate perceptions. In a similar study, Kines, Anderson, 
Spangenberg, Mikkelsen, and Zohar (2010) provided construction supervisors with 
training to increase the proportion of safety-related communications with workers 
after finding that only 6-16% of supervisor-worker communications had a safety-
related component. Following training, safety-related communications between 
supervisors and workers increased along with workers’ safety behaviors.  
Receiving safety-related messages from more than one leader also appears to 
have a greater affect on safety than receiving only a single-source safety message. 
Newman and Griffin (2008) examined individual and leader effects on driving 
accidents. On the individual level, drivers’ safety motivation was negatively related to 
motor vehicle accidents. At the leader level, drivers’ perceptions of fleet managers’ 
safety values had a larger effect on drivers’ safety motivation than perceptions of their 
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direct supervisor’s safety values. However, perceptions of supervisors’ and fleet 
managers’ safety values interacted to increase safety motivation in drivers. 
These studies show the importance of group-level managers’ active efforts to 
improve safety through valuing, encouraging, coaching, and rewarding safe behaviors 
in subordinates. Managers who are able to convince employees that safety is important 
to the organization and the work-team members, and motivate them to conduct work 
in a safe manner tend to foster a more positive safety climate at the unit-level. Safety 
climate leads to more safety motivation and knowledge, safer working behaviors, and 
reduced accidents and injuries. 
In addition some researchers have examined the relationship between leader-
member exchange (LMX) and safety climate. High quality LMX relationships are 
characterized by loyalty, positive affect, mutual contributions toward work goals, and 
professional respect, between supervisors and subordinates (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). 
Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) investigate the relationship between perceived 
organizational support (POS; Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson, & Sowa, 1986) 
and LMX on accidents, as mediated by supervisors’ levels of safety communication 
and safety commitment. They reasoned that both POS and LMX would be positively 
related to the level of safety communications by supervisors, as the former conveys 
the organization’s valuing of employees and the latter, by definition, involves open 
and constructive communication. Taking a social exchange perspective (Blau, 1964) 
they predicted that both would invoke the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) with 
POS leading to more pro-organizational behaviors and LMX leading to more pro-
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leader behaviors. Their path analysis confirmed that both POS and LMX were 
negatively related to accidents, with the relationship being fully mediated by the levels 
of direct-supervisors’ safety communication and safety commitment. They concluded 
that the backing of upper management is needed for direct supervisors to successfully 
convey both organizational and supervisor support to their subordinates, and improve 
safety outcomes. 
Similarly, Hofmann, Morgeson, and Geras (2003) examined the effect of 
safety climate on the relationship between LMX, safety citizenship role definitions, 
and safety citizenship behaviors. Again, taking the social exchange perspective they 
predicted that high quality LMX relationships would increase subordinates’ desire to 
reciprocate with leader-valued behaviors. When supervisors work to create a positive 
safety climate their subordinates are more likely to view safe behaviors as important 
and valued.  The authors found that safety climate moderated the relationship between 
LMX and safety citizenship role definitions. When the level of safety climate was low 
LMX had no effect on safety citizenship role definitions. However, when the level of 
safety climate was high, subordinates in high-quality LMX relationships adopted more 
safety citizenship role definitions than subordinates in low-quality LMX relationships. 
As predicted, safety citizenship role definitions were positively related to safety 
citizenship behaviors. The authors concluded that safety climate defines important 
organizational behaviors and LMX predicts the degree of subordinate reciprocity. 
These studies show the effect of positive social exchange relationships on safety 
motivation. Managers who form high-quality LMX relationships with subordinates are 
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more likely to also facilitate a positive safety climate, which increases subordinates’ 
motivation and ability (knowledge) to work safely. 
Zohar (2003b) suggests that the same values upon which reciprocity is based–
trust, openness, loyalty, and positive affect–also encourage leaders to focus on safety 
rather than short-term production pressures. In other words, the values and behaviors 
common high-quality LMX relationships lead to a positive safety climate. In addition, 
recent studies highlight the importance of trust in leaders for safety outcomes. Conchie 
and Burns (2009) found that workers’ trust in different information sources about 
safety were due to different factors. Trust in project managers, safety managers, 
government sources, and co-workers was based on the accuracy of the source. In 
contrast, trust in supervisors was based on demonstrations of caring. This has 
implications for the delivery of training, which the authors suggest is largely 
performed by supervisors. In a similar study, Conchie and Donald (2009) found that 
safety-specific trust in leaders moderated the relationship between safety-specific 
transformational leadership and workers safety citizenship behaviors. At high and 
moderate levels of trust safety-specific transformational leadership significantly 
increased workers’ safety citizenship behaviors, but not at low levels of trust. Finally, 
Luria (2010) found that trust in management was negatively related to injuries and 
positively related to safety climate strength and level. 
Zohar does not consider the effect of individual difference variables in 
supervisors on the development of safety climate. However, relevant to this 
dissertation, there is some evidence that individual differences affect the development 
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of LMX relationships. For example, the match between supervisor and subordinate 
positive and negative affectivity was positively related to the development and quality 
of LMX relationships (Bauer & Green, 1996; Engle & Lord, 1997). Similarly, in their 
review, Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) conclude that “(the) development of LMX 
relationships is influenced by characteristics and behaviors of leaders and members 
and occurs through a role-making process” (p. 229). This suggests that the same 
individual differences in supervisors which lead to high quality social exchange 
relationships with subordinates are likely to contribute to the formation of a positive 
safety climate. 
The work environment. Characteristics of the work environment have also been 
found to affect safety climate. For example, consider high reliability process industries 
(e.g. nuclear energy and chemical processing industries) which have little room for 
error. Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, and Ciaverelli (2003) compared safety climate 
perceptions between naval aviators and health care workers. They reasoned that naval 
aviation is a high-reliability process industry. Therefore, naval aviators should report 
stronger safety climate perceptions than health care workers. The authors counted the 
number of problematic responses–those that suggest a lack of safety climate–for the 
two groups of workers. In addition, the authors divided the health care workers into 
groups based on hospital department, e.g. emergency room, operating room. As 
predicted, Gaba et al. found that only 5.6% of the aviators’ responses were 
problematic versus 17.5% of hospital workers’ in general and 20.9% of hospital 
workers’ in high hazard departments such as the emergency room and operating room. 
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Similarly, Zacharatos, Barling, and Iverson (2005) studied safety in high-performance 
work systems, which refers to an interconnected set of human resource practices (e.g. 
recruitment, selection, development, motivating, and retaining employees, and 
compensation contingent on safe performance) with the emphasis on employees as a 
primary competitive advantage. They found a high-performance work system showed 
a strong positive relationship with safety climate at the individual level, as well as trust 
in management. Finally, Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, and Vaccaro (2002) examined 
the safety climate perceptions of construction workers who had experienced a non-
fatal fall in a cross-sectional study. After dividing the injured workers into union and 
non-union groups, differences in safety climate perceptions in the two groups were 
examined. Overall, union workers reported more positive safety climate perceptions 
than non-union workers. 
The work environment is not limited to the physical characteristics of the 
workspace or work processes. Social aspects of the work environment can also have 
an effect on safety climate. For example, Luria (2008) found that safety climate 
strength was influenced by both leadership style and social cohesion in the work 
groups as group members work together to understand their leader’s priorities. 
Similarly, Zohar and Tenne-Gazit (2008) found that the relationship between 
transformational leadership and safety climate strength was partially mediated by the 
proportion of workers who engage in work-related social exchanges, and by the 
proportion of workers who have established friendships. The proportion of friendships 
in workgroups also had a positive direct effect on safety climate strength. Finally, 
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Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Hershcovis, and Stride (2008) found that the relationship 
between perceived organizational support for safety and worker’s safety voice (being 
willing to talk about safety problems) was fully mediated by workers’ perceptions of 
co-workers support for safety. 
Summary of safety climate antecedents. Taken together, these studies confirm 
the antecedent relationships hypothesized in Zohar’s (2003a) multilevel model. To wit, 
organizational climate and supervisor safety practices are proximal antecedents of 
unit-level safety climate. In addition, distal antecedents such as immediate superior’s 
goals, supervisor discretion level, job characteristics, and leadership style affect unit-
level safety climate through their effect on supervisor safety practices. Although 
Zohar’s model does not specify an effect for individual differences in supervisors, 
such differences could well have an effect on supervisor goals and leadership style. 
Personality traits which help supervisors form positive social relationships with 
subordinates and convey personal and organizational concern for workers’ welfare and 
well-being are likely to result in positive social exchanges and increase subordinates’ 
motivation to reciprocate. As Hofmann, Morgeson, and Geras (2003) suggest, the 
relationship between supervisors and subordinates provides the motivation to 
reciprocate, and a focus on safety defines the behaviors valued by the organization. 
Safety Climate Outcomes 
According to Zohar’s (2003a) multilevel model, organizational climate and 
safety climate lead to behavior-outcome expectancies, safety behaviors, 
accident/injury incidence, and health outcomes. As mentioned previously, safety 
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climate is considered a leading indicator of the state of safety in an organization. In 
other words, it should be predictive of expectancies, behaviors, and “hard” outcomes. 
Indeed, several studies have documented a relationship between safety climate and 
accidents (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Mearns, 
Whitaker, & Flin, 2003, 2003; Seo et al., 2004; Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004; 
Varonen & Mattila, 2000; Wallace et al., 2006; Zohar, 2000). Regarding injuries, 
Hofmann and Mark (2006) found a relationship between safety climate at the unit-
level and back injuries in nurses. Gillen et al. (2002) found that individual-level safety 
climate accounted for unique variance in injury severity. Lastly, Huang, Chen, Krauss, 
and Rogers (2004) reported that the quality of the execution of corporate safety 
policies was negatively related to injury risk and injury incidence. Four studies 
reported a relationship between safety climate and near misses (Seo et al., 2004), 
safety events (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006), and safety incidents 
(Zacharatos et al., 2005). Unfortunately, most of these studies did not aggregate safety 
climate perceptions to the unit-level, and a variety of safety climate measures were 
used. Likewise, most of these studies are cross-sectional in nature leaving causal 
relationships unclear. In her meta-analysis Clarke (2006a) concluded that safety 
climate shows a small and unreliable relationship with accidents, and only predicts 
accidents in prospective (longitudinal) studies. She also found that safety climate was 
strongly related with safety behaviors (compliance and participation; Griffin & Neal, 
2000), and that these safety behaviors showed small but reliable relationships with 
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safety outcomes. Finally, she concluded that the relationship between safety behaviors 
and safety outcomes was consistent across settings. 
Several other studies have also found that safety climate is related to a variety 
of safety behaviors including PPE compliance (McGovern et al., 2000), self-reported 
at risk behaviors (Watson et al., 2005), medication errors (Hofmann & Mark, 2006), 
treatment errors (Naveh et al., 2005), unsafe behaviors (Clarke, 2006b), a variety of 
driving behaviors including driver distraction, traffic violations, driver errors, and pre-
trip vehicle maintenance (Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2006), and, safety compliance 
behaviors and safety participation behaviors (Clarke, 2006a).   
In addition, safety climate shows relationships with a number of perceptions, 
attitudes, cognitions, and feelings. Rundmo (2001) found safety climate was 
negatively related to the acceptability of safety rule violations. Similarly, Watson et al. 
(2005) found safety climate was negatively related to the perceived safety of the work 
environment. Safety climate is positively related to job satisfaction (Hofmann & Mark, 
2006; Siu et al., 2004), safety knowledge and safety motivation (Neal, et al., 2000; 
Neal & Griffin, 2006), individual responsibility for safety (Cheyne, et al., 1998, 2002), 
and prevention focus (Wallace & Chen, 2006). Finally, three studies have found 
relationships between safety climate and psychological and/or physical strain (Fogarty, 
2005; Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003; Siu, et al., 2004). 
Summary of Safety Climate Outcomes 
As predicted by Zohar’s (2003a) model, these studies show that safety climate 
is related to accidents, injuries, near misses, and safety-related events/incidents. In 
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addition, safety climate is related to a variety of safety behaviors, attitudes, 
perceptions, cognitions, and feelings of physical and psychological strain. The weight 
of the evidence supports the notion of safety climate as a leading indicator of the state 
of safety in an organization or work group. In other words, organizations can use 
safety climate to determine if and where safety improvement interventions are needed, 
and to assess the effectiveness of safety interventions whether they occur at the 
organizational level or the workgroup level.  
Safety climate studies also point to the importance of the unit-level supervisor 
in the development of the workgroup safety climate. Zohar and colleagues (2000; 
Zohar & Luria, 2005) have shown within-workgroup consistency and between-group 
variability in safety climate perceptions. They have also shown that certain boundary 
conditions such as organizational climate and routinization/formalization of work 
decrease supervisors’ discretion in the implementation of unit-level safety climate. In 
addition, studies of leadership styles and leader-member exchange illustrate the 
importance of the unit-level supervisor (Barling, et al., 2002; Conchie & Donald, 2009; 
Hofmann, & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Kelloway, et al., 
2006; Kines, et al., 2010; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; Newman & Griffin, 2008). A 
safety-specific transformation leadership style leads to group-level managers’ active 
efforts to improve safety through valuing, encouraging, coaching, and rewarding safe 
behaviors in subordinates. Similarly, managers who form high-quality LMX 
relationships with subordinates are more likely to also facilitate a positive safety 
climate. High-quality LMX relationships also increase subordinates’ desire to 
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reciprocate, and a positive safety climate defines which behaviors are valued by the 
supervisor and the organization, leading to safety-related behaviors by subordinates. 
Finally, behaviors associated with a transactional leadership style such as monitoring, 
providing feedback and reinforcement, modeling and coaching are also related to 
safety behaviors in subordinates (Kines, et al., 2010; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; 
Maierhofer, Griffin, & Sheehan, 2000) and positive safety climates (Zohar, 2003b). 
Considered together, the research suggests that unit-level supervisors are a crux in the 
development of workgroup safety climate. The effect of organizational-level safety 
climate on workers behaviors is mediated, at least partially, by unit-level supervisors 
who implement safety policies and procedures, and in doing so convey the relative 
importance of safety to their subordinates. However, individual differences in 
supervisors and workers that affect safety at work are not accounted for in Zohar’s 
model. In the next chapter I will review the literature on individual differences and 
safety. 
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Chapter III 
Individual Differences and Accidents 
Given the large economic and social costs of work-related accidents and 
injuries it is not surprising that organizations strive to reduce them (Barling & Frone, 
2004). Many of these efforts have been directed towards the four levels of hazard 
control: hazard removal, engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal 
protective equipment (Kaminski, 2001). Even though some researchers have suggested 
that 90% of accidents can be attributed to human error (McKenna, 1983), the study of 
the relationship between individual differences and accidents and injuries has received 
less attention. Rather, most safety researchers have focused on organizational 
influences to further reduce the costs of occupational accidents and injuries (Shannon, 
Mayr, & Haines, 1997). Landy and Conte (2004) describe the personnel approach to 
reducing accidents and injuries. This approach involves finding individual differences 
related to accidents and injuries and using that information when making decisions 
about hiring and job placement. 
Hansen (1988) discusses a number of individual difference variables that could 
be related to accidents and injuries. These include physical characteristics of workers, 
education, marital status, perceptual and mental abilities, and personality traits. In their 
model of factors that contribute to workplace accidents, Sanders and McCormick 
(1993) suggest that a variety of worker characteristics mediate the effects of 
organizational factors, the physical environment, equipment design, the design of 
work, and the social-psychological environment on unsafe behavior and accidents. 
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They list a variety of worker characteristics including ability level, personality, 
motivation, and off-the-job pressures and distractions. Other authors (e.g. George, 
1992) suggest that individual differences like personality traits moderate the effects of 
the situation on individual states and behaviors. 
This chapter will review the research on a number of different individual 
difference variables that are related to accidents and injuries in the workplace. This 
review will begin by examining the constructs of accident proneness and differential 
accident liability. Following this, research on the relationship between several 
individual difference variables (locus of control, impulsivity, trait affect, cognitive 
failures, and personality traits) and accidents and injuries will be reviewed. Next, a 
review of the bandwidth-fidelity dilemma leads to an argument for trait-level 
predictors of safety outcomes. The focus then shifts to studies of individual differences 
in managers and workers, and their relationship with important organizational 
outcomes including accidents and injuries.  Next, I review the research on proactive 
personality (Bateman & Crant, 1993) and argue that managers with a proactive 
personality will produce better safety outcomes in their work groups than those 
without. The chapter concludes with a discussion of trait-level personality variables in 
supervisors and workers that should relate to safety outcomes. 
Accident Proneness and Differential Accident Involvement 
Safety researchers began studying accident proneness in the early 20th century 
(Greenwood & Woods, 1919; as cited in McKenna, 1983) and over the years a variety 
of definitions have been put forth. In general the construct of accident proneness 
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assumes that certain individuals are more likely to have accidents than others (Landy 
& Conte, 2004). Hansen (1988) described five assumptions common to most 
definitions of the construct: a) Accident proneness is a personality trait or syndrome; 
most researchers have considered it to be a unitary trait; b) Accident proneness is 
innate or inherent; c) Accident proneness is stable across time; d) Accident proneness 
causes workers to have accidents, and; e) Accident prone workers will have multiple 
accidents. However, the history of accident proneness is as controversial as it is long, 
and today it is no longer considered a viable construct. According to McKenna (1983) 
the reasons for this are threefold. First, accident proneness is based on flawed 
statistical reasoning. Secondly, accident proneness lacks an accepted definition. 
Finally, and most importantly, the assumptions underlying the construct have received 
little empirical support. I will address each of these concerns in turn. 
Greenwood and Wood (1919) put forth the statistical reasoning to demonstrate 
the existence of accident prone individuals. They reasoned that if all workers have an 
equal probability of having an accident then accidents would be described by a 
Poisson distribution. However, if the probability of having an accident was not 
equivalent across workers then accidents would be distributed as a negative binomial 
distribution, which usually occurs. The problem lies in the fact that other variables can 
result in a negative binomial distribution of accidents. For example, non-personal 
factors such as exposure to risk, biases in reporting, and even prior accident 
involvement (McKenna, 1983). Therefore, the fact that accidents are described by the 
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negative binomial distribution does not necessarily suggest that an individual 
difference between workers is responsible. 
The second problem with the construct of the accident prone personality is the 
variety of definitions and assumptions in the different statements of the theory 
(Hansen, 1988; McKenna, 1983). For example, sometimes accident proneness is 
viewed as a unitary trait, while at other times it is thought to involve multiple 
psychological factors. In addition, accident proneness presents a tautology. Accident 
proneness is defined by a pattern of accident involvement on the one hand, while at 
the same time it is viewed as the cause of accidents. This type of circular reasoning 
tells us nothing about how workers with an accident prone personality differ from 
those without. 
Finally, there is little empirical support for the construct of accident proneness. 
McKenna (1983) reviewed the research and described several negative findings. For 
example, if individuals have an accident prone personality, then there should be a high 
correlation between the number of accidents they suffer at two points in time. 
However, in these studies the correlations are usually low and do not account for 
differential risk exposure. Accident proneness is also thought to be a general 
characteristic which will manifest itself across situations. In other words, people who 
are accident prone at work will be so at home, and this will be reflected in the number 
of accidents. Once again, the limited data do not support this assumption. Accident 
proneness has also been viewed as innate and immutable. There is little support for 
this hypothesis and it can lead organizations to neglect other causes of accidents, like 
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the work environment, which can be modified. Finally, the idea that most accidents 
are caused by a few people has been used to support the accident proneness construct. 
McKenna suggests that this is not necessarily true, and is in fact likely to occur by 
chance. 
Despite these problems with the accident prone personality, researchers have 
discovered that some individual differences are associated with higher accident rates. 
McKenna (1983) suggests that researchers focus on differential accident involvement, 
a construct which requires fewer assumptions, is less judgmental, and is easier to 
define. Essentially, differential accident involvement entails using psychological tests 
to predict accidents. It allows for changes over time and circumstances, unlike 
accident proneness which was thought to be stable. For example, a worker going 
through a divorce may have a higher probability of being in an accident, but only 
while the stressor is present. This allows researchers to study both personal and non-
personal factors related to accident involvement. The focus of this review will now 
turn to the individual difference variables that have been shown to be related to 
accidents. 
Individual Differences and Accidents 
Researchers have examined the relationship between a number of individual 
difference variables and accidents. These include locus of control, impulsivity, trait 
affect, cognitive failures, and personality traits. In this section I will briefly review 
these lines of research while focusing mostly on the Big Five personality factors and 
traits. 
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Locus of control. A number of researchers have examined the relationship 
between locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and accidents. Mayer and Treat (1977) found 
that locus of control was more external for participants in their high accident group 
than their low accident group. Jones and Wuebker (1985) developed the Safety Locus 
of Control scale from Rotter’s original scale. They found that externals reported more 
accidents than internals and those who scored in the middle range. In their meta-
analysis, Arthur, Barrett, and Alexander (1991) reported that internal locus of control 
was negatively related to accidents. Similarly, in his review Hansen (1988) concluded 
that locus of control was related to accidents. People with an external locus of control 
are not likely to believe that they can do anything to prevent accidents, will expend 
little effort to do so, and should have a higher probability of having an accident. 
Conversely, people with an internal locus of control are likely to believe that they can 
prevent accidents, will expend effort to prevent accidents (behave safely), and are less 
likely to have an accident. 
Impulsivity. A smaller number of researchers have examined the relationship 
between impulsivity and accidents. Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) present a rational 
for the hypothesized relationship. They argue that one tendency of impulsive 
individuals is to discount consequences which are not immediate. In the safety arena, 
impulsive individuals will tend to discount the negative consequences (i.e. accidents, 
injuries) of their unsafe behaviors, as well as the benefits of safe practices. Dahlen, 
Martin, Ragan, and Kuhlman (2005) found that impulsivity, sensation seeking, and 
boredom proneness accounted for unique variance in predicting unsafe driving 
Individual Differences and Safety 44 
behaviors. Similarly, in his review Hansen (1988) concluded that impulsivity is 
consistently related to accidents.  
Trait affect. Iverson and Erwin (1997) examined the relationships between 
positive and negative affect and occupational injuries while controlling for 
demographics and quality of work life factors. Positive affectivity refers to the 
disposition to perceive situations in a positive and enthusiastic manner (George, 1989; 
Judge, 1993). On the other hand, negative affectivity refers to the tendency to perceive 
situations and experiences negatively, and to experience negative emotions (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). In addition, self-report ratings of positive and negative 
affectivity tend to be stable over time (Levin & Stokes, 1989) and are thus considered 
dispositional or trait-like. 
People with high scores on positive affectivity tend to have more self-efficacy 
and to seek more active control over their environments (George, 1989; George & 
Brief, 1992), which should lead to more task engagement and fewer injuries. In 
addition, people high in positive affectivity tend to be more systematic in their 
decision making (Staw & Barsade, 1993) which should lead to more in-depth and 
careful appraisals of situations and fewer accidents. On the other hand, people high in 
negative affectivity tend to have more attention lapses and distractibility on the job 
(Hansen, 1989) which should make them less engaged in work tasks and more 
susceptible to accidents. They are also less likely to seek control over their 
environment (Judge, 1993) and more likely to engage in emotion-focused coping 
(Parkes, 1986; 1990), which should increase their accident potential. 
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In their study, Iverson and Erwin (1997) found that positive affectivity was 
negatively related to occupational injuries, while negative affectivity was positively 
related to injuries. Their study also shows the importance of the work environment in 
predicting injuries. Their best predictor of injury in this blue collar sample was work 
routinization, which showed a strong negative relationship. Supervisor and co-worker 
support also showed inverse relationships with injuries. The authors suggest that even 
though extreme extraversion is associated with injuries, some characteristics of 
extraversion such as enthusiasm and self-efficacy may help prevent occupational 
injuries. 
Cognitive failure. Research on the measurement and correlates of cognitive 
failure has increased over the past twenty years. Reason (1988) discusses two classes 
of failures. The first are planning failures in which the individual chooses the wrong 
course of action. The second are execution or cognitive failures in which the 
individual fails to correctly perform the intended action. Reason suggests that people 
who experience a high level of cognitive failures may have a rigid attentional focus 
which prevents them from processing information in novel or dynamic situations. 
Cognitive failures have been defined as cognitively-based mistakes or failures of 
performance of an action that a person is normally capable of performing (Martin, 
1983; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002). The tendency for cognitive failures is usually 
viewed as dispositional or trait-like (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) 
and is expected to vary across individuals.  
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Common examples of cognitive failures include celebrating when the opposing 
team scores (Norman, 1981), forgetting appointments (Larson & Merritt, 1991), and 
pouring cream into coffee when the customer requested it black. Reason (1984) 
suggests that cognitive failures tend to occur when tasks are automated or when a 
person’s attention is distracted by internal or external stimuli. Similarly, Robertson, 
Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, and Yiend (1997) suggests that cognitive failures occur 
under conditions of boredom, worry, or divided attention. 
Broadbent, et al. (1982) developed the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) 
to measure the frequency of errors in three areas: perception, memory and motor 
functions. The authors suggested that the CFQ measures a general cognitive factor that 
includes perceptual, memory and motor functions. However, other researchers have 
found the CFQ consists of several factors (e.g. Larson, Alderton, Neideffer, & 
Underhill, 1997). Wallace, Kass, and Stanny (2002) conducted a principle components 
analysis of CFQ scores and found four internally consistent factors: memory, 
distractibility (attention errors), blunders (execution errors), and memory for names. 
A number of correlates of CFQ scores have been reported in the literature. 
Cognitive failures are negatively related to memory performance (Martin, 1983) and 
sustained attention (Robertson et al., 1997). Wallace, Kass, and Stanny (2002) found 
that the memory factor of the CFQ predicted performance in “go” situations in which 
a response is required at the correct time. They suggest that people who score high on 
the memory factor are less likely to respond when necessary. Cognitive failures are 
also positively related to absentmindedness (Reason & Lucas, 1984), self-
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consciousness and social anxiety (Houston, 1989), and, boredom proneness and 
daytime sleepiness (Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002; Wallace, Vodanovich, & Restino, 
2003).  
A few studies have examined the relationship between cognitive failures and 
accidents. Larson and Merritt (1991) found a positive relationship between cognitive 
failures and driving accidents after controlling for the most extreme “bad” driving 
records. Larson et al. (1997) found a positive correlation between cognitive failures 
and work accidents in military personnel. Similarly, Wallace and Vodanovich (2003b) 
reported that the CFQ Blunder factor predicted automobile accidents, work accidents, 
and job performance. Wallace and Vodanovich (2003a) found that cognitive failures 
were positively correlated with unsafe behaviors and accidents, and negatively 
correlated with conscientiousness. In addition, cognitive failures accounted for unique 
variance over conscientiousness in predicting unsafe behaviors and accidents. Finally, 
they found that cognitive failures moderated the relationship between 
conscientiousness, and unsafe behaviors and accidents. In their sample, the impact of 
cognitive failures on unsafe behaviors and accidents was greater for individuals low in 
conscientiousness relative to those high in conscientiousness. This suggests that 
people who experience more cognitive failures also engage in more off task behavior 
which leads to unsafe behaviors and accidents. 
Demographic variables. Demographic variables are usually measured by 
researchers to describe their sample and also to use as control variables in analyses. 
Hansen (1988) suggests personality researchers should control for age, experience and 
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gender when trying to predict accidents. Typically, demographic variables do not 
show significant relationships with accidents and injuries (e.g. Arthur, Barrett, & 
Alexander, 1991; Arthur & Graziano, 1996; Hansen, 1989; Iverson & Erwin, 1997). 
However, there are exceptions. For example, Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, and Kuhlman 
(2005) found that women received fewer moving violation tickets than men, and 
younger drivers reported more risky driving than older drivers. Iverson and Erwin 
(1997) reported that gender was negatively related to accidents—women had fewer—
but age, education, and tenure were not. Finally, Hansen (1989) reported that accident 
risk fully mediated the relationship between tenure and accidents. The most common 
control variables used in studies of individual differences and accidents are age, 
gender, education, and job tenure. 
Big Five personality factors. Industrial psychologists have long been interested 
in the relationship between personality traits and work outcomes (see Barrick & 
Mount, 1991). Barrick and Mount (1995) describe the prototypical characteristics of 
the Big Five factors. Extraversion is characterized by talkativeness, sociability, 
assertiveness, adventurousness, and high energy level. Agreeableness encompasses 
cooperativeness, caring for others, flexibility, trust in and tolerance for others, 
courtesy, and cheerfulness. Conscientiousness refers to taking responsibility, acting in 
an orderly and well-planned manner, being careful, perseverance, and a hard work 
achievement-orientation. Neuroticism is characterized by emotionality, tension, 
anxiety, nervousness, excitability, anger, and apprehension. Openness to Experience 
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refers to imagination, artistic sensitivity, intellectual curiosity, independence, and 
broad interests. 
However, less attention has been paid to personality traits as predictors of 
occupational safety. For example, Arthur and Graziano (1996) examined the 
relationship between Five Factor Model (McCrae & Costa, 1987; Goldberg, 1992, 
1993) personality traits and driving accidents in two samples. They found that 
conscientiousness showed small but reliable inverse relationships with at-fault driving 
accidents and moving violations. In addition, when participants were dichotomized 
into accident and no-accident groups, the latter had significantly higher 
conscientiousness scores. Similarly, in their study of undergraduates, Cellar, Nelson, 
and Yorke (2001) found that conscientiousness was inversely related to both not-at-
fault accidents (r = -.14) and total accidents (r = -.16). Agreeableness was also 
inversely related to total accidents (r = -.13). In addition, they found that 
conscientiousness was the only significant predictor of not-at-fault and total accidents. 
However, the effect size was small (R2 ~ .02). Finally, Wallace and Chen (2006) found 
that conscientiousness was positively related with safety performance, but the 
relationship was fully mediated by regulatory focus. The same mediated relationship 
was found for production focus as well.  
Two meta-analyses (Clarke & Robertson, 2005; 2008) examined the 
relationships between Big Five personality factors and accident involvement. The best 
predictor of accident involvement in these two studies was low agreeableness. 
Estimated true score correlation coefficients between low agreeableness and accidents 
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ranged from ρ = .26 - .44. More importantly, low agreeableness was the only Big Five 
factor determined to be valid and generalizable in both meta-analyses. In addition, 
estimated true score correlations for low conscientiousness ranged from ρ = .27 - .31 
(valid and generalizable in 2005 but not 2008). The authors also reported that 
extraversion was a valid and generalizable predictor of traffic accidents (2005), and 
neuroticism was a valid and generalizable predictor of accidents, depending on the 
situation (2008). In addition, a meta-analysis by Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and 
Burke (2009) showed that conscientiousness was significantly (ρ = .16) related to 
safety motivation. 
Other personality taxonomies. Lardent (1991) examined differences in 16PF 
(Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1980) profiles between military fighter pilots who had 
crashed and those who had not. Pilots who crashed were more conscientious and self-
sufficient, and less suspicious, shrewd, and tense. Lardent suggested that the unique 
personality profiles of fighter pilots and their strict adherence to within-group norms 
might explain the counterintuitive relationship between conscientiousness and crashes. 
A number of studies have also examined the relationships between the Eysenkian 
personality traits of extroversion and neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), as 
measured at the national level, and accidents. Several studies have found positive 
relationships between neuroticism and extroversion, and accidents (Lajunen, 2001; 
Lester, 2000; Lynn & Hampson, 1975). Ozkan and Lajunen (2007) found extroversion 
measured at the national level was positively related to traffic fatalities. Finally, in his 
review Hansen (1988) concluded that extroversion was strongly related to accidents.  
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These studies document reliable relationships between conscientiousness, 
extroversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, and accidents at the level of the individual 
worker. However, that has not always been the case. For example, Salgado (2002) in 
his meta-analysis did not find any of the Big Five factors were predictive of accidents. 
In addition, the bivariate correlations between personality traits and accidents are often 
small (e.g. r ~ |.15|), and there are a number of environmental and demographic 
variables that moderate the relationships. Nevertheless, it does appear that people who 
score high on conscientiousness tend to have fewer accidents, while people who score 
high on extroversion and neuroticism tend to have more accidents. 
To summarize, the literature on individual differences and occupational safety 
suggests that individual workers characterized by conscientiousness, agreeableness, 
internal locus of control, positive affectivity and low cognitive failures are least likely 
to experience accidents and injuries at work. Such individuals are able to focus on 
their work tasks, believe they can affect their environment and make efforts to do so, 
and are not easily distracted by external or internal stimuli. On the other hand, 
individuals characterized by high extroversion and neuroticism, low agreeableness, 
external locus of control, negative affectivity, and high cognitive failures are more 
likely to have accidents and injuries. These individuals have difficulty focusing on 
their work tasks, are easily distracted by external and internal stimuli, and tend not to 
believe they can affect their environment. The negative effects of these characteristics 
are likely to be exacerbated by stressful work situations such as increased production 
pressure or negative social interactions with supervisors and co-workers. Demographic 
Individual Differences and Safety 52 
variables are not usually related to accidents or injuries, although there are a few 
exceptions in the literature. In the next section I will discuss bandwidth-fidelity 
considerations when predicting behavior, leading to an argument for the use of trait-
level predictors of safety outcomes for supervisors and workers. 
Bandwidth-Fidelity Considerations in the Prediction of Behavior 
The bandwidth-fidelity dilemma (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) refers to the 
choice to measure either a single narrowly defined trait, or a more broadly defined 
factor such as the Big Five factors. The main concern for I/O psychologists is which 
level of measurement specificity leads to better prediction of job performance, and 
facilitates an explanation of the mechanisms of behavior and the development of 
theories of job performance (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996). Broad traits such as the Big 
Five have high cross-situational reliability and predictive validity (Barrick & Mount, 
1991; Stewart, 1999; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991) and they have been used 
successfully to predict broad criteria like overall job performance. It is possible for 
narrow traits to show higher predictive validity than broad factors if the unique 
variance of the narrow traits is related to the performance criteria of interest. However, 
Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) suggest that trait specific variance is not usually related 
to job performance either within or across situations. Therefore, they argue that when 
predicting overall job performance (a broad criterion) factor-level measures are likely 
to be more useful than trait-level measures.  
Another advantage of broad measures relative to narrow measures is higher 
reliability. There is a direct relationship between internal consistency (coefficient α) 
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and the length of the scale. In general, factor-level scales are longer than trait-level 
scales and show higher reliability coefficients. However, several authors have argued 
that the increased reliability of factor scales must be balanced against the loss of trait-
specific variance which might be predictive of the criterion (Ashton, 1998; Paunonen, 
1998; Schneider, Hough, & Dunnette, 1996). In other words, depending on the 
criterion, aggregating trait-level scores to the factor-level may dilute or cancel out 
specific trait-level variance shared with the criterion (Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999), 
thereby reducing predictive validity. Psychometrically, reliability only defines the 
upper limit of validity, but does not ensure validity (Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 
2007). 
Typically, the choice of the bandwidth of a predictor depends on the bandwidth 
of the criterion. In general, the best prediction is expected when the bandwidths of the 
predictor and the criterion match (Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971; Hogan & Roberts, 1996; 
Paunonen & Ashton, 2001a). Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) argue that most criteria 
used to predict work-related outcomes are based on broad samples of behavior 
gathered over time, for example, supervisor ratings of overall job performance. 
Therefore, a broad bandwidth predictor will usually be preferable. In addition, 
choosing predictors based on theory, empirical results, or a job analysis should 
improve validity even more (Hogan & Roberts, 1996). However, not everyone agrees; 
some authors have concluded that homogeneous traits are preferable when predicting 
work-related outcomes. 
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Paunonen, Rothstein, and Jackson (1999) agree with Ones and Viswesvaran 
that predicting broad, complex criteria may require a broad bandwidth measure. 
However, rather than use the Big Five factors, they advocate using several trait-level 
predictors, chosen on theoretical or rational grounds, and combining them into a 
composite using cross-validated regression weights. For example, Schneider et al. 
(1996) note that integrity and customer service orientation are composites of narrow 
traits that show increased predictive validity over the Big Five factors. Others have 
suggested that the best predictive validity will be achieved when combining trait-
specific variance with factor-level variance (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001a; Stewart, 
1999).  
Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) also discuss practical considerations in the 
choice of predictors. They argue that even if a narrow measure shows incremental 
validity over a broad measure in predicting job performance, the utility of the narrow 
measure will depend on how well it predicts performance for a wide variety of jobs. 
Since they assume that the validity of narrow predictors will not generalize across jobs 
they conclude that with limited resources in mind, organizations may not find it cost-
effective to pursue increased predictive validity for a small set of jobs.  
In summary, there is some disagreement over the usefulness of trait-level 
personality variables in predicting organizational outcomes. Logically, there is no 
reason that a broad bandwidth predictor cannot predict a narrow bandwidth criterion, 
or vice versa. In this same vein, Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) suggest that bandwidth 
and fidelity are not always on opposite ends of the same continuum. Meta-analytic 
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studies (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991) provide evidence 
that broad bandwidth measures are good predictors of overall job performance (a 
broad bandwidth criteria). However, despite the wide spread use of overall job 
performance as a criterion in selection and performance evaluation, there may be other 
criteria of interest to organizations. For example, Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) 
suggest that trait-level measures are likely to be useful in a developmental or training 
context. There is considerable agreement among researchers that the bandwidth of the 
predictor and criterion should match (e.g. Hogan & Holland, 2003), and that predictive 
validity is maximized when predictors are chosen based on theory, empirical results, 
or a job analysis (Tett, et al., 1991). Recently researchers have begun to examine the 
relative predictive and incremental validities of trait-level predictors for a variety of 
personal and organizational outcomes. 
The Predictive Validity of Factors and Traits 
Few studies have examined the relative predictive validities of factor-level and 
trait-level personality measures. The studies presented in this section can be organized 
based on the criterion type: personal behaviors, academic success, and organizational 
outcomes (including a single study that examined some safety outcomes). Many of the 
studies are cross-sectional and rely on correlational and regression analyses, however, 
several report on multisource data, and two incorporate longitudinal designs. Overall, 
these studies suggest that trait-level measures can account for unique criterion 
variance not included in broad factor-level measures. This dissertation is the first study 
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I am aware of to investigate trait-level predictors of safety outcomes. I will begin this 
review with the prediction of personal behaviors. 
Personal behavior criteria. Three studies (Ashton, Jackson, Paunonen, Helmes, 
& Rothstein, 1995; Paunonen, 1998; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001a) examined the 
concurrent validity of factor- and trait-level personality measures on a wide variety of 
personal behaviors; all three concluded that trait-level measures can, at times, show 
higher validity than factor-level measures. 
Ashton et al. (1995) examined correlations between factor-level measures, 
trait-level measures, and a variety of personal behaviors (e.g. dating, fraternity interest, 
smoking, drinking alcohol, bed-making, speaking in class) in a cross-sectional study.  
Specifically they examined relationships between extraversion and methodicalness 
(conscientiousness) at the factor-level, three traits of extraversion–affiliation, 
exhibition, and dominance–three traits of methodicalness–cognitive structure, 
deliberateness, and order–and a wide variety of specific behaviors and behavioral 
composites. They found that the trait-level composite of affiliation + exhibition 
predicted several fun-seeking behaviors (e.g. dating, fraternity interest, smoking, 
alcohol consumption) slightly better than extraversion. Similarly, the trait-level 
composite of cognitive structure + deliberateness showed a slightly stronger 
relationship with specific fun-seeking behaviors than methodicalness. Single trait-level 
predictors were also predictive of specific behaviors. Dominance was the best 
predictor of speaking up in class and making complaints, while order was the best 
predictor of bed-making and keeping one’s room clean. Ashton et al. also examined 
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the relationships with three composite criteria: fun-seeking, tidiness, and surgency. 
Fun-seeking behaviors were predicted equally well by two trait-level composites: 
affiliation + exhibition and cognitive structure + deliberateness, and the extraversion 
factor. Combining composite scores ([affiliation + exhibition] – [cognitive structure + 
deliberateness]) showed a stronger relation ship with fun-seeking behaviors than a 
combination of factor-level scores (extraversion – methodicalness). In addition, order 
showed a stronger relationship with the Tidiness composite than did methodicalness, 
and dominance showed a stronger relationship with the Surgency composite than did 
extraversion. Furthermore, the trait-level predictors maintained significant 
relationships with the criteria even after the factor-level shared variance had been 
partialled out. 
Paunonen (1998) examined the relationship between Big Five factors, traits, 
and a variety of behaviors (e.g. GPA, dating, smoking, traffic violations, popularity). 
Both self- and peer-ratings were used in this cross-sectional study. They reported 
several small to moderate correlations between both types of predictors, and specific 
behaviors, concluding that both factors and traits account for important criterion 
variance. They also examined the incremental validity of factors over traits, and vice 
versa. Both broad factor scores and narrow trait scores showed significant incremental 
validity relative to each other. However, the incremental validity of the trait measures 
was greater than that of the factor measures. 
Finally, Paunonen and Ashton (2001a) examined correlations between Big 
Five factors, narrow traits, and 40 different behaviors including health related 
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behaviors (e.g. smoking, alcohol consumption, obesity), social behaviors (e.g. dating, 
parties attended), safety related behaviors (e.g. driving fast, traffic violations), 
intelligence (e.g. general knowledge, numerical ability), college courses and 
achievement (e.g. GPA, humanities & business classes taken), and peer ratings (e.g. 
intelligence, popularity, honesty). Once again, both self- and peer-ratings were used in 
this cross-sectional study.  They found that both factors and traits showed several 
significant correlations with the various criteria, although the trait-level measures 
accounted for slightly more. Trait-level measures also showed incremental validity 
over factor-level measures (average = 7.9%) in predicting 11 of the 40 behavioral 
criteria. 
These studies, although they are cross-sectional and exploratory in nature, 
suggest that narrow trait-level measures account for important criterion variance. At 
times the trait-level predictors show the only significant relationships with specific or 
composite behavioral criteria. For some behaviors the trait-level measures and factor-
level measures showed equivalent relationships with the behavioral criteria. For other 
behaviors factor-level measures produced the only significant relationships with the 
behavioral criteria. In addition, while both factor-level and trait-level measures 
demonstrated incremental validity relative to each other, the trait-level measures 
tended to show greater incremental validity. Finally, the strongest relationships were 
found between composites of trait-level predictors and composites of behaviors. 
Several authors (e.g. Ashton, et al., 1995; Hough & Schneider, 1996) have argued that 
the specific variance of trait-level measures could be more predictive than the shared 
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or common trait-level variance which make up factors. Demonstrations of the 
incremental validity of traits over factors, and the ability of trait-level measures to 
maintain significant correlations with criteria even after the factor-level shared 
variance is partialled out, support this argument.  
 Academic performance criteria. Two studies of academic performance further 
highlight the usefulness of narrow traits. Paunonen and Ashton (2001b) examined 
relationships between two broad factors (conscientiousness and openness to 
experience), two narrow traits (achievement and need for understanding)–which are 
traits of conscientiousness and openness respectively–and course grades in an 
undergraduate psychology class. These predictors were chosen on rational grounds. 
The study design was longitudinal (one academic term) and multi-source data was 
gathered (self-reports and TA grading). Both achievement and conscientiousness 
showed moderate positive relationships with course grades, and did not differ 
significantly. Similarly, need for understanding showed a moderate positive 
relationship with course grades but openness to experience was unrelated to grades. 
The strongest relationship with course grades was for a composite of achievement + 
need for understanding (r =.31). In contrast, the factor-level composite of 
conscientiousness + openness to experience showed a relatively weak relationship  
(r =.15).  
In another study of academic performance using a cross-sectional design and 
multisource data, Rothstein, Paunonen, Rush, & King (1994) examined personality 
and cognitive predictors of success in graduate business school. The authors measured 
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two components of academic success: classroom performance and written 
performance. All personality predictors were chosen on empirical/rational grounds. 
Only cognitive ability, as measured by the GMAT, predicted written performance. 
However, three narrow trait measures–achievement, dominance, and exhibition–
predicted classroom performance. In addition, the trait-level measures showed 
incremental validity over cognitive ability in predicting classroom performance  
(∆R2 = .12). None of the Big Five factors predicted either type of academic 
performance.  
In both of these studies personality predictors were chosen on rational grounds 
to predict academic criteria. Tett, et al. (1991) has suggested that predictive validity 
can be maximized by choosing predictors on theoretical or rational grounds. In both of 
these studies, a small number of personality predictors were chosen rationally, and in 
both studies narrow trait-level predictors performed better than broad factor-level 
measures. Now I will turn my attention to the few studies examining narrow trait-level 
predictors of work-related outcomes. 
Work-related criteria. Mershon and Gorsuch (1988) examined 16 data sets 
relating the 16PF (Cattell, Eber, Tatsuoku, 1980) to a variety of work-related criteria, 
e.g. pay, tenure, supervisor ratings of performance. They computed multiple 
correlations for each dependent variable based on either six or 16 measures of 
personality for each data set, then compared the amount of criterion variance 
accounted for. They found that the 16 narrow trait-level measures accounted for about 
twice as much criterion variance as the six broad factor-level measures. This study 
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suggests that narrow trait-level measures can account for important criterion variance 
above broad factor-level measures. However, this study is still exploratory in nature, 
and from a statistical point of view, multiple correlations can always be expected to 
increase as the number of predictors increases. 
Moon (2001) examined the relative predictive validity of conscientiousness 
and two narrower dimensions of conscientiousness–duty and achievement striving–
discussed in the literature (e.g. Barrack & Mount, 1995). This experimental study 
employed a brief longitudinal design (one month). The criterion in this study was 
participants’ choice in an escalation of commitment dilemma. The escalation of 
commitment dilemma refers the decision to continue expending resources on a losing 
course of action. Decision makers high in achievement striving are more likely to 
maintain their commitment to a losing course of action in order to get ahead or 
maximize self-interest. In contrast, decision makers high in duty will be more likely to 
abandon a losing course of action for the good of the organization. As predicted, high 
achievement striving was correlated with an escalation of commitment, while duty 
showed an inverse relationship. The Big Five factor of conscientiousness was 
unrelated to escalation of commitment decisions. 
Stewart (1999) used a longitudinal design and multisource data to examine the 
effect of the broad factor conscientiousness and two of its narrower traits–order and 
achievement–in predicting job performance in the transition and maintenance job 
stages. He noted that conscientiousness has shown a consistent relationship with job 
performance in both the transition and maintenance stages. However, he predicted that 
Individual Differences and Safety 62 
order would be a more important predictor in the transition stage because at the start of 
a new job, organization, structure, and time management help people understand how 
previously learned behaviors can be applied to the new job. On the other hand, in the 
maintenance stage achievement becomes more important as job performance in this 
stage depends more on perseverance and hard work to achieve goals. As expected, 
conscientiousness showed a consistent relationship with job performance across job 
stages. However, in the transition stage order was the strongest predictor of 
performance, while in the maintenance stage achievement was the best predictor of 
performance. In addition, both order and achievement showed a small (∆R2 = .03 - .04) 
amount of incremental validity over conscientiousness in predicting job performance 
in the transition and maintenance stages, respectively. 
Ashton (1998) examined the relationships of the Big Five factors and the 16 
narrow traits from the JPI (Jackson, 1970), and self-reported workplace delinquency 
(e.g. absenteeism, tardiness, substance use at work, and safety violations) in a cross-
sectional study. He found that the factors were slightly less correlated than the narrow 
traits with workplace delinquency. Nevertheless, conscientiousness showed a 
significant negative relationships with absenteeism, tardiness, and an overall 
composite of self-reported workplace delinquency. In addition, agreeableness showed 
a significant positive relationship with giving away goods and services, and the overall 
composite of delinquent behaviors. None of the Big Five factors was related to unsafe 
work behaviors. However, three narrow traits showed small to moderate, but 
significant, correlations with unsafe behaviors: self-esteem (r = .22), risk-taking  
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(r = .24), and responsibility (r = -.20). 
In her review article Hough (1992) examined several studies that measured 
personality according to the PDRI nine-factor taxonomy. This taxonomy extends 
beyond the Five Factor Model by including two personality factors not in the Big 
Five–Rugged Individualism (masculinity) and Locus of Control–as well as measuring 
two aspects of both extraversion and conscientiousness. For extraversion the two 
factors are affiliation and potency, and for conscientiousness the two factors are 
achievement and dependability. While the author refers to these as factors, other 
authors have considered them to be facets or trait-level variables subsumed under 
conscientiousness and extraversion (Barrick & Mount, 1995). Three other PDRI 
factors account for the rest of the Big Five, Adjustment (neuroticism), Agreeableness, 
and Intellectance (openness to experience). Hough reports the mean correlations (this 
is not a meta-analytic review) between the PDRI factors and several measures of job 
success. She reported that achievement was the best predictor of job proficiency, 
training success, educational success, and commendable behavior. On the other hand, 
dependability was the best predictor of law abiding behavior. In addition, she also 
reported on the best predictors of overall job performance for managers/executives and 
health care workers. For managers/executives the best predictors of job performance 
were potency (r = .18) and achievement (r = .18). For health care workers the best 
predictors were achievement (r = -.24), dependability (r = .24), and agreeableness (r 
= .19). The author concluded that the Big Five factors are not adequate to predict 
important life or work outcomes. 
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Barrick and Mount (1995) conducted a meta-analysis to determine the relative 
magnitude of relationships between conscientiousness and two of its traits 
(achievement and dependability) with a variety of work related performance outcomes. 
Both broadly- and narrowly-defined outcomes were used. They reported that all three 
personality measures showed stronger relationships with specific narrow criteria than 
broadly-defined criteria. For example, the meta-analytic correlation coefficients for all 
global outcomes were: conscientiousness (ρ = .31), achievement (ρ = .33), and 
dependability (ρ = .30). On the other hand, the coefficients for all specific outcome 
measures were: conscientiousness (ρ = .40), achievement (ρ = .38), and dependability 
(ρ = .28). They also found that conscientiousness and its two traits predicted 
motivation related or “will do” outcomes better than skill related or “can do” outcomes: 
Conscientiousness (ρ = .26 vs. .13), achievement (ρ = .44 vs. .22), and dependability 
(ρ = .42 vs. .20), respectively. They concluded that trait-level personality variables can 
predict better than factor-level variables only when they are conceptually related to the 
criteria of interest. 
Finally, Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki, and Cortina (2006) conducted a meta-
analysis of conscientiousness and four of its narrow traits, achievement, order, 
cautiousness, and dependability in predicting various types of job performance. In 
general, they found that the narrow traits showed incremental validity over 
conscientiousness in predicting job performance. However, the relationships were 
moderated by the type of job performance and different occupational types. Regarding 
types of job performance, the trait of achievement was the best predictor of task 
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behaviors, while dependability best predicted job dedication, interpersonal facilitation, 
and counterproductive work behaviors (inverse relationship). In addition, narrow traits 
showed incremental validity over conscientiousness across all types of job 
performance (∆R2s ranged from .037 for overall job performance to .259 for job 
dedication). As for different types of occupations, narrow traits showed incremental 
validity over conscientiousness for sales persons, managers, and skilled/unskilled 
workers, but not for customer service workers. The authors concluded that 
dependability and achievement drive the relationship between conscientiousness and 
job performance, with some variation across occupational types. 
Summary. Considering the arguments made by Ones and Viswesvaran (1996), 
what do the results of these studies have to tell us about the relative validities of broad 
and narrow personality measures in predicting job performance? To recap, Ones and 
Viswesvaran argued that: a) Trait-level specific variance is not predictive of job 
performance either within, or across situations; b) Matching the bandwidth of the 
predictor and criterion is preferable; since most measures of job performance are 
broadly defined, broad factor-level measures will tend to predict best; c) Broad 
measures tend to have greater reliability than narrow measures, therefore, the latter 
will tend to have lower validity; and, d) Even if narrow trait measures do at times 
show stronger relationships with criteria, most organizations will not find it cost-
effective to measure narrow traits because their predictive power does not generalize 
across jobs. I will consider these arguments in turn. 
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First, if trait-level specific variance is not predictive of job performance either 
within or across situations, then it obviously makes sense to use broad factor-level 
predictors. However, this seems to be an empirical question. Since few studies have 
been conducted on the predictive validity of trait-level personality measures, I think 
the conclusion is premature. The studies presented in the present review suggest that 
narrow trait-level measures are predictive of job performance in some situations. Both 
Moon’s (2001) finding traits predicted decisions in the escalation of commitment 
dilemma-while Big Five factors did not–and Stewart’s (1999) results showing that 
different traits of conscientiousness were important for job performance depending on 
tenure on the job, while the broad factor showed a consistent relationship across time, 
suggest that narrow trait measures can account for important criterion variance within 
situations. In addition, the review by Hough (1992) and meta-analyses by Barrick and 
Mount (1995) and Dudley et al. (2006) suggests that narrow trait measures can predict 
performance across situations. For example, the trait of dependability was the best 
predictor of three different measures of job performance (job dedication, interpersonal 
facilitation, and counterproductive work behaviors). In addition, narrow traits showed 
incremental validity over conscientiousness for three of four occupations (sales, 
managers, skilled/unskilled workers). A related consideration is the relative criterion 
validities of broad and narrow personality measures. Examining the reported validities 
for Big Five factors in two often-cited meta-analyses (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, et 
al., 1991) reveals low to moderate relationships (rs ~ .15 - .30) with work-related 
outcomes; the trait-level studies presented here show the same magnitude of 
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relationships. In addition, trait-level composites have shown stronger relationships, 
even when predicting composite criteria (Ashton, et al., 1995). While it is certain that 
we will need more research to determine the usefulness of trait-level specific variance 
in predicting job performance, these studies suggest that such efforts are certainly 
worthwhile. 
Second, although many authors have suggested that predictor and criterion 
bandwidth should match (e.g. Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971), Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) 
state this is not necessarily the case. They argue that bandwidth and fidelity are not 
opposite ends of the same continuum; there is no reason that a broad measure cannot 
predict a narrow criterion. But the reverse is also true. Dudley, et al. (2006) reported 
that narrow traits showed incremental validity over conscientiousness for all measures 
of job performance, even overall job performance (∆R2 =.037). One might also to 
expect that narrow trait predictors chosen on a theoretical or rational basis will 
demonstrate even stronger relationships (Barrick & Mount, 1995; Paunonen & Ashton, 
2001a).  
Third, is the argument that broad measures tend to have higher reliabilities–and 
therefore higher validities–than narrow measures. Since broad measures tend to be 
longer than narrow measures they will usually show higher internal consistency 
reliabilities. This tends to be true even though broad measures often have lower item-
total correlations than narrow trait measures. However, high reliability does not 
guarantee any given level of validity. An examination of the reliabilities reported in 
some of the trait studies cited above (not all studies reported reliability coefficients) 
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confirms the expected pattern of reliability coefficients. Table 3 shows differences in 
Cronbach’s α and the validity coefficients for broad and narrow measures from four of 
the studies discussed previously. 
As expected estimates of internal consistency tend to be lower for the trait 
measures than the factor measures. However, in all cases the validity coefficients of 
the less reliable trait scales are equivalent to, or even exceed those of the more reliable 
factor scales. Given the negative effect of measurement error on validity, the 
equivalence of the validity coefficients between trait and factor measures argues for 
continued research on trait-level predictors of job performance. Some critics of Ones 
and Viswesvaran (1996; e.g. Paunonen & Ashton, 2001a; 2001b) have argued that 
trait-level specific variance might compensate for lower reliability when predicting job 
performance. The studies reviewed here suggest this may be the case.  
Finally, Ones and Viswesvaran (1996) argue that most organizations would 
find little utility in using trait-level predictors of job performance. This is because such 
narrow measures will tend to be situation- or job-specific predictors, and most 
organizations have neither the time or money to develop and validate selection criteria 
for each different job at each location. Once again, the utility of narrow trait measures 
for predicting job performance is an empirical question that remains unanswered. 
However, given the research published so far it seems clear that we should continue 
our inquiries. If narrow measures, or composites of narrow measures, demonstrate a 
large enough increase in predictive validity over the Big Five factors, the 
organizational utility of trait-level measures as predictors of job performance could 
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increase. This may be especially true in the case of safety-related cognitions, attitudes, 
and behaviors given the high organizational and personal costs of workplace accidents, 
injuries, and illnesses. Little research has investigated narrow trait-safety outcome 
relationships. In the next section I will present research on personality variables in 
supervisors that are related to organizational outcomes.  
Manager’s Dispositions and Organizational Outcomes  
In the early part of the twentieth century the study of leadership focused on the 
personality traits of leaders. At the time it was believed that leaders were born, not 
made and therefore researchers searched for traits which characterized the “great man” 
(Den Hartog & Koopman, 2001). By the 1950s this research stream ran out as 
researchers failed to find a consistent profile of successful leader traits. However, in 
the 1970s researchers began to show renewed interest in leader traits and questioned 
the conclusion that personality traits were not predictive of effective leadership (see 
Kilpatrick & Locke, 1991; Lord, De Vader, and Allinger, 1986). In his review Yukl 
(1989) noted several traits that predicted effective leadership (e.g. high energy level, 
ability to tolerate stress, internal locus of control). 
George (1991, 1992) takes the interactional perspective (Bandura, 1986) to 
explain the relationship between traits, states, behaviors, and organizational outcomes. 
In her view, traits interact with the situation to produce states which lead to behaviors. 
Stated differently, states capture the trait-situation interaction. She concludes that traits 
can be used to predict job attitudes, affective states, and behaviors of managers and 
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workers. However, only a few studies have specifically examined the relationship 
between manager’s dispositions and subordinates’ outcomes. 
George and Bettenhausen (1990) examined the relationship between manager’s 
level of positive affectivity (PA; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), and prosocial behavior 
and turnover intentions in their workgroups. The authors reasoned that managers high 
in PA would be active, excited, and enthusiastic, and would be perceived as confident, 
competent, and optimistic. High PA managers would also be more likely to encourage, 
notice and reward positive subordinate behaviors like prosocial behaviors. Since 
people usually prefer to work for positive managers and in workgroups with a strong 
climate for prosocial behavior, turnover intentions in these workgroups should be 
lower than in workgroups whose managers report lower levels of PA. They found that 
high PA managers showed more positive mood states which were positively 
associated with group prosocial behaviors and lower turnover intentions. Similarly, 
Ganster, Schaubroeck, Sime, and Mayes (1991; as cited in George, 1992) found that 
subordinates of managers with Type A personality (Friedman & Rosenman, 1974) 
reported more somatic complaints and depression, and chronic irritation, while 
subordinates of managers high in negative affectivity (NA) reported less satisfaction 
with their supervisor. 
Staw and Barsade (1993) also looked at the effects of PA on manager’s 
behaviors and peer ratings of managerial performance in assessment center exercises. 
MBA students were divided into groups (low, medium, and high) based on their level 
of self-reported PA. Relative to their counterparts in the low and medium PA groups, 
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managers high in PA performed better on an interpersonal task (leaderless group 
discussion), and received higher ratings of managerial potential. In addition, they were 
more likely to request information and made more accurate decisions on an in-box 
exercise. They were also more aware of situational contingencies. The authors 
concluded that PA has an energizing function which leads to more effective 
managerial behavior. 
Walumbwa and Schaubroeck (2009) examined the relationship between 
managers’ personality traits and workers’ ratings of supervisors’ ethical leadership, 
and psychological safety, which refers to the perception that it is safe for workers to 
engage in interpersonal risk-taking and is positively related with workers’ exercise of 
voice. They found that managers’ levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness were 
positively related to subordinates perceptions of ethical leadership, which was directly 
related to perceptions of psychological safety. In addition, perceptions of ethical 
leadership fully mediated the relationship between managers’ agreeableness and 
workers’ psychological safety. However, perceptions of ethical leadership only 
partially mediated the relationship between managers’ conscientiousness and workers’ 
psychological safety.  
Only one study has examined the relationship between manager’s personality 
and safety outcomes. Thoms and Venkataraman (2002) hypothesized that four of the 
Big Five factors would be related to accident and injury rates. They reasoned that 
managers’ conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness would be negatively 
related to accident and injury rates. Conscientious managers would be likely to attend 
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to details, limit unsafe working conditions, anticipate potential accidents, and 
consistently review safety issues. Extraverted managers would tend to be outgoing and 
energetic, and thus, make more time to visit work sites and talk to their subordinates 
about safety problems and concerns. Agreeable managers would be more likely to 
interact with, and care about their subordinates, and thus, pay more attention to safety. 
They also hypothesized that managers high in neuroticism would be more concerned 
about meeting their production goals and would tend to push their workers to meet 
these goals. This should lead to higher accident and injury rates. They found that 
managers’ neuroticism was positively related to injury rates, while managers’ 
conscientiousness and extraversion were negatively related to accident rates. 
In summary, while early research failed to discover a consistent profile of 
personality traits which characterize effective leaders, more recent research has shown 
the utility of managerial traits in predicting outcomes at the organizational-, group-, 
and individual-level. Taking an interactional perspective George (1991, 1992) posits 
that traits interact with the situation to produce states which lead to behaviors. Recent 
research has focused on the effects of manager’s level of PA/NA and Big Five 
personality factors in predicting a variety of outcomes. The only study of safety 
outcomes found significant correlations between managers’ conscientiousness, 
extraversion, and neuroticism, and accident/injury rates. However, these studies 
focused on factor-level personality predictors. In the next section I will propose trait-
level predictors at the supervisor-level which should be related to the development of a 
positive workgroup safety climate. 
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Manager Traits and Safety Climate 
For supervisors it is hypothesized that personality will be directly related to the 
development of a positive workgroup safety climate (see Figure 1). Safety climate 
refers to perceptions of the relative importance of production versus safety in 
workgroup members. Workgroup supervisors play the most important role in the 
development of safety climate through monitoring and feedback (Zohar & Luria, 
2003). In addition, several studies suggest that leadership styles which convey concern 
for the well-being of subordinates are related to the development of a positive safety 
climate (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; 
Zohar, 2003b) and a variety of safety outcomes (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; 
Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003).  
Although there are no previous studies of the relationship between  
Big Five traits in supervisors and unit-level safety climate, a few studies show the 
importance of trust in supervisors. Conchie and Burns (2009) reported that trust in 
supervisors as an information source about safety was based on demonstrations of 
caring by the supervisor. Likewise, Conchie and Donald (2009) showed that safety-
specific trust moderated the relationship between leadership style and safety 
citizenship behaviors. Finally, Luria (2010) showed that trust in management was 
positively related to safety climate strength and level. These studies suggest that Big 
Five personality traits which facilitate positive interpersonal relationships and trust 
between supervisors and workers should be related to the development safety climate 
in workgroups. 
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Specifically, traits of extraversion and agreeableness are likely to lead to 
behaviors which would facilitate interpersonal relationships and trust between 
supervisors and workers. An examination of the Big Five traits (See Table 4 for 
descriptions of the traits from McCrae and Costa, 1992) suggest that three Big Five 
traits in supervisors would be likely to affect the development of safety climate. Two 
traits of extraversion (cheerfulness and friendliness) and a single trait of agreeableness 
(altruism) are relevant here. People high in friendliness tend to be friendly, sociable, 
cheerful, affectionate, and outgoing. People high in cheerfulness tend to be 
enthusiastic, praising, humorous, spontaneous, and optimistic. Finally, people high on 
altruism tend to be warm, soft-hearted, gentle, generous, kind, not selfish, and tolerant. 
Supervisors high in these traits should be skilled at initiating and maintaining social 
relationships, conveying the importance of worker’s safety and well-being, and 
providing feedback to their subordinates that will improve their safety performance 
and foster a positive safety climate in their workgroups. 
It could be argued that other traits of extraversion and agreeableness might also 
affect the formation of positive interpersonal relationships between supervisors and 
workers, as well as the formation of a positive unit-level safety climate. For example, 
people high on the extraversion trait of gregariousness tend to be sociable, outgoing 
pleasure-seeking, spontaneous, and talkative. While it would be expected that people 
high on gregariousness would be skilled at forming interpersonal relationships, the 
pleasure-seeking and spontaneous aspects of this trait suggest less concern for others 
than the self, while safety climate perceptions of workers is related to the supervisor’s 
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concern for workers’ safety. Similarly, the extraversion traits of assertiveness, activity, 
and excitement seeking reflect a self- rather than an other-focus.  
Most of the agreeableness traits do not appear to be related to the formation of 
interpersonal relationships between supervisors and subordinates (e.g. trust, 
straightforwardness, compliance, modesty). Individuals high in tender-mindedness 
share most of the characteristics of those high in altruism, however, the latter is also 
characterized by unselfishness which could lead a supervisor to focus more on the 
safety of workers than receiving rewards for more production. 
Proactive Personality 
According to Bateman and Crant (1993) proactive behavior is related to 
people’s needs to manipulate and control the environment, which are known to vary 
across individuals. This suggests the presence of a latent trait they call proactive 
personality. People high in proactive personality tend to be unconstrained by 
situational forces, they seek out opportunities for change, show initiative and take 
action, and persevere until change occurs. Bateman and Crant develop the 17-item 
Proactive Personality Scale to measure what they assumed was a unidimensional trait. 
The final scale loaded on a single factor (in three independent samples) and showed 
adequate reliability. Both internal consistency (α = .89) and test-retest (r = .72 over 3 
months) reliabilities were demonstrated. 
Associations between proactive personality and a number of other traits have 
been documented. Proactive personality is positively related to conscientiousness (rs 
= .15 - .43) and extraversion (rs = .20 - .35) and openness to experience (r = .37; 
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Bateman & Crant, 1993; Crant, 1995; Major, Turner, & Fletcher, 2006). Major et al. 
examined the relationships between Big Five traits, proactive personality, motivation 
to learn, and developmental activity. They found that nine traits of the Big Five 
personality factors (vulnerability, assertiveness, activity, actions, ideas, values, 
altruism, dutifulness, and achievement striving) accounted for 26% of the variance in 
proactive personality scores. They also found that proactive personality accounted for 
additional variance over extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness to experience 
in predicting motivation to learn. 
In addition, Bateman and Crant (1993) reported that proactive personality is 
related to the need for achievement (r  = .45) and the need for dominance (r = .43). 
Significant associations between proactive personality and a variety of behaviors and 
outcomes have also been reported. These include extracurricular activities, personal 
achievements, and peer ratings of transformational leadership (Bateman & Crant), job 
performance (Crant, 1995), and relationship building and role clarity (Finkelstein, 
Kulas, & Dages, 2003). Proactive personality has also accounted for incremental 
variance in hierarchical regressions predicting charismatic leadership (Crant & 
Bateman, 2000) and career success in real estate agents (Siebert, Crant, & Kraimer, 
1999). 
A few studies have tested more complex models of the correlates and 
consequences of proactive personality. Parker and Sprigg (1999) examined the 
relationship between job demands, job control and strain (Karasek, 1999) in 
employees who scored high and low on the Proactive Personality Scale. Karasek’s 
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model predicts that high demand jobs will cause less strain when employees have a 
high level of control over their work. However, Parker and Sprigg found that job 
control reduced strain in high demand jobs only for employees with proactive 
personalities. Job control did not ameliorate strain from high job demands in passive 
employees. Siebert, Kraimer, & Crant (2001) tested a structural model in which the 
effect of proactive personality on objective and subjective measures of career success 
was fully mediated by proactive behaviors/cognitions (voice, innovation, political 
knowledge, and career initiative). The model fit the data well and demonstrated that 
proactive personality leads to proactive behaviors at work which are related to career 
success. Finally, Harvey, Blouin, and Stout (2006) tested competing models of 
proactive personality as a moderator of the relationship between interpersonal conflict 
at work and individual outcomes. In their buffering model–based on the general stress 
buffering hypothesis (cf. Jex & Beehr, 1991) – proactive personality would be 
expected to reduce the negative effects of interpersonal conflict. In contrast, the 
accentuation model–based on the work of De Dreu & Weingart (2003) and Amason 
(1996) – predicts that proactive personality would exacerbate the negative effects of 
interpersonal conflict at work. In this model, proactive people will tend to experience 
more frustration because of the often illogical and uncontrollable nature of 
interpersonal conflict. Harvey, et al. found support for the accentuation model. 
Proactive people reported more burnout at work and school, less job satisfaction, and 
lower grades than their passive counterparts. 
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In summary, proactive personality is a compound personality trait that is only 
partially related to the Big Five factors of extraversion, conscientiousness, and 
openness to experience. Proactive personality is predictive of a number of general 
behaviors (e.g. identifying opportunities, challenging the status quo, creating favorable 
conditions) and context-specific behaviors (e.g. socialization, feedback seeking, issue 
selling, innovation), and individual outcomes (e.g. job performance, career success, 
feelings of personal control, role clarity). However, I am unaware of any studies of the 
effects of managers’ proactive personality on subordinates attitudes, cognitions, 
perceptions, behaviors, or work-related outcomes. 
Considering the correlates of proactive personality and the consequences of 
proactive behaviors, it is likely that supervisors’ proactive personality will be related 
to the development of a positive unit-level safety climate under certain conditions. 
Proactive personality is related to leadership styles and behaviors that are positively 
related to safety climate, such as transformational leadership (Bateman & Crant, 1993), 
charismatic leadership (Crant & Bateman, 2000), and relationship building 
(Finkelstein, Kulas, & Dages, 2003). Leadership style is related to safety climate 
(Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Mullen & 
Kelloway, 2009), and supervisors with a transformational leadership style tend to 
foster a positive safety climate. Transformational leaders are able to convey the 
importance of safety to their subordinates, inspire and motivate their subordinates to 
work for the collective good, spur new ways of thinking to improve safety, and take an 
active interest in their subordinates’ welfare and well-being. Therefore, if supervisors 
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with a proactive personality are more likely to have a transformational leadership style, 
they should also be more likely to foster a strong, positive safety climate in their work 
groups. However, the positive relationship between supervisors’ proactive personality 
and safety climate should depend on supervisors’ perceptions of organizational safety 
climate.  
Supervisors’ Proactive Personality and Organizational Safety Climate 
The research shows that proactive personality leads to general and context 
specific behaviors that lead to career success (Siebert, Kraimer, & Crant, 2001). These 
behaviors include identifying opportunities for change, showing initiative and taking 
action, and persevering until change occurs. Zohar and Luria (2003) showed that 
supervisors engage in sense-making to determine the relative value of safety vs. 
production at work. Therefore, the focus of proactive behaviors should also be related 
to what is valued at work, in other words, organizational climate. If the organizational 
climate places a positive value on safety at work, proactive personality in supervisors 
should lead to behaviors aimed at improving safety. However, if the organizational 
climate places a higher value on production relative to safety, proactive personality in 
supervisors should lead to efforts to improve production. This suggests that 
supervisors’ perceptions of organizational safety climate should moderate the 
relationship between supervisors’ proactive personality and unit-level safety climate 
perceptions in workers. Supervisors high in proactive personality will create a more 
positive unit safety climate in the presence of a positive organizational safety climate, 
than those operating in a negative organizational safety climate. Finally, in the next 
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section I will discuss workers’ personality traits that should be related to safety 
motivation, and safety behaviors. 
Worker’s Personality Traits, Safety Motivation, and Safety Behaviors 
There is some evidence suggesting Big Five personality traits in workers 
should relate to safety motivation and safety behaviors. As Barrick and Mount (1995) 
noted, the conscientiousness and its traits are better predictors of “will do” behaviors 
than “can do” behaviors. Similarly, Barrick, Stewart, and Piotrowski (2002) found that 
motivation mediates the relationship between Big Five personality factors and job 
performance. This suggests that conscientiousness traits should be related to safety 
motivation. Regarding work-related behaviors, Dudley et al. (2006) reported that 
dependability is related to job dedication and counterproductive work behaviors. 
Similarly, Hough (1992) reported that dependability predicted law abiding behaviors 
(following rules), and Moon (2001) found that dutifulness related to acting for the 
benefit of the organization. However, I am unaware of any studies that have examined 
the relationship between conscientiousness traits and safety outcomes.   
Previous studies of the Big Five conscientiousness factor and safety outcomes 
have shown small (Arthur & Graziano, 1996; Cellar, Nelson, & York, 2001; Christian 
et al., 2009) and inconsistent relationships (Clarke & Robertson, 2005, 2008; Lardent, 
1991; Salgado, 1992). Referring back to the bandwidth-fidelity dilemma, it is possible 
that specific trait-level variance will show stronger relations with safety outcomes than 
the conscientiousness factor, and increase our understanding of the conflicting results. 
A number of studies have shown that traits of the Big Five are related to both broad 
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and narrowly defined criteria across situations, and can account for incremental 
variance over their respective factors (Barrick & Mount, 1995; Dudley, et al., 2006; 
Hough, 1992). Similarly, it has been suggested that choosing trait-level predictors on a 
theoretical or rational basis should result in stronger relationships with criteria 
(Barrick & Mount, 1995; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001a).  
On rational grounds two traits of conscientious seem most relevant to safety 
outcomes, order and cautiousness. People high on order have been described as 
organized, careful, methodical and thorough. Similarly, people high on cautiousness 
are viewed as thorough, careful, patient, and not easily distracted. Workers high on 
these traits are likely to comply with safety rules and procedures, which often requires 
extra time and effort. In addition, they are likely to be aware of potential hazards and 
take action to remove hazards from the workplace. While it cold be argued that all of 
the traits of conscientiousness should be related to safety, the foregoing suggests that 
the conscientiousness traits of order and cautiousness should be related to safety 
motivation and safety compliance behaviors (performing prescribed safety behaviors).  
The Big Five agreeableness factor has shown small to moderate negative 
relationships to accidents (Cellar, Nelson, & York, 2001; Clarke & Robertson, 2005, 
2008). Similarly, Ashton (1998) found that agreeableness is negatively related to 
counterproductive work behaviors. However, as with conscientiousness, agreeableness 
traits may show stronger predictor-criterion relationships than the agreeableness factor.  
I am aware of only one study that examined the relationship between agreeableness 
traits and safety outcomes. Chen (2009) found that altruism was negatively related to 
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risk-taking attitudes among young Taiwanese motorcyclists. Likewise, three other 
studies have demonstrated the importance of workers’ social interactions on safety 
outcomes. Tucker et al. (2008) showed that perceived co-workers’ support for safety 
fully mediated the relationship between perceived organizational support for safety 
and the exercise of workers’ safety voice. Luria (2008) showed that both leadership 
style and workgroup social cohesion influenced safety climate strength. Finally, Zohar 
and Tenne-Gazit (2008) showed that the relationship between transformational 
leadership and safety climate strength was partially mediated by workgroup safety 
communications and friendships. 
 Rationally, two traits of agreeableness seem relevant to safety outcomes, 
altruism and trust. People high on altruism are warm, kind, tolerant, and soft-hearted, 
while people high on trust are forgiving, trusting, open, and soft-hearted. Altruism 
reflects warm and kind feelings towards others which should provide motivation to act 
for the benefit of others. Similarly, workers scoring high on trust should be amiable 
work-team members who develop good relationships with co-workers, again 
enhancing to motivation to act for the benefit of others. On the other hand, while 
agreeableness traits of straightforwardness, compliance, and modesty would facilitate 
getting along with others, they do not obviously relate to safety motivation. The 
foregoing suggests that the agreeableness traits of altruism and trust should be related 
to safety motivation and safety participation (discretionary) behaviors.  
This chapter has reviewed a number of individual differences related to 
accidents including locus of control, impulsivity trait affect cognitive failure, and Big 
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Five factors. A review of the bandwidth-fidelity dilemma and a number of recent 
studies suggest utility in using Big Five traits as predictors at both the supervisor and 
worker levels. In addition, arguments were made suggesting proactive personality and 
Big Five traits in managers should be related to safety climate in their workgroups. 
Finally, rational arguments for the relationship between Big Five traits in workers and 
safety motivation were presented. In the next chapter I will review the research on 
safety outcomes including safety motivation, safety knowledge, two types of safety 
behaviors, and accidents/injuries. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Safety Outcomes 
Given the high cost of occupational accidents and injuries, and the efforts by 
organizations to reduce these costs, many safety researchers logically focus on the 
reduction of accidents and injuries (cf. Clarke, 2006a). However, accidents and 
injuries present problems as outcome measures for researchers investigating 
organizational influences on occupational safety. First, accidents and injuries occur 
infrequently and are not normally distributed, making statistical prediction difficult. 
Low base rate count data like accidents and injuries are often over-dispersed (i.e. the 
mean and variance of the distribution are unequal) necessitating the use of alternatives 
to ordinary least squares regression, for example negative binomial regression (Abdel-
Aty & Radwan, 2000; Hofmann & Mark, 2006). Second, accidents and injuries are 
considered a lagging indicator of the state of safety as they only occur when there is a 
system failure, and do not provide any information on safety conditions across 
worksites or risks to workers (Seo, et al., 2004). Finally, the correlation between 
organizational safety variables such as safety climate and accidents tends to be small, 
although in the predicted direction (Clarke, 2006a). One reason for these weak 
relationships is that organizational factors are distal predictors of accidents and 
injuries (Neil & Griffin, 2004; Zohar, 2003). Researchers have responded to these 
problems by measuring additional outcome variables such as microaccidents (Zohar, 
2000) and near misses (Seo, et al., 2004). Several studies have also examined the 
perceptual, cognitive, social, and behavioral antecedents of accidents and injuries as 
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outcome variables. For example, Clarke and Ward (2006) examined the relative 
importance of manager-worker value congruence and behavioral modeling on workers 
safety behaviors. Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras (2003) showed that safety climate 
moderates the relationship between leader-member exchange and safety citizenship 
role definitions. Finally, Truxillo, Bauer, Reiser, & Bertolino (2006) showed that 
safety motivation mediated the relationship between safety climate and safety attitudes.  
Neil and Griffin (2004) present a mediated model that describes the 
mechanisms through which organizational and individual variables affect safety 
outcomes (see Figure 3 below). In this model, work environment antecedents like 
safety climate and organizational factors (e.g. supervision, work design) combine with 
individual antecedents like attitudes and personality traits to affect safety knowledge 
and safety motivation at the individual level. Safety knowledge and motivation in turn 
affect safety behaviors, which in turn affect safety outcomes like accidents, injuries, 
and near misses. Building on the concepts of task and contextual behaviors (Borman 
& Motowidlo, 1993) Griffin and Neal (2000) describe two types of safety behaviors. 
Safety compliance behaviors refer to “core safety activities that need to be carried out 
by individuals to maintain workplace safety” (p. 349). Examples of safety compliance 
behaviors include wearing required personal protective equipment or testing the air 
quality of underground vaults before entering. As such, safety compliance behaviors 
are similar to Borman and Motowidlo’s concept of task performance. Safety 
participation refer to “behaviors such as participating in voluntary safety activities or 
attending safety meetings” (p. 349). In other words, safety participation behaviors 
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are discretionary behaviors by workers that are specifically related to safety similar to 
Borman and Motowidlo’s concept of contextual performance. Safety outcomes could 
refer to accidents, injuries, microaccidents, and near misses; these tend to be measured 
either objectively (e.g. OSHA recordable incidents, company records) or by self-report. 
The model improves our understanding of the mechanisms through which distal 
factors affect accidents and injuries, while also suggesting additional outcome 
measures such as safety knowledge, safety motivation, and safety behaviors. This 
review of the safety outcome literature will begin with a description of the model by 
Griffin, Neal, and their colleagues, followed by other studies which examine parts of 
the model. 
A paper by Griffin and Neal (2000) describes two studies testing their model. 
In their first study they examined the relationship between safety climate, safety 
knowledge, and both types of safety behaviors, compliance and participation. They 
found that safety knowledge partially mediated the relationship between safety climate 
and safety compliance behaviors, but not participation behaviors. In other words, 
safety knowledge was not significantly associated with safety participation behaviors, 
but safety climate had a strong effect. In addition, the two types of safety behaviors 
were weakly related. Figure 4 illustrates the path model from Study 1 (Griffin & Neal, 
2000). 
Their second study examined the relationships between safety climate, safety 
knowledge, two types of safety motivation (compliance and participation), and the two 
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types of safety behaviors. In this study, the relationship between safety climate and 
safety behaviors was fully mediated by safety knowledge and safety motivation. As in 
study 1, the two types of safety behaviors were weakly correlated. However, unlike 
study 1, safety knowledge was strongly related to both types of safety behaviors. 
Safety climate showed moderate positive relationships with both types of safety 
motivation, but a much stronger relationship with safety knowledge. In addition, 
safety motivation was weakly related to safety knowledge. The relationship between 
safety participation motivation and safety knowledge was small (r = .15); safety 
compliance motivation was not significantly related to safety knowledge. However, 
the two types of safety motivation were strongly correlated (r = .75). Participation 
motivation showed a strong positive relationship with safety participation behaviors, 
but there was no significant relationship with safety compliance behaviors. Of even 
more interest, compliance motivation showed a weak and positive relationship with 
safety compliance behaviors and a strong negative relationship with safety 
participation behaviors. The authors suggest this might be explained by resource 
allocation models (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) which posit that task motivation can 
lead to decreases in contextual behaviors. Figure 5 shows the path model from Study 2 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000). 
Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000) examined the relationship between 
organizational climate, safety climate, safety knowledge and motivation, and safety 
behaviors. They found that the safety climate fully mediated the relationships between 
organizational climate and other variables. In addition, safety knowledge and safety 
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motivation fully mediated the relationship between safety climate and safety 
compliance behaviors, and partially mediated the relationship between safety climate 
and safety participation behaviors. Safety climate showed strong positive relationships 
with both safety knowledge and safety motivation. In turn, safety knowledge showed 
moderate positive relationships with safety compliance and participation behaviors. 
Likewise, safety motivation showed moderate to strong relationships with both types 
of safety behaviors. Figure 6 depicts the final path model. 
While all three of these studies provide support for the model, they are also 
cross-sectional in design and do not rule out reverse causation as an explanation for 
the results. Reverse causation suggests that accident involvement could lead to 
decreases in safety climate perceptions for the worker in question. To rule out reverse 
causation Neal and Griffin (2006) conducted a longitudinal, multilevel test of their 
model. They found that group safety climate predicted individual safety motivation 
which in turn predicted individual safety participation behaviors. However, safety 
motivation was not related to safety compliance behaviors, as had been reported 
previously by Probst and Brubaker (2001). The authors attributed the discrepant 
results to different measures of safety motivation. In addition, individual self-reported 
safety behaviors, when aggregated to the group level, predicted group accident rates. 
Finally, they reported a reciprocal relationship between safety motivation and safety 
participation behaviors. The authors hypothesized that the performance of safety 
participation behaviors was reinforced, which increased safety motivation and led to 
more safety participation behaviors. This study is important because it establishes the 
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direction of causality specified in the model, rules out reverse causation as an 
alternative explanation, demonstrates the influence of group-level variables on 
individual behavior, and shows the utility of examining accident rates by workgroup. 
Safety Climate 
 A large number of studies have examined different models which include 
some of the variables discussed by Griffin and Neal. For example, several researchers 
have examined the consequences of safety climate. This research is presented in detail 
in Chapter II, so I will only summarize the literature here. The inverse relationship 
between a positive safety climate and accidents/injuries is well documented (e.g. 
Wallace et al., 2006; Zohar, 2000) but weak. Meta-analyses suggest a small and 
unreliable relationship between safety climate and accidents/injuries; in longitudinal 
studies safety climate also predicts accidents/injuries (Clarke, 2006a). Safety climate 
is also related to a number of safety-related behaviors including use of personal 
protective equipment (McGovern et al., 2000), self-reported at-risk behaviors (Watson 
et al., 2005), unsafe behaviors (Clarke, 2006b), and safety compliance and safety 
participation behaviors (Clarke, 2006a). Finally, as discussed previously, safety 
climate predicts safety knowledge and safety motivation (Neal, et al., 2000; Neal & 
Griffin, 2006). I will now turn my attention to other variables in the model. 
Safety Knowledge 
Safety knowledge is important because information about occupational safety 
makes it more likely that workers will successfully cope with potentially dangerous 
situations (Westaby and Lee, 2003). Safety training is based on the assumption that 
Safety Outcomes 90 
providing knowledge will reduce accidents/injuries (Reber & Wallin, 1984); managers 
in high reliability process industries make the same assumption (Hofmann, Jacobs, & 
Landy, 1995). Safety knowledge is positively related to safety communication 
(Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999), safety behaviors and tenure (Westaby & Lee, 2003), 
and improves with training (Wells, Stokols, McMahan, & Clitheroe, 1997). Finally, 
safety knowledge fully mediated the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behaviors (Larsson, Pousette, & Torner, 2008). 
Safety Motivation 
There are two main theoretical perspectives which predict safety motivation, 
social exchange and expectancy-valence theories.  Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) 
suggests that when employees perceive the organization is genuinely concerned for 
their well-being, the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) is invoked and employees 
will feel an obligation to reciprocate with beneficial work behaviors. Employees may 
reciprocate by performing their core work tasks at a high level or by performing 
contextual or citizenship behaviors (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). For 
example, Gyekye & Salminen (2005) found that soldier’s perceptions of 
organizational commitment to safety were positively related to organizational 
citizenship behaviors. Similarly, Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) reported that 
perceived organizational support and high-quality LMX relationships were related to 
workgroup supervisors’ levels of safety communication and safety commitment 
(motivation). In addition, Hofmann, Morgeson, and Gerras (2003) found that safety 
climate moderated the relationship between LMX and safety citizenship role 
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definitions, and ultimately safety citizenship behaviors. They concluded that safety 
climate defines behaviors that are valued by the leader and the organization, and high-
quality LMX relationships lead to employee reciprocity. These studies suggest that 
positive social exchange relationships can be an important factor in generating safety 
motivation. 
Expectancy-valence theory (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996) predicts employees 
will be motivated to follow prescribed safety procedures and participate in 
discretionary safety activities if they believe doing so will lead to valued outcomes. 
Few studies have explicitly examined expectancy-valence theory to explain safety 
motivation. Truxillo, Bauier, Reiser, & Bertolino (2006) developed the VIES measure 
of safety motivation, which consists of three subscales for valence, instrumentality, 
and expectancy. They found that safety motivation fully mediated the relationship 
between safety culture perceptions and two types of safety attitudes: the likelihood of 
supporting the safety program and behavioral intentions to act safely. In addition, 
safety motivation partially mediated the relationship between agreeableness and 
support for the safety program, and partially mediated the relationship between the 
safety sensitivity of the job and behavioral intentions to act safely. In a follow-up 
study, Truxillo, Buck, McCune, Bauer, Hammer, & Bertolino (2007) reported that 
VIES safety motivation scores had moderate to strong relationships with safety 
compliance behaviors and safety participation behaviors.  
An examination of the safety motivation items from Griffin and Neal (2000) 
and Griffin, Neal, and Hart (2000) suggests these safety motivation scales are more 
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related to expectancy-valence theory than social exchange theory. The safety 
motivation scale items from these two studies are presented in Table 5 below. Only 
two of the 15 items refer to other people (two factor version #s 8 and 11), and none 
refer to managers. On the other hand, several items seem to be tapping into the value 
individuals place on safety. For example, ‘I feel that it is important to maintain safety 
at all times’ (single factor version #3) and ‘I believe that it is worthwhile to volunteer for 
safety related tasks’ (two factor version #9). Several items seem to be assessing the 
expectation that safety-related behaviors will lead to desired outcomes, although these 
outcomes are not made explicit. For example ‘I feel that adhering to tagout/lockout 
procedures is worthwhile’ (two factor version #1) and ‘I believe that it is worthwhile 
to volunteer for safety related tasks’ (two factor version #10). Conversely, none of the 
items seem to be assessing instrumentality or the belief that one can perform the 
necessary behaviors to obtain the desired outcome. Therefore, while Griffin, Neal, and 
colleagues do not specifically refer to expectancy-valence theory, their safety 
motivation measures appear to tap into the value workers place on safety outcomes 
and the expectations that safety-related behaviors will lead to desired outcomes. Two 
intervention studies also offer support for an expectancy-valence approach to safety 
motivation. 
Cooper, Phillips, Sutherland, & Makin (1994) describe a goal setting and 
feedback intervention to reduce accident rates. Goal setting affects performance by 
directing attention and behaviors, mobilizing effort, increasing persistence, and 
motivating the search for performance strategies (Locke & Latham, 2002). In terms of 
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expectancy-valence theory, goal setting highlights the valence of goal achievement, 
and in conjunction with feedback, strengthens the perception that behaviors can be 
performed which will lead to valued outcomes. The authors found that goal setting and 
feedback increased safety behaviors and led to reduced accident rates. In another 
interesting study, Lingard (2002) found that first aid training affected the safety 
motivation and safety behaviors of Australian construction workers. Following first 
aid training workers were less willing to accept current levels of safety on the job and 
reported increase perceptions of risk. They also reported more awareness of the 
importance of safety behaviors. While Lingard did not specifically relate these 
findings to expectancy-valence theory her results suggest that following first aid 
training the workers placed a greater value on behaving safely–possibly in reaction to 
increased perceptions of risk–and believed that they could improve the levels of safety 
on the worksite. In summary, these studies suggest that safety motivation, whether 
stemming from social exchange relationships or expectancy-valence cognitions (or a 
combination of both), is related to safety behaviors as posited by Griffin & Neal 
(2004).  
However, several other studies of safety motivation have taken a less 
theoretical approach. For example, Newman, Griffin, and Mason (2008) studied 
factors related to work-related driving accidents. They found that driver’s attitudes 
towards rule violations (e.g. speeding) and safe driving self-efficacy were both 
positively related to safety motivation, which predicted self-reported driving accidents. 
Maierhofer, Griffin, & Sheehan (2000) examined how managers’ values for safety and 
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time urgency (production pressure) were conveyed to subordinates, and the effect of 
these values and behavioral modeling on behavior. Interestingly, while subordinates 
tended to show value congruence with their managers, only time urgency values were 
related (inversely) to safety behaviors. Modeling of safe behaviors by managers was 
also positively related to subordinate safe behavior. Finally, Mullen (2004) conducted 
a qualitative study of the factors affecting safety behaviors at work. She describes 
several organizational and social factors that are likely to affect safety motivation. 
Organizational factors included role overload which leads to a focus on performance 
over safety and socialization of employees to violate safety rules. Social factors 
affecting safety behaviors included coercive pressure to violate safety rules from co-
workers and supervisors, negative attitudes towards safety, the need to maintain an 
image as competent or tough and avoiding teasing and harassment from co-workers 
for behaving safely. This study, along with Maierhofer, et al. show how behavioral 
constructs such as modeling, reinforcement, and punishment can be applied to safety 
motivation. 
In summary, safety motivation has been studied from different theoretical 
perspectives and measured with different instruments. As predicted by Griffin and 
Neal (2004) safety motivation acts as a mediator between safety climate and safety 
behaviors. A variety of interventions affect safety motivation including supervisor 
modeling, goal setting and feedback, reinforcing and aversive social 
relationships/interactions, risk perceptions and safety sensitivity, and expected 
outcomes.  
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Safety Behaviors 
By some estimates 80-90% of all industrial accidents can be attributed to the 
actions of individuals (Reason, 1990), however, there are a number of influences on 
workers’ behavior. Reason suggests that accidents are often caused by unintentional 
errors by the involved worker or co-workers. Failure to comply with safety procedures 
(poor safety compliance) and a lack of effort to improve safety (poor safety 
participation) can lead to pre-existing hazards (e.g., poor housekeeping) that increase 
vulnerability to accidents for the whole work group. As the proportion of unsafe 
employees in a group increases, hazards will tend to accumulate over time, thereby 
increasing the probability of accidents for the group as a whole. This is not to suggest 
that individuals bear the sole, or even primary, responsibility for unintentional errors 
that result in accumulating hazards and accidents. Several researchers have shown that 
organizational safety policies and procedures, organizational safety climate, 
supervisors’ safety practices, and unit-level safety climate have direct and indirect 
effects on individual workers’ safety behaviors (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2004; Zohar, 
2003a). 
Safety behavior has been firmly established as the most proximal antecedent of 
safety outcomes like accidents/injuries (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Griffin, Neal, & Hart, 
2000; Johnson, 2007; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Studies supporting the mediated 
relationships in the Griffin and Neal model have been presented above. Therefore, in 
this section I will discuss research related to supervisory interactions and intra-
individual influences on safety behavior.  
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As the safety climate studies presented in Chapter II and summarized earlier 
clearly show, supervisors have a strong influence on the safety-related behaviors of 
their subordinates. Two others studies reinforce the importance of supervisor 
interactions and feedback on safety performance. Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, and 
Bailey (1996) described an intervention in which roofers earned time off with pay 
when they reached or surpassed 80% compliance with a safety checklist. Baseline 
levels of safety compliance averaged 53% and increased to 93% following the 
intervention. Similarly, Luria, Zohar, and Erev (2008) reported that the physical layout 
of the work area had a direct effect on the frequency of supervisor-subordinate 
interactions. When employees were clearly visible to their supervisors there were 
more supervisor-employee interactions and more safe behaviors than in situations 
where employees were less visible. These results are consistent with previous studies 
(Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003) showing the importance of supervisor-employee 
interactions in promoting safety behaviors. 
A number of studies have documented the effect of intra-individual influences 
such as reactions to work stress and boredom, and personality traits, on safety 
behaviors. This research has been reviewed in chapter III so I will only summarize the 
literature here. In general, these factors are assumed to cause distraction and lapses of 
attention, which lead to unsafe behaviors. For example, Rundmo (1992) found that 
work stress was related to human errors and injuries. In addition, cognitive failures are 
related to unsafe behaviors and accidents (Larson et al., 1997; Wallace and 
Vodanovich, 2003a). Similarly, Game (2007) found that the ability to cope with 
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boredom was related to employees’ well-being and compliance with safety rules. 
Relative to low boredom-copers, high boredom-copers tended to cope with boredom at 
work in ways that were more functional for themselves and the organization. For 
example, they would try to develop new strategies to perform job tasks better, while 
low boredom-copers were more likely to seek excitement and violate rules. Finally, 
personality traits are also related to safety behaviors. For example, some studies have 
reported that conscientiousness and agreeableness are related to safety behaviors and 
accidents (Arthur & Graziano, 1996; Cellar et al., 2001; Clarke & Robertson, 2005, 
2008; Wallace & Chen, 2006). In addition, extraversion and neuroticism are related to 
unsafe behaviors and accidents (Hansen, 1988; Lajunen, 2001; Ozkan & Lajunen, 
2007). However, not all researchers have been able to demonstrate these relationships 
(cf. Salgado, 2002), and the effect sizes are typically small.  
In summary, unsafe behaviors are direct antecedents of accidents and injuries, 
but a number of organizational, social, and intra-personal factors affect behaviors at 
work. Interactions with supervisors and co-workers may be the most important 
influences. When supervisors convey the importance of safety to their workers (a 
strong, positive safety climate) through monitoring, feedback, and coaching, safety 
behaviors increase and accidents/injuries decrease. In addition, intra-individual 
variables can cause workers to become distracted, suffer lapses of attention, or seek 
excitement in response to boredom, all of which can lead to unsafe behaviors and 
accidents/injuries. 
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CHAPTER V 
Hypotheses 
The primary aim of this study was to test the relationships in a proposed model 
relating managers’ personality to safety in the workplace. This study expands our 
knowledge of workplace safety by incorporating the effects of supervisors’ personality 
on the development of safety climate. In particular, this is the first study, to my 
knowledge, that examines the effects of supervisors’ proactive personality and Big 
Five trait-level variables on the development of safety climate in workgroups. In 
addition, the effect of supervisors’ proactive personality on workers’ perceptions of 
unit-level safety climate should be moderated by supervisors’ perceptions of 
organizational safety climate. 
This study also expands our knowledge by investigating the effect of workers’ 
trait-level Big Five personality variables on workers’ safety motivation and two types 
of safety behaviors, which to my knowledge has not been investigated. Specifically, I 
posit that workers’ trait-level personality variables will be directly related to safety 
motivation and indirectly related to both types of safety behaviors.  
Third, this study seeks to gather further evidence on the validity of the VIES 
measure of safety motivation. Specifically, this study evaluated the validity of the 
VIES within the Neal and Griffin (2004) framework (see Figure 3) on a sample of 
construction and maintenance workers. This allowed for a confirmatory factor analysis 
with a sample of construction and maintenance workers employed full-time. In 
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addition, this study tested the cross-level effects of workgroup safety climate on safety 
motivation as assessed by the VIES. 
Finally, this study provided a partial replication of the Neal and Griffin 
mediated model. While the model has received good empirical support, some studies 
have not supported full mediation (e.g. Griffin & Neal, 2000). The fully mediated 
model was evaluated against partially mediated models, which might suggest the need 
for model revision. Detailed evidence supporting each hypothesis (presented in the 
preceding chapters) is reviewed, and a detailed description of each hypothesis is 
reviewed below. The study model with hypotheses is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Supervisor Personality 
Proactive personality. In Zohar’s (2003a) multilevel climate model 
supervisory safety practices have a direct effect on group-level safety climate and 
safety behaviors. As employees try to determine what behaviors are desirable and 
rewarded at work they focus on both organizational-level consequences (performance 
evaluations, pay raises, job transfers) and unit-level consequences stemming from 
their immediate supervisor’s frequency and intensity of monitoring safety behaviors, 
and responding to safety issues. Proactive personality is related to leadership styles 
and behaviors that are positively related to safety climate, such as transformational 
leadership (Bateman & Crant, 1993), charismatic leadership (Crant & Bateman, 2000), 
and relationship building (Finkelstein, Kulas, & Dages, 2003). Leadership style is 
related to safety climate (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & 
Francis, 2006), and supervisors with a transformational leadership style tend to foster 
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a positive safety climate. Transformational leaders are able to convey the importance 
of safety to their subordinates, inspire and motivate their subordinates to work for the  
collective good, spur new ways of thinking to improve safety, and take an active 
interest in their subordinates’ welfare and well-being. Therefore, if supervisors with a 
proactive personality are more likely to have a transformational leadership style, they 
should also be more likely to foster a strong, positive safety climate in their work 
groups. 
 However, the relationship between proactive personality and workers’ 
perceptions of safety climate should depend on supervisors’ perceptions of the value 
the organization places on safety relative to production. In other words, the level 
(positive or negative) of the organizational safety climate. When the supervisors 
perceive that the organization values safety, proactive behaviors by supervisors are 
more likely to be directed to improving safety in their workgroups, and thus, lead to a 
more positive unit-level safety climate. On the other hand, if the supervisors perceive 
that the organization places more value on production, supervisors’ proactive 
behaviors should be directed to increasing output in their workgroups, leading to a less 
positive safety climate. Figure 7 shows the expected moderation of the relationship 
between supervisors’ proactive personality and unit-level safety climate. 
Hypothesis 1: Supervisors’ perception of organizational safety climate will 
moderate the relationship between supervisors’ proactive personality and unit-level 
safety climate.  
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Agreeableness and extraversion traits. Workgroup supervisors play the most 
important role in the development of safety climate through monitoring and feedback 
(Zohar & Luria, 2003). In addition, several studies suggest that leadership styles which 
convey concern for the well-being of subordinates and foster trust in management are 
related to the development of a positive safety climate (Barling, Loughlin, & 
Kelloway, 2002; Conchie & Burns, 2009; Conchie & Donald, 2009; Kelloway, 
Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Luria, 2010; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; Zohar, 2003b) and a 
variety of safety outcomes (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann, Morgeson, & 
Gerras, 2003). Supervisors high on two extraversion traits (friendliness and 
cheerfulness) and one agreeableness trait (altruism) should be skilled at initiating and 
maintaining social relationships, fostering trust in management, conveying the 
importance of worker’s safety and well-being, and providing safety-related feedback 
to their subordinates, all of which should foster a positive safety climate in their 
workgroups.  
Since the relationship between supervisors Big Five traits and workgroup 
safety climate has not been studied, the traits of cheerfulness, friendliness, and 
altruism were chosen because they are likely to lead to behaviors which would 
facilitate interpersonal relationships and trust between supervisors and workers. 
However, I will measure all of the traits of extraversion and agreeableness and 
conduct exploratory tests of their relationships to workgroup safety climate. 
Hypothesis 2: The extraversion traits of a) cheerfulness, and b) friendliness in 
supervisors will be positively related to the development of a positive workgroup-level 
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safety climate; c) The agreeableness trait of altruism in supervisors will be positively 
related to the development of a positive workgroup-level safety climate. 
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between the traits of 
extraversion and agreeableness in supervisors and workgroup-level safety climate 
perceptions? 
Worker Personality.  
Conscientiousness traits. Several researchers have documented relationships 
between conscientious traits, work attitudes and work behaviors. Hough (1992) 
reported that dependability predicted law abiding behaviors (following rules), and 
Moon (2001) found that dutifulness related to acting for the benefit of the organization. 
In addition, Dudley et al. (2006) reported that dependability is related to job dedication 
and counterproductive work behaviors. However, none of these studies examined 
motivation as a mediator of the relationship between personality and work behaviors. 
Barrick and Mount (1995) noted conscientiousness and its traits are better predictors 
of “will do” behaviors than “can do” behaviors, and Christian, et al. (2009) found 
safety motivation fully mediated the relationship between conscientiousness and safety 
performance. Similarly, Barrick, Stewart, and Piotrowski (2002) found that motivation 
mediates the relationship between Big Five personality factors and job performance. 
These studies suggests that conscientiousness traits should affect safety behaviors 
through their effect on safety motivation.  
On rational grounds two traits of conscientious seem most relevant to safety 
outcomes, order and cautiousness. People high on order have been described as 
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organized, careful, methodical and thorough. Similarly, people high on cautiousness 
are viewed as thorough, careful, patient, and not easily distracted. Workers high on 
these traits are likely to comply with safety rules and procedures, which often requires 
extra time and effort. In addition, they are likely to be aware of potential hazards and 
take action to remove hazards from the workplace. The foregoing suggests that the 
conscientiousness traits of order and cautiousness should be related to safety 
motivation and safety compliance behaviors (performing prescribed safety behaviors). 
However, I will measure all the traits of conscientiousness and conduct exploratory 
tests of their relationships with safety motivation and safety compliance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 3: The conscientiousness traits of a) orderliness and b) cautiousness 
will be positively related to safety motivation in workers. 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between any of the traits of 
conscientiousness in workers and safety motivation? 
Agreeableness traits. Ashton (1998) found that agreeableness is negatively 
related to counterproductive work behaviors. Similarly, Clarke and Robertson (2005; 
2008) examined the relationships between Big Five personality factors and accident 
involvement. The best predictor of accident involvement in these two meta-analyses 
was low agreeableness. Estimated true score correlation coefficients between low 
agreeableness and accidents ranged from ρ = .26 - .44. More importantly, low 
agreeableness was the only Big Five factor determined to be valid and generalizable in 
both meta-analyses. Finally, Chen (2009) found that the trait of altruism was 
negatively related to risk-taking attitudes. It is expected that two traits of 
Hypotheses 104 
agreeableness (altruism and trust) will be indirectly related to safety participation 
behavior through a positive affect on safety motivation (Barrick, et al., 2002). Safety 
participation behaviors are discretionary (contextual) safety-related behaviors, for 
example, volunteering for safety-related activities, or removing hazards in the 
workplace to prevent injuries to self or others.  
Rationally, two traits of agreeableness seem relevant to safety outcomes, 
altruism and trust. People high on altruism are warm, kind, tolerant, and soft-hearted, 
while people high on trust are forgiving, trusting, open, and soft-hearted. Altruism 
reflects warm and kind feelings towards others which should provide motivation to act 
for the benefit of others. Similarly, workers scoring high on trust should be amiable 
work-team members who develop good relationships with co-workers, again 
enhancing the motivation to act for the benefit of others. The foregoing suggests that 
the agreeableness traits of altruism and trust should be related to safety motivation and 
safety participation (discretionary) behaviors. However, I will measure all the traits of 
agreeableness and conduct exploratory tests of their relationships with safety 
motivation and safety participation behaviors. 
Hypothesis 4: The agreeableness traits of a) altruism and b) trust will be 
positively related to safety motivation in workers. 
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between any of the traits of 
agreeableness in workers and safety motivation? 
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Replications 
The final aims of this study involve replications of previous research. First, the 
positive relationship between safety climate and safety motivation has been modeled 
by Neal and Griffin (2004) and Zohar (2003a), and demonstrated by Neal, Griffin, and 
colleagues (Neal, et al., 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006) will be replicated using 
hierarchical linear modeling. 
Hypothesis 5: Workgroup-level safety climate will be positively related to 
safety motivation after controlling for the individual-level Big Five traits of altruism, 
trust, cautiousness, and orderliness.  
Second, confirmatory factor analysis will replicate previous results showing 
the proposed three factor structure of the VIES (Truxillo, et al., 2006, 2007). The three 
factors represent valence, instrumentality, and expectancy as defined by expectancy-
valence theory (cf. Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Finally, the fit of the fully mediated 
study model (see Figure 1) will be tested against other possible partially mediated 
models. 
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Chapter VI 
Method 
In this study three sources of data were gathered from municipal employees: 
self-report, supervisor-report, and archival data. Supervisors self-reported on proactive 
personality and Big Five traits. Supervisors also rated their subordinates’ safety 
behaviors. Workgroup members self-reported on Big Five traits, safety motivation, 
safety behaviors, and accidents/injuries. Finally, archival data was collected on 
accidents/injuries for the organization, but not individual workgroup members because 
of confidentiality concerns. These data are compiled by risk managers and includes 
workers’ injuries and accidents, including vehicle accidents. 
A power analysis was conducted using a Java applet from Lenth (2009) to 
determine the size of the workgroup member sample needed to detect an effect. Zohar 
(2002) reported an average ∆R2 = .26 for two types of leadership styles 
(transformational and contingent reward) in predicting safety climate. While little 
work has documented the relationship between trait-level personality variables and 
motivation, two studies provided benchmarks for the effect size used in this power 
analysis. Barrick and Mount (1995) suggest that conscientiousness and its traits are 
better predictors of motivation than task skill. Their meta-analysis showed small to 
moderate effect sizes (ρ2 =.07-.19) for conscientiousness and two of its traits 
(achievement and dependability) in predicting motivation. In addition, Dudley, et al. 
(2006) reported that conscientiousness traits showed incremental validity (∆R2 = .259) 
over conscientiousness in predicting job dedication.  
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The current power analysis was conducted to determine the sample size needed 
to have an 80% chance of detecting an effect using multiple regression. Conservative 
effect size estimates were used. For Hypothesis 1 predicting the moderated effect of 
supervisors’ proactive personality on group-level safety climate, and Hypothesis 2 
predicting positive relationships between the three Big Five traits in supervisors, a 
predicted effect size of ∆R2 = .26 was entered. Given this estimate, a sample of 33 
supervisors will be needed to obtain the desired power. For Hypotheses 3 and 4, job 
tenure was entered as a demographic control variable with a predicted effect size of 
∆R2 = .02. Second, the four Big Five traits (altruism, trust, cautiousness, orderliness) 
were entered with a predicted effect size of ∆R2 = .08. Given these estimates of effect 
size, a sample size of 140 workgroup members would be needed to have an 80% 
chance of detecting an effect. 
Participants. Construction/maintenance and other field workers, and 
supervisors from a moderately sized Western city municipal bureau in the United 
States participated in this study. Participants were sampled either with paper-and-
pencil surveys in small groups, or with a web survey. Both surveys had identical 
content. Participants who completed the paper-and-pencil survey received a short 
verbal introduction to the survey and read an informed consent cover letter describing 
the survey. A total of the 178 paper-and-pencil surveys were distributed to workers 
and supervisors. Of these 131 usable surveys (74%) were returned. The remainder 
either did not complete the survey or were unable to be assigned to a workgroup. An 
examination of the organizational chart suggests that there were 213 workers and 
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supervisors who could have potentially completed the survey, thus, about 84% of the 
domain was sampled. Employees who took the web survey received an email from the 
Bureau administrator introducing the survey and asking for their participation. They 
also received an informed consent cover letter and clicked on a link to begin the 
survey. The web survey was part of a larger data collection and was sent to employees 
at other organizational sites who also had more computer access. An examination of 
the organizational chart suggested an additional 94 workers and supervisors who 
received the email about the survey that could be potential study participants. Of these, 
43 returned usable electronic surveys (46%). The final sample (N = 174) consisted of 
28 supervisors and 146 workers. 
Participants in this study were divided into two groups. The first group consists 
of unit-level supervisors and “lead persons” (hereafter referred to as supervisors) who 
are in charge of work-groups performing construction and maintenance work for the 
municipality. The second group consists of the workers in each workgroup. A total of 
28 workgroups were sampled. Workgroup sizes varied from three to 24 workers (mean 
= 5.21; SD = 4.20; n = 146) and one supervisor (n = 28). Sample demographics will be 
presented separately for supervisors and workers.  
Supervisor sample. The average age of the sample was 46.96 years (SD = 7.38 
years; n = 28) and was predominantly male (93%) and Caucasian (89.3%). African-
Americans, Pacific Islanders, and “other” accounted for 3.6% each. Exactly half of 
supervisors reported some college or an associate’s degree followed by 28.6% with a 
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high-school diploma, 17.9% with a bachelor’s degree, and 3.6% with graduate degrees. 
Supervisors’ average organizational tenure was 14.89 years (SD = 7.82 years). 
Worker sample. The average age of the sample was 44.16 years (SD = 10.72 
years; n = 146) and was predominantly male (91%) and Caucasian (81.5%). The 
second highest racial category was “other” with 11.6%. All other groups accounted for 
less than 3% each. More than half (52.1%) of workers reported some college or an 
associate’s degree followed by 24.7% with a high-school diploma, 19.2% with a 
bachelor’s degree. Graduate degrees and “some high school” accounted for less than 
3% each. Workers’ average organizational tenure was 9.66 years (SD = 7.37 years). 
Measures 
 Supervisor surveys. Supervisors completed five measures of personality along 
with measures of organizational safety climate perceptions, safety behavior ratings of 
workers, and demographic items. Proactive personality was measured with a 10-item 
scale from Siebert, Crant, and Kraimer (1999; α = .87), which was derived from the 
original 17-item scale by Bateman and Crant (1993). Participants responded to each 
item on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Sample 
items include “I am constantly on the lookout for new ways to improve my life” and “I 
excel at identifying opportunities.” 
In addition, three Big Five trait-level variables were measured with items from 
the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999). Only the positively 
worded items were used for the trait-level scales in this study. Participants responded 
to all trait-level items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very inaccurate, 5 = very accurate). 
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Two traits of extraversion were measured. Cheerfulness (8 items; α = .86) corresponds 
to the positive emotions trait scale in the NEO-PIR (McCrae & Costa, 1992). Sample 
items include “I radiate joy” and “I look at the bright side of life.” Friendliness (5 
items; α = .88) corresponds to the warmth trait scale in the NEO-PIR (McCrae & 
Costa, 1992). Sample items include “I make friends easily” and “I feel comfortable 
around people.” A single agreeableness trait, Altruism (5 items; α = .86) corresponds 
to the altruism trait scale in the NEO-PIR (McCrae & Costa, 1992). Sample items 
include “I anticipate the needs of others” and “I am concerned about others.” Since 
trait-level personality variables have not been assessed as predictors of safety 
outcomes, all of the traits for extraversion and agreeableness will be measured and 
examined in an exploratory manner. However, only cheerfulness, friendliness, and 
altruism are hypothesized to effect the development of group-level safety climate.  
 The final personality measure was a 5-item measure of emotional stability 
from the IPIP (α = .77; Goldberg, 1999) which was used as a control variable. Only 
positive items were used and participants responded on the same 5-point Likert scale 
used for the facet measures. A sample item is “I feel comfortable with myself.”  
Organizational safety climate perceptions in supervisors were assessed by a 
16-item scale from Zohar and Luria (2005; α = .92). A sample item is “Top 
management in this bureau reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety 
hazards.” In addition, two items from the safety climate scale used by Dedobbeleer 
and Beland (1991) were adapted and appended to the Zohar and Luria scale. These 
items are “Top management believes workers’ safety practices are important for the 
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management of this bureau” and “Supervisors and top management seem to care about 
workers’ safety.” Supervisors responded to the organizational safety climate items on 
a 5-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). The internal 
consistency of the combined scale (α = .90) was slightly lower than that reported by 
Zohar and Luria (2005). 
In addition, supervisors were asked to rate each of their workgroup members 
on two types of safety behaviors described by Neal and Griffin (2004). Safety 
compliance behaviors were measured with a three-item scale (α = .96) from Neal and 
Griffin (2006). A sample item is “The worker uses all necessary safety equipment to 
do his/her job.” Safety participation behaviors were measured with a three-item scale 
(α = .94) from Griffin and Neal (2006). A sample item is “The worker promotes the 
safety program within the organization.” Supervisors responded to the safety behavior 
items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The 
wording of the items on the two scales was adapted from a self-report format to a 
rating of subordinates’ safety behaviors.  
While I am unaware of any studies which used supervisor ratings of 
subordinates’ safety behaviors using the Neal and Griffin (2006) scales, there is along 
history of supervisors rating subordinates’ behaviors (i.e. performance evaluations; 
Viswesvaran, 2001). Viswesvaran notes that supervisor ratings tend to correlate higher 
with organizational records than peer ratings, suggesting supervisor ratings are more 
accurate. Borman and Motowidlo (1993) recommend rating both task and contextual 
behaviors, which are reflected in the Neal and Griffin scales as safety compliance 
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behaviors (task behaviors) and safety performance behaviors (contextual behaviors), 
respectively. In addition, Motowidlo, Borman, and Schmit (1997) suggest that 
performance ratings should focus on homogenous sets of behaviors rather than results 
or outcomes which may be out of the workers’ control. An examination of the Neal 
and Griffin items reveals such a focus on behaviors. Finally, two studies using 
supervisor ratings of subordinates’ safety behaviors—using different scales—
demonstrated adequate reliability (αs = .86 - .96; Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & Smith-
Crowe, 2002; Wallace & Chen, 2006). The forgoing suggests that supervisor ratings of 
subordinates’ safety behaviors using the Neal and Griffin (2006) items are likely to be 
reliable and valid. In the current study, while supervisors provided only 40 ratings of 
subordinates’ (n = 146) safety behaviors, the reliability of the supervisor ratings was 
slightly higher than those of workers reporting on their own safety behaviors.  
Finally, age, gender, and organizational tenure were collected as control 
variables as some previous research has documented relationships between these 
demographic variables and accidents/injuries (Liao, Arvey, Butler, & Nutting, 2001; 
Loughlin & Frone, 2004). In addition, while most studies do not report significant 
relationships between demographic variables and safety outcomes, Hansen (1988) 
recommends controlling for demographic variables, and these variables are also 
commonly used to control for extraneous variance in multiple regression analyses (e.g. 
Arthur, Barrett, & Alexander, 1991; Arthur & Graziano, 1996; Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, 
& Kuhlman, 2005; Hansen, 1989; Iveson & Erwin, 1997). Gender was coded 0 = 
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female, 1 = male, age and job tenure were recorded in months. Items for the supervisor 
survey are presented in Appendix A. 
Worker survey. Workers responded to four trait-level personality scales from 
the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999), on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very inaccurate, 5 = very 
accurate). Two traits of agreeableness were measured, altruism (α = .87; sample items 
presented above) and trust (6 items; α = .89). Sample items from the trust scale 
include “I trust others” and “I trust what people say.” In addition, work group 
members completed two trait-level scales of conscientiousness. Cautiousness (3 items; 
α = .81) corresponds to the deliberation scale in the NEO-PIR (McCrae & Costa, 
1992). Sample items include “I avoid mistakes” and “I choose my words with care.”  
Orderliness (5 items; α = .83) corresponds to the order scale in the NEO-PIR (McCrae 
& Costa, 1992). Sample items include “I like to tidy up” and “I do things according to 
plan.” Again, all of the traits for agreeableness and conscientiousness were measured 
and examined in an exploratory manner. However, only altruism, trust, cautiousness, 
and orderliness were hypothesized to effect workgroup members’ safety motivation.  
Workers also responded to scales measuring safety climate, safety motivation, 
and two types of safety behaviors on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). Safety climate was measured with a 10 item scale (Zohar, 2000) and 
showed good reliability (α = .88). Sample items include “My direct supervisor 
discusses how to improve safety with us” and “My direct supervisor is strict about 
working safely when we are tired or stressed.”  
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Safety motivation was measured with the 13-item VIES (Truxillo et al., 2006, 
2007; α = .95). The VIES consists of three subscales, valence, instrumentality, and 
expectancy which can be scored separately or combined into a total score. The total 
score was used in this study since a confirmatory factor analysis suggested adequate fit 
for a single second-order factor model (χ2 = 113.226, p < .05, CFI = .963, GFI = .898, 
RMSEA = .078). Model fit was improved slightly by allowing the error terms on three 
of the instrumentality items to covary.  Sample items include “Job safety is important 
to me” (valence), “If I stick to safety rules I can avoid accidents” (instrumentality), 
and “I can perform the safety procedures if I try” (expectancy).  
Workers also responded to scales measuring the two types of safety behaviors 
described by Neal and Griffin (2004), as described above. Internal consistency was 
slightly lower among workers (Safety Compliance Behaviors α = .89; Safety 
Participation Behaviors α = .89) than supervisors, but both showed more than 
adequate internal consistency. Finally, age, gender, and organizational tenure were 
collected as control variables. Items for the workgroup member survey are presented 
in Appendix B. 
Safety outcomes. Two measures of accidents and injuries were used. First, 
organizational records were used to measure accidents, and injuries for the broad 
organizational units in this study. These are commonly referred to as OSHA 
recordables, which are company records of accidents and injuries required by law. 
Unfortunately, several researchers have found that accidents and injuries tend to be 
underreported in official company records (cf. Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008). 
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Probst et al. found that the annual injury rate was more than three times higher when 
medical insurance records were examined. The current archival data includes workers’ 
compensation claims, which Probst et al. suggest are likely to be more accurate. 
However, due to confidentiality concerns no individual data was obtained. In addition 
while it is not certain that underreporting of accidents and injuries occurred within 
municipal bureau in which the study participants are employed, self-reported accidents 
and injuries were also elicited from individual workers to be compared with 
organizational records. All measures used in the study are summarized in Table 6. 
Procedure 
Participants were sampled using either paper-and-pencil or electronic surveys. 
Approximately three-fourths of the participants (n = 131) completed paper-and-pencil 
surveys in small groups, which were scheduled with the help of municipal bureau 
training staff. The rest of the participants completed the survey via computer as part of 
an ongoing research/training effort between university faculty and the municipal 
bureau. Participants who took the paper-and-pencil were mostly from the bureau’s 
main field facility, while those who took the electronic survey tended to work out of 
other locations, and also had more access to the municipal computer network while at 
work. A series of t-tests were run to check for differences on all study variables by 
survey type. Significant differences were found for workers on orderliness (t
 (144) =  
-2.05, p < .05), and altruism (t(144) = -2.45, p < .05). Given these differences, survey 
type was used as a control variable in analyses with these two scales. No significant 
differences were found for supervisors.    
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The nature of the study was explained to participants completing the paper-
and-pencil survey, questions from the group were answered, and they were asked to 
participate in the study. A cover letter was included with both surveys which 
explained the study, including potential costs and benefits. In addition, the electronic 
survey included a letter from the bureau administrator in the e-mail invitation 
encouraging participation. Completion of the survey was considered evidence of 
informed consent. A gift card raffle was held to compensate participants for their time 
and effort.  
In order to maintain confidentiality, the names of supervisors and workers 
were separated from the main data file. A separate file was created with participants’ 
names and a code. Supervisors received a letter code (e.g. A, B, C, etc.) to denote their 
workgroup, while corresponding workers received an alphanumeric code reflecting 
their workgroup (e.g. A01, B06). Each participant was identified in the main data file 
only by their code. The file names with the names and codes was available only to 
myself, and will not be made available to the municipal bureau in any form. Once all 
participants are coded, the name-code list was only used to determine the names of the 
gift card raffle winners. Participants who completed the survey but could not be 
matched to a workgroup were not included in this study but were eligible for the gift 
card drawing. All participants who provided their name on  a survey were included in 
a drawing for six $50 Visa gift cards. A total of 221 participants were entered in the 
drawing making the odds of winning about 1 out of 37. 
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Analysis Strategy   
 In this study, individual workers are nested in workgroups which violates the 
assumption of independent observations in ordinary least squares regression. In 
addition, group-level safety climate—the aggregated perceptions of group members—
is hypothesized to mediate the relationship between supervisors’ personality variables 
and individual workers’ safety motivation. Therefore, a combination of hierarchical 
linear modeling, multiple regression, and path modeling was used to analyze the data. 
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Chapter VII 
 
Results 
 
Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence limits for all study variables 
are presented in Table 7 for the individual-level (Level 1) participants, and Table 8 for 
the supervisor-level (Level 2) participants. Table 9 presents the intercorrelations and 
internal consistencies of all variables measured at the individual- or worker-level, 
while Table 10 presents the same for the supervisor- or workgroup- level.   
At the supervisor-level (Level 2; see model Figure 1) all instruments showed 
adequate internal consistency, with αs ranging from .74 to .90.  The decision to 
aggregate worker’s individual safety climate perceptions to the workgroup-level was 
based on the results of a one-way ANOVA, ICC(1), ICC(2), and Rwg(j) as 
recommended by Bliese (2000), Hofmann and Stetzer (1996, 1998) and Hofmann, 
Morgeson, and Geras (2003). The results of the one-way ANOVA suggest that safety 
climate varied significantly by workgroup (F(27, 118) = 3.64, p < .001). Intraclass 
correlations were calculated from the ANOVA results. The calculation of the ICC(1) 
takes group size into account. When the size of the groups is unequal, Bliese suggests 
that the mean group size can often be used. However, when there is considerable 
variability in group size, as in the current study, Bliese suggests an averaging 
procedure described by Blalock (1972) which reduces the effect of extreme scores on 
the mean. Therefore, Blalock’s formula to compute average group size was used. The 
ICC(1) = .31, suggesting that 31% of the variance in safety climate scores was due to 
group membership. The ICC(2) = .66, suggesting adequate reliability of mean safety 
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climate scores by group. To assess the within-group consistency of responding 
compared to a uniform distribution, the Rwg(j) was calculated (James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1984). The Rwg(j) = .94 suggesting a high level of within-group consistency. 
Taken together, these statistics provided sufficient evidence to justify aggregation of 
individual safety climate perceptions to the workgroup-level (see Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1996, 1998; Hofmann, Morgeson, & Geras, 2003). 
An examination the correlations of variables at the supervisor-level in Table 10 
shows no significant correlations between workgroup safety climate perceptions and 
any measure of supervisor personality. Likewise, the correlation between supervisor 
perceptions of organizational safety climate and workgroup safety climate perceptions 
approached zero (r = .06). There were several significant correlations between 
supervisor personality variables. Proactive personality was significantly correlated 
with the agreeableness traits of altruism (r = .45, p < .05) and morality (r = .44, p 
< .05), and the extraversion traits of assertiveness (r = .44,    p < .05) and activity level  
(r = .43, p < .05). Proactive personality was also significantly correlated with 
organizational safety climate (r = .43, p < .05). Emotional stability, measured as a 
control variable, showed several significant correlations with the agreeableness and 
extraversion traits, as well as with organizational safety climate (r = .38, p < .05). 
Organizational safety climate was significantly correlated with the extraversion traits 
of friendliness (r = .47, p < .05), assertiveness (r = .44, p < .05), and cheerfulness  
(r = .42, p < .05), as well as the agreeableness traits of trust (r = .47, p < .05), and 
altruism (r = .51, p < .01). Finally, the traits of extraversion and agreeableness showed 
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several significant correlations among intra-factor trait scales, and some significant 
correlations between trait scales from different factors. Notably, the three trait scales 
hypothesized to effect workgroup safety climate—cheerfulness, friendliness, and 
altruism—were all significantly correlated with each other (rs =.47 to .76). 
At the individual-level all instruments showed adequate internal consistency, 
with αs ranging from .73 to .96 (see Table 9). A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted on the VIES measure of safety motivation, which contains subscales for 
valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. A second-order latent factor model was 
fitted with Amos 18 (SPSS, 2009) and showed adequate fit with the data after 
allowing the error terms for three of the instrumentality items to covary (CMIN (60) = 
113.23, CMIN/DF = 1.89; GFI = .898, CFI = .963, RMSEA = .078).  Therefore, the 
total score for the scale will be used to assess study hypotheses. An examination of the 
correlation matrix in Table 9 shows that VIES scores correlated significantly with self-
reported safety compliance behaviors (r = .51, p < .01), self-reported safety 
participation behaviors (r = .47, p < .01), and supervisor ratings of worker’s safety 
compliance behaviors (r = .44, p < .01), but not supervisor ratings of worker’s safety 
participation behaviors (r = .27, ns). In addition, VIES scores were significantly 
correlated with all the traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness (rs =.17 to .39). 
Specifically, the four trait-level measures of worker personality which were 
hypothesized to have a direct effect on safety motivation (VIES) showed small to 
moderate, but statistically significant relationships: Orderliness (r = .26, p < .01), 
cautiousness (r = .39, p < .01), altruism (r = .26, p < .01), and trust (r = .18, p < .05).  
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Self-reported safety compliance behaviors showed significant correlations with 
all trait-level personality measures (rs =.21 to .54), while self-reported safety 
participation behaviors showed significant correlations with all trait-level personality 
measures except orderliness and modesty (rs =.03 to .41). Supervisor’s ratings of 
worker’s safety compliance were significantly correlated only with the trait of 
cautiousness (r = .42, p < .01), while supervisor’s ratings of worker’s safety 
participation behaviors were not significantly correlated with any trait measures of 
worker’s personality. Supervisor ratings of worker’s safety compliance and safety 
participation behaviors were significantly correlated (r = .73, p < .01). This correlation 
is higher than those reported in previous studies. Three studies (Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Neal & Griffin, 2006; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) examined workers’ self-reports of 
safety compliance and safety participation behaviors. They reported five correlations 
between safety compliance and safety participation behaviors (rs =.30 to .64). In the 
current study, the correlation for workers’ self-reported safety compliance and safety 
participation behaviors was r = .62. I am unaware of any studies that reported the 
correlation between supervisors’ ratings of workers’ safety compliance and safety 
participation behaviors using the Neal and Griffin scales. 
For workers, all the conscientiousness traits were significantly correlated with 
each other (rs =.45 to .81). Similarly, most of the agreeableness traits were 
significantly correlated with each other (rs =.01 to .60). Correlations between traits 
across factors also showed several significant correlations (rs =.00 to .58).  
Data Analysis Strategy 
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 In this study, individual workers are nested in workgroups which violates the 
assumption of independent observations in ordinary least squares regression. In 
addition, workgroup-level safety climate—the aggregated perceptions of group 
members—is hypothesized to mediate the relationship between supervisors’ 
personality variables and individual workers’ safety motivation. Therefore, a 
combination of multi-level modeling and multiple regression was used to analyze the 
data. In addition, replications testing for mediation in the individual section of the 
model were tested using path analysis. Before beginning the data analysis, missing 
data was imputed to maximize the sample size. When a participant failed to respond to 
all the items a given scale, the missing data were replaced with the participant’s scale 
mean. There were twelve instances of missing data, and no scale had more than two 
participants who neglected to respond to a scale item.  
Hypothesis Tests 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 pertain to Level 2, the supervisor-level; no cross-level 
effects are predicted. Multiple regression was used to test these two hypotheses (refer 
to the study model in Figure 1). Age, gender, and organizational tenure were measured 
as demographic control variables. However, in order to maximize degrees of freedom, 
only those control variables which were significantly correlated with outcome 
variables were included in statistical analyses. In addition, given the small sample size 
in Level 2 of the model (n = 28), the alpha level to determine statistical significance 
will be set at .10 one-tailed to maximize statistical power as discussed by Cascio and 
Zedeck (1983). 
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 Hypothesis 1 predicts that supervisor’s perceptions of organizational safety 
climate will moderate the effect of proactive personality on workgroup safety climate. 
To test this hypothesis a three step hierarchical regression was conducted. Since none 
of the control variables (age, gender, and organizational tenure) was significantly 
related to workgroup safety climate they were not included in either of the Level 2 
hypothesis tests. In Step 1 emotional stability was entered as a control variable. In 
Step 2 the main effects of proactive personality and organizational safety climate were 
entered. Finally, in Step 3 the interaction of proactive personality and organizational 
safety climate were entered. Table 11 shows the results of the hierarchical regression.  
While none of the effects were statistically significant, the ∆R2 for Step 2 
accounted for 4% more variance than emotional stability in Step 1 , with most of the 
effect due to proactive personality (β = .23). A two-step hierarchal regression was run 
without any control variables to maximize degrees of freedom, but no significant 
relationships were obtained. Therefore, although Hypothesis 1 was not supported, the 
results suggest that proactive personality accounted for incremental variance in 
workgroup safety climate, and that the lack of significant results might be due to a 
lack of statistical power in this analysis.  
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that three Big Five traits in supervisors—cheerfulness, 
friendliness, and altruism—would have a direct effect on workgroup safety climate. A 
two step hierarchical regression was conducted to test this hypothesis. In Step 1 
emotional stability was entered as a control variable. In Step 2 the main effects of 
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cheerfulness, friendliness, and altruism were entered. Table 12 shows the results of the 
hierarchical regression analysis.  
There were no significant predictors of workgroup safety climate. However, 
Step 2 accounted for an additional 3% of the variance above Emotional Stability. An 
additional regression was conducted with just the three trait measures as predictors but 
no significant relationships were obtained. Therefore, although Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported, the three trait measures of supervisor personality did account for 
incremental variance in workgroup safety climate above Emotional Stability. 
Research Question 1 asks what is the relationship between the traits of 
extraversion and agreeableness in supervisors and workgroup safety climate? A two-
step hierarchical regression was conducted to evaluate the research question. In Step 1 
emotional stability was entered as a control variable. In Step 2 the main effects of all 
the agreeableness and extraversion traits were entered. Table 13 shows the results of 
the regression analysis. The trait measures of supervisor personality accounted for an 
additional 60% of the variance in workgroup safety climate above emotional stability 
(p < .10, one-tailed). Several predictors were significant in the final equation including 
emotional stability, trust, morality, cooperation, sympathy, friendliness, and 
gregariousness.  
While a comparison between the trait and factor measures of supervisors’ 
personality as predictors of aggregated safety climate was not planned, an exploratory 
analysis using supervisors’ factor scores for agreeableness and extraversion was 
conducted. Factor scores were calculated from trait scores. The resulting measures 
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showed high reliability: agreeableness α = .92 and extraversion α = .93. Neither factor 
scale was significantly correlated with workgroup safety climate, although 
extraversion was significantly related to emotional stability (r = .48, p < .01, two-
tailed). Given the absence of any significant correlations with safety climate no 
regressions were conducted. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 pertain to the individual-level, while Hypothesis 5 
involves a cross-level effect. These three hypotheses were tested with hierarchical 
linear modeling. 
A series of multi-level tests were used to establish individual- and group-level 
variance in safety motivation per Hofmann, Griffin, and Gavin (2000). Since safety 
climate, a group-level variable, is hypothesized to affect safety motivation, an 
individual-level variable, there must be significant between-group variance in safety 
motivation. The first test uses a one-way ANOVA model to show that there is 
meaningful between-group variance in safety motivation. In addition, the total 
variance is partitioned into within- and between-group components. The following 
equations will be estimated: 
Level 1:  Safety motivationij = β0j + rij 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + U0j 
where 
 β0j = mean for safety motivation for group j 
  γ00 = grand mean for safety motivation 
 rij = within-group variance in safety motivation 
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 U0j = between-group variance in safety motivation 
 A chi-square test of U0j (τ00) is used to determine if there is significant 
between-group variance in safety motivation. An intraclass correlation can also be 
computed which specifies the percentage of total variance residing between groups. 
The analysis showed that there is significant between-group variance in safety 
motivation (χ2 (27; n = 28) = 33.64, p < .10, one-tailed), and the ICC = .17 suggests 
group membership accounts for a moderate portion of the variance in safety 
motivation. 
 Given significant between-group variance in safety motivation, the random-
coefficient regression model tests the hypothesis that individual-level predictors are 
associated with significant variance in safety motivation intercepts across groups. This 
model is similar to ordinary least squares regression except that intercept coefficients 
are allowed to vary across groups. The following equations will be estimated: 
Level 1: Safety motivationij = β0j + β1j(cautiousness) + β2j(orderliness) + 
  Β3j(altruism) + β4j(trust) + rij 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + U0j 
  
β1j = γ10 + U1j 
  β2j = γ20 + U2j 
  β3j = γ30 + U3j 
  β4j = γ40 + U4j 
where 
  β0j = mean for safety motivation for group j 
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  β1j – β4j = slopes for Big Five traits for group j 
  γ00 = mean of the intercepts across groups 
γ10 – γ40 = mean of slopes for Big Five traits across groups 
(Hypotheses 3 & 4) 
rij = level 1 residual variance 
U0j = variance in intercepts 
U1j – U4j = variance in slopes 
A series of t-tests for γ10 – γ40 provide direct tests of Hypotheses 3 (a & b) 
and 4 (a & b), and determine if the Big Five traits of cautiousness, orderliness, 
altruism, and trust are significantly related to safety motivation. An effect size can also 
be computed to determine the magnitude of the relationship between the Big Five 
traits and safety motivation. Table 14 shows the results of this analysis.  
The analysis shows that only worker’s cautiousness scores significantly 
predicted safety motivation (p < .05, one-tailed). Thus, Hypothesis 3a was supported 
but Hypotheses 3b and Hypotheses 4 a and 4b were not. The effect size was calculated 
by comparing the amount of Level 1 error variance in the current model (σ2 = .242) 
with that in the unconditional model (σ2 = .275) which had no Level 1 predictors, as 
suggested by Nezlek (2001). Therefore, the addition of Level 1 predictors accounted 
for an additional 3.2% of the variance in safety motivation.  
Results 128 
The final intercepts-as-outcomes model tests the effect of workgroup safety 
climate on safety motivation after controlling for Level 1 trait predictors. This model 
is similar to the random-coefficients regression model with the addition of a Level 2 
predictor (safety climate) of the variance in safety motivation intercepts (β0j) across 
groups. The following equations will be estimated: 
Level 1: Safety motivationij = β0j + β1j(cautiousness) + β2j(orderliness) + 
  Β3j(altruism) + β4j(trust) + rij 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01(safety climatej) + U0j 
  
β1j = γ10 + U1j 
  β2j = γ20 + U2j 
  β3j = γ30 + U3j 
  β4j = γ40 + U4j 
where 
  β0j = mean for safety motivation for group j 
  β1j – β4j = slopes for Big Five traits for group j 
  γ00 = level 2 intercept 
  γ01 = level 2 slope (Hypothesis 5) 
γ10 – γ40 = mean of slopes for Big Five traits across groups 
rij = level 1 residual variance 
U0j = residual intercept variance (residual variance across groups) 
U1j – U4j = variance in slopes 
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 A t-test for γ01 determines if safety climate is significantly related to group 
safety motivation after controlling for Level 1 Big Five traits (Hypothesis 5). A chi-
square test for U0j determines if there is systematic Level 2 variance that can still be 
modeled. Finally, an effect size can be computed to assess the magnitude of the 
relationship between safety climate and safety motivation. Table 15 shows the 
regression results. 
The regression results show that workgroup safety climate was a significant 
predictor (p < .10, one-tailed) of variance in  safety motivation intercepts after 
controlling for the effects of the four Big Five traits. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was 
supported. Cautiousness remained the only significant trait-level predictor of variance 
in safety motivation intercepts across groups (p < .05, one-tailed). The effect size for 
the addition of workgroup safety climate as a predictor was calculated by comparing 
the Level 2 error variance in the current model (σ2 = .241) with that of the previous 
model which did not include a Level 2 predictor (σ2 = .242), suggesting that 
workgroup safety climate accounted for only a slight increase in the variance in safety 
motivation. Finally, there is little variance that could still be modeled (χ2(26; n = 28) = 
26.97, ns). 
 Research Question 2 concerned the effect of workers’ conscientiousness traits 
on individual safety motivation. To test these effects a three-step hierarchical 
regression was run. Organizational tenure was significantly related to safety 
motivation and survey type was a significant covariate of orderliness. Therefore, both 
were entered as control variables in Step 1. In Step 2 individual safety climate 
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perceptions were entered. In Step 3 all six traits of conscientiousness were entered. 
Table 16 shows the results of the hierarchical regression. The results show that only 
individual-level safety climate significantly predicted individual safety motivation. 
However, the conscientiousness traits accounted for significant incremental variance 
in safety motivation over controls and safety climate (∆R2 = .12,  F-change(6, 135) = 
3.48  p < .01).  
Research Question 3 concerned the effect of all of the agreeableness traits on 
individual safety motivation. To test these effects a three-step hierarchical regression 
was run. As in the previous analysis in Step 1 organizational tenure and survey type 
were entered as controls. In Step 2 individual safety climate perceptions were entered. 
Finally, in Step 3 all six traits of agreeableness were entered. Table 17 shows the 
results of the hierarchical regression. Once again, individual safety climate perceptions 
were significant predictors of individual safety motivation, accounting for significant 
incremental variance (∆R2 = .07, F-change(1, 141) = 11.00,  p < .01). In addition, the six 
agreeableness traits accounted for significant incremental variance (∆R2 = .09, 
 F-change(6, 135) = 2.60, p < .05). The only significant agreeableness trait predictor of 
safety motivation was morality. 
Two further exploratory analyses were conducted to determine the effect of 
workers’ conscientiousness and agreeableness factors on individual safety motivation. 
As described earlier, factor scores were computed from trait scale scores and both 
scales showed good reliability: conscientiousness (α = .95) and agreeableness (α = .89). 
In addition, both factors were significantly correlated with safety motivation 
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(agreeableness r = .32, p < .01; conscientiousness r = .37, p < .01). To test the utility 
of both factors in predicting safety motivation a three step hierarchical regression was 
conducted. In Step 1 organizational tenure was entered as a control variable since it 
was significantly correlated with safety motivation (r = -.23, p < .01). In Step 2 
individual safety climate was entered, and in Step 3 agreeableness and 
conscientiousness were entered. Table 18 shows the results of the hierarchical 
regression. In Step 2 individual safety climate accounted for significant additional 
variance in safety motivation above organizational tenure (∆R2 = .07, F-change(1, 142) = 
10.77,  p < .01). Likewise, in Step 3 agreeableness and conscientiousness accounted 
for significant additional variance (∆R2 = .10, F-change(2, 140) = 9.27,  p < .01), with 
conscientious acting as a significant predictor of safety motivation.  
Replications 
Replication of the individual-level portion of the model (see Figure 1) were 
tested using path modeling. The model describes fully mediated relationships between 
safety climate, personality traits, safety motivation, two types of safety behaviors, and 
accidents and injuries. There are also a number of partially mediated models which 
can be tested. For example, the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behaviors may be only partially mediated by safety motivation (cf. Griffin & Neal, 
2000; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). Finally, Barrick, Stewart, and Piotrowski (2002) 
suggest that motivation mediates the relationship between personality and behavior. 
Therefore safety motivation will be tested as a mediator of the relationship between 
workers’ Big Five traits and safety behaviors. 
Results 132 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) four conditions are necessary to 
demonstrate mediation. First, the independent variable must be significantly related to 
the mediator. Second, the mediator must be significantly related to the dependent 
variable. Third, the independent variable must be significantly related to the dependent 
variable. Finally, the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable becomes non-significant when the relationships between the independent 
variable and the mediator, and between the mediator and the dependent variable are 
controlled.  
 To satisfy Baron and Kenny’s (1986) initial conditions Howell (2002) suggests 
examining the correlations between the three variables. The hierarchical regressions 
conducted to evaluate Research Questions 2 and 3, along with an examination of 
correlations between Level 1 study variables suggests five possible mediation 
pathways all involving safety motivation as the mediator. First, safety motivation 
mediates the relationship between safety climate and safety participation behaviors. 
Second, safety motivation mediates the relationship between cautiousness and safety 
compliance behaviors. Third, safety motivation mediates the relationship between 
cautiousness and safety participation behaviors. Fourth, safety motivation mediates the 
relationship between morality and safety compliance behaviors. Finally, safety 
motivation mediates the relationship between morality and safety participation 
behaviors. 
 Path analysis was used to simultaneously test all five possible mediation 
pathways. Figure 8 shows the basic path model without mediation pathways, and with 
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regression coefficients. The model did not fit the data well (χ2 (16) = 44.96, p < .01; 
CFI = .91; RMSEA = .11). Figure 9 shows the mediation model with regression 
coefficients. The model fit was improved when the mediating pathways were entered 
(χ2 (11) = 6.86, ns; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .001). The chi-square difference statistic 
shows the mediation model accounted for significantly more covariance than the basic 
model (χ2difference (4) = 38.10, p < .001). 
 The path analysis showed full or partial mediation for all five of the possible 
mediation pathways. Sobel’s (1982) test was also conducted to evaluate the complete 
mediation pathway from the independent variable to the mediator to the dependent 
variable (Howell, 2002). Figure 9 shows that safety motivation partially mediated the 
relationship between safety climate and safety participation behaviors. Sobel’s test 
was also significant (z = 2.87, p < .01). Safety motivation partially mediated the 
relationship between cautiousness and safety compliance behaviors and Sobel’s test 
showed the full pathway was significant (z = 3.55, p < .01). Likewise, safety 
motivation partially mediated the relationship between cautiousness and safety 
participation behaviors and Sobel’s test showed the full pathway was significant (z = 
3.34, p < .01). In addition, safety motivation fully mediated the relationship between 
morality and safety compliance behaviors, and Sobel’s test showed the full pathway 
was significant (z = 3.49, p < .01). Finally, safety motivation fully mediated the 
relationship between morality and safety participation behaviors, and Sobel’s test 
showed the full pathway was significant (z = 3.30, p < .01). 
Archival Injury Data 
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 Archival data showed 56 workers’ compensation claims in the municipal 
bureau during the 2010 fiscal year. In contrast, workers’ report 601 minor injuries 
(contusions, scratches, cuts, and slips) and 126 major injuries (burns, sprains, 
concussions, fractures, hernias, and tendonitis). Probst, et al. (2008) suggested that 
insurance claims are a more accurate measure of occupational injuries than injuries 
reported to OSHA. The current data suggest that only about 8% of self-reported 
injuries resulted in workers’ compensation claims. This could be due to over-reporting 
of injuries by workers in the current study, or under-reporting of injuries by workers to 
the organization. 
Summary of Results 
 The current study tested a multi-level model of the relationships between 
supervisors’ personality and supervisor’s perceptions of organizational safety climate 
perceptions on worker group safety climate perceptions in Level 2, and the 
relationship of workers’ personality traits on safety motivation in Level 1 (see Figure 
1). In addition, Level 1 of the model posits fully mediated relationships between safety 
climate, safety motivation, workers’ personality traits, safety behaviors, and self-
reported injuries which were also tested where appropriate (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 correspond to Level 2 of the model and were tested with 
hierarchical regression. Hypothesis 1 posits that supervisor’s perceptions of 
organizational safety climate perceptions will moderate the relationship between 
supervisors’ proactive personality and workgroup safety climate. While Hypothesis 1 
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was not supported, proactive personality did account for substantial variance in 
workgroup safety climate. Hypothesis 2 posited that three Big Five traits (cheerfulness, 
friendliness, and altruism) would have a direct effect on workgroup safety climate. 
Again, while Hypothesis 2 was not supported, the three personality traits accounted 
for an additional 3% of the variance in workgroup safety climate over controls. 
Research Question 1 asked what was the relationship between all the traits of 
agreeableness and extraversion and workgroup safety climate? Several of the traits 
(trust, morality, cooperation, sympathy, friendliness, and gregariousness )were 
significant predictors of workgroup safety climate, and taken together, all the traits of 
agreeableness and extraversion accounted for an additional 60% of the variance in 
workgroup safety climate. Finally, agreeableness and extraversion factors were tested 
to see if they predicted workgroup safety climate, which they did not. 
 Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b pertain to Level one of the model, and posit the 
four Big Five traits in workers, cautiousness (3a), order (3b), altruism (4a), and trust 
(4b) would have a direct effect on safety motivation. These hypotheses were tested 
using hierarchical linear modeling. Cautiousness was the only significant predictor of 
safety motivation, accounting for an additional 3.2% of the variance in safety 
motivation over individual safety climate. Hypothesis 5 involved a cross-level effect 
and posited the workgroup safety climate would be a significant predictor of 
individual safety climate, after controlling for the effects of the individual predictors 
(cautiousness, order, altruism, and trust) in Hypotheses 3 and 4. This was also tested 
with hierarchical linear modeling. Workgroup safety climate was a significant 
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predictor of individual safety motivation, although the effect size was quite small at 
less than one percent. 
 Research Questions 2 and 3 asked what is the relationship between all the traits 
of conscientiousness and agreeableness and safety motivation? These research 
questions were evaluated using ordinary least squares hierarchical regression. Of the 
12 traits tested, only the agreeableness trait of morality was a significant predictor of 
safety motivation. Finally, conscientiousness and agreeableness factors were tested to 
see if they predicted safety motivation. Only conscientiousness was a significant 
predictor of safety motivation. 
 Lastly, as a replication of previous studies (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal & 
Griffin, 2006; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) the fully mediated Level 1 section of the 
model was tested. As with previous studies, the model was not fully mediated. Safety 
motivation partially mediated the relationship between individual safety climate and 
safety participation behaviors. Likewise, safety motivation partially mediated the 
relationships between cautiousness and safety compliance behaviors, and safety 
participation behaviors. Finally, safety motivation fully mediated the relationships 
between morality and safety compliance behaviors, and safety participation behaviors. 
Figure 10 shows the study model and which hypotheses were supported. 
 
 
Discussion 137 
Chapter VIII 
Discussion 
The primary goals of this study were to examine the relationship of 
supervisor’s personality variables to the development of workgroup safety climate 
perceptions, and to examine the effect workers’ Big Five traits on safety motivation 
and safety behaviors. In addition, this study gathered further evidence on the validity 
of the VIES with maintenance and construction workers, and provided another test of 
Neal and Griffin’s (2004) fully mediated model of the relationship between safety 
motivation, safety behaviors, and safety outcomes. In this discussion I will review the 
general findings of the study, discuss the implications for safety research and practice, 
review potential limitations of the study, and suggest avenues for future research. 
General Findings 
While neither of the hypotheses regarding supervisors’ personality variables 
and workgroup safety climate perceptions were supported, possibly due to low 
statistical power, the regression results suggest further study is warranted. While the 
correlations between supervisors’ proactive personality, organizational safety climate 
perceptions, and workgroup aggregated safety climate were not significant, proactive 
personality and organizational safety climate accounted for an additional 4% of the 
variance, over emotional stability, in workgroup safety climate perceptions, with most 
of the effect due to proactive personality. The hypothesized moderating effect of 
supervisors’ organizational safety climate perceptions on the relationship between 
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proactive personality and workgroup aggregated safety climate perceptions was also 
not supported. 
Likewise, none of the three trait-level measures of supervisor’s personality—
altruism, friendliness, cheerfulness—were significant predictors of workgroup safety 
climate. However, together they accounted for an additional 3% of the variance, over 
emotional stability, in workgroup safety climate perceptions. Of the three traits, 
supervisor cheerfulness had the strongest effect, although none of the βs was 
significant. Similarly, an exploratory examination of the relationship between all the 
traits of extraversion and agreeableness, and workgroup safety climate perceptions 
found several of the traits to be significant predictors. Together the trait predictors 
accounted for an additional 60% of the variance in workgroup safety climate 
perceptions above emotional stability, with trust having the strongest effect.  
These results suggests that a manager’s personality traits may play an 
important role in the implementation of the organizational approach to safety which 
relies on getting workers to “buy-in” to the organization’s safety goals and safety 
management program, and to work to achieve these goals. Social exchanges (Gouldner, 
1960) and the norm of reciprocity (Blau, 1964) motivate this process as studies on 
leadership styles and LMX have suggested (Barling, Loughlin, and Kelloway, 2002; 
Hofmann, Morgeson, and Geras, 2003; Kelloway, Mullen, and Francis, 2006; Mullen 
and Kelloway, 2009). Recent studies have also shown the importance of workers’ trust 
in management in the formation of a strong safety climate and the performance of 
safety behaviors (Conchie & Donald, 2009; Luria, 2010). Likewise, Conchie and 
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Burns (2009) showed that workers’ trust of their supervisor as a source of information 
about safety risks was more dependent on supervisors’ demonstrations of caring than 
on the accuracy of the information they provided. While none of the supervisor 
personality variables in this study were significantly related to workgroup safety 
climate, the fact that agreeableness and extraversion traits accounted for significant 
incremental variance in safety climate suggests that further study is warranted.  
Trait-level measures of workers’ personality also showed some significant 
relationships to workers’ safety motivation, even though three of the four hypotheses 
regarding workers’ personality were not supported. All of the trait-level measures 
showed significant positive bivariate correlations with safety motivation. Cautiousness 
and workgroup safety climate were the only significant predictors of workgroup safety 
motivation in a hierarchical linear model. Exploratory analyses of all the conscientious 
and agreeableness traits showed that morality was the only trait which significantly 
predicted individual safety motivation using ordinary least squares regression. 
Morality corresponds to straightforwardness from the NEO-PI (McCrae & Costa, 1992) 
and refers to the tendency to follow rules. In addition, while none of the 
conscientiousness traits was a significant predictor of individual safety motivation, 
together they accounted for an additional 12% of the variance, over individual safety 
climate perceptions, in safety motivation. Similarly, the agreeableness traits accounted 
for an additional 9% of the variance, over individual safety climate perceptions, in 
safety motivation.  
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These results are congruent with current models of safety variables and 
outcomes. Zohar’s (2003a) model suggests that the broad organizational safety climate 
and the narrower workgroup safety climate both affect behavior-outcome expectancies 
which lead to safety behaviors and ultimately to accidents and injuries. While the main 
focus of Zohar’s model is on the organizational- and group-level environment, 
including co-workers and supervisors, personality variables also affect behavior-
outcome expectancies (Mishel, 2004). Similarly, the Neal and Griffin (2004) model 
lists four precursors of safety knowledge and safety motivation: Safety climate, 
organizational factors, individual attitudes, and individual differences. Several studies 
have found relationships between individual differences and safety outcomes, and the 
current results suggest that trait-level personality measures can account for 
incremental variance in safety motivation over individual safety climate perceptions.  
A post hoc analysis of the relationships between conscientiousness and 
agreeableness factors and safety motivation showed that together the two factors 
accounted for an additional 10% of the variance in safety motivation above safety 
climate, and conscientiousness was a significant predictor. If upon further study the 
trait of cautiousness is found to be a consistent predictor of safety motivation, it may 
help to resolve some of the inconsistent results in previous studies of conscientious 
and safety.  
Replication analyses of the Level 1 portion of the model showed that safety 
motivation mediated the relationships between safety climate, cautiousness, and 
morality, and both safety compliance and safety participation behaviors. Safety 
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motivation partially mediated the relationship between safety climate and safety 
participation behaviors. These results are in line with those of Neal, Griffin, and Hart 
(2000) while using a different measure of safety motivation (Truxillo, et al., 2006, 
2007).  Similarly, Barrick, Stewart, and Piotrowski (2002) reported that motivation 
mediates the relationship between Big Five personality factors and job performance. 
In the current study safety motivation fully mediated the relationship between morality 
and both safety compliance behaviors, and safety participation behaviors. Thus, the 
primary effect of morality—the tendency to follow rules—is to increase safety 
motivation. On the other hand, safety motivation only partially mediated the 
relationship between cautiousness and both safety compliance and safety participation 
behaviors. In this case it appears that personality traits can have an independent effect 
on job performance over and above motivation. 
The prediction of accidents and injuries has traditionally been difficult because 
they are infrequent events. In the current study, self-reported injuries showed few 
significant correlations with other study variables (see Table 9). Minor injuries were 
negatively related to age, and major injuries were negatively related to both safety 
compliance and safety participation behaviors. Safety behaviors were significant 
predictors of minor injuries; neither type of safety behavior predicted major injuries 
(see Figure 9). While the negative relationship between safety participation behaviors 
and self-reported minor injuries is expected, safety compliance behaviors were 
positively related to self-reported minor injuries. It may be that as workers comply 
with safety procedures they become more safety sensitive and more likely to 
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remember the occurrence of minor injuries and to report them when asked. On the 
other hand, having experienced an injury could also lead workers to become more 
safety sensitive, expend more effort to follow safety rules and procedures, and to 
remember and report subsequent injuries. As Beus et al. (2010) reported, injuries have 
a strong negative effect on safety perceptions at the group-level. These results, along 
with previous studies, suggest that the Neal and Griffin (2004) model is not 
necessarily a fully mediated model, although it is still useful for conceptualizing distal 
and proximal antecedents of accidents and injuries. Furthermore, this is the first study 
to show that Big Five traits can predict safety motivation and safety behaviors.   
Implications for Research 
This is the first study I am aware of to examine the effects of supervisors’ 
personality on the development of workgroup safety climate. Despite the lack of 
statistical significance, the results suggest that proactive personality and Big Five traits 
can account for incremental variance in workgroup safety climate perceptions. 
Supervisors play a major role in the development of workgroup safety climate by 
monitoring safety behaviors, responding to safety issues, and taking an active interest 
in workers’ welfare. The current study increases our knowledge by showing that 
supervisors’ personality variables could affect their ability to convey the importance of 
safety to their subordinates. Recent studies (Conchie & Burns, 2009; Conchie & 
Donald, 2009) show that workers’ trust in supervisors has an effect on supervisors’ 
ability to promote safety in their workgroups. In addition, several studies show the 
importance of the workgroup social environment in promoting workplace safety 
Discussion 143 
(Luria, 2008; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011; Tucker, et al., 2008; Zohar & 
Tene-Gazet, 2008).  Future studies should examine supervisory behaviors and 
personality traits that facilitate trust in management and positive social interactions in 
the workgroup, and also encourage safe behaviors. In addition to comparing the 
predictive utility of factors and traits, future studies could examine the relative utility 
of self- and other-rated supervisor personality traits.  
Similarly, workers’ personality is not a major focus of safety professionals’ 
efforts to improve workplace safety. We have rightly discarded the notion of the 
accident prone personality and focused instead on environmental interventions with 
the implementation of safety management systems, an interpersonal approach which 
stress concern for workers’ health and welfare by the organization, supervisors, and 
co-workers. Nevertheless, the current study shows that workers’ personality traits can 
account for significant incremental variance in safety motivation and safety behaviors 
over safety climate perceptions. Specifically, cautiousness was positively related to the 
safety motivation and safety behaviors, and morality was predictive of safety 
motivation. These results advance our knowledge by showing that trait-level measures 
can predict important safety outcomes, and, with further research, might help us to 
better understand how safety climate and safety motivation develop in workgroups. In 
the same vein, workers’ personality traits might differentially affect perceptions of 
valence, instrumentality, and expectancy on the VIES.  
Once important traits in either supervisors or workers are established, an 
intervention could be developed to increase behaviors in supervisors and/or workers 
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which tend to occur more often in those with certain personality characteristics. In this 
case it would be important to control for pre-training levels of the trait(s) in question 
as Scandura and Graen (1984) found with their program to improve LMX 
relationships. 
Finally, this study provided further validity evidence for the VIES scale of 
safety motivation with workers whose job sites often contain multiple safety hazards. 
The basic factor structure of the scale was confirmed, and the scale showed the same 
relationships with safety climate and safety behaviors as previously published scales.  
Implications for Practice 
The main implications for practice from the current study involve the selection 
and training of supervisors. Proactive personality has been related to a variety of 
behaviors, cognitions, and outcomes. Proactive personality leads to behaviors and 
cognitions such as voice, innovation, political knowledge, and career initiative, which 
in turn lead to career success (Siebert, Kraimer, & Crant, 2001). Proactive personality 
has also been related to a number of outcomes including a higher level of 
extracurricular activities, personal achievements, peer ratings of transformational 
leadership, relationship building, and charismatic leadership (Bateman & Crant, 1993). 
The current study suggests that proactive personality may also be related to the 
development of a positive workgroup safety climate. Therefore, including a measure 
of proactive personality in the selection process for managers, especially those that 
supervise safety sensitive jobs, could lead to hiring managers who are better at 
promoting safety. Managers can also be taught to perform behaviors typical of those 
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high in proactive personality through direct instruction, modeling, and coaching, even 
if they do not have a natural tendency to do so. This could be especially helpful in the 
blue collar sector where first level managers often come up through the ranks.  
Supervisor training could build on an intervention by Scandura and Graen 
(1984) to improve LMX relationships. Their 12-hour training covered the basic LMX 
model, active listening skills, exchanging mutual expectations and resources, and 
practicing in one-on-one sessions. The scope of mutual expectations and resources 
could be expanded to include a safety focus, along with proactive problem-solving and 
subsequent efforts to improve safety. Supervisors can also be trained to effect change. 
Research  suggests that arguments for change work best when they reflect prosocial 
organizational values  and are expressed with low negative affect (Grant, Parker, & 
Collins, 2009). Changes in supervisor and workgroup behavior could be measured 
during and after training using experience sampling methodology (Alliger & Williams, 
1993) which entails random sampling of supervisor interactions using short one-page 
questionnaires. Data could also be collected electronically on telephones or notepad 
computers. While this would initially be carried out by training or research staff, 
ideally it could be worked into the day-to-day work routine. 
Regarding workers, cautiousness had a direct effect on safety behaviors 
independent of safety motivation. Workers high in cautiousness are likely to be 
sensitive to safety concerns and motivated to act safety (safety compliance) and to 
seek out ways to improve safety in general (safety participation). Several authors 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000; Truxillo et al., 2006, 2007) have argued that safety compliance 
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behaviors and safety participation behaviors correspond to the constructs of task and 
contextual behaviors (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993), respectively. Contextual 
behaviors are usually considered to be voluntary, and involve employees acting 
beyond their basic job tasks to help the organization and their co-workers. Safety 
participation behaviors should be related to the success of organizational approaches 
to safety, which rely not only on adherence to safety rules and procedures, but also 
having workers adopt the organization’s safety goals and work to achieve them. Since 
no set of safety rules and procedures can cover every possible situation that workers 
might encounter, these contextual safety-related behaviors help to maintain a safe 
working environment. Managers should be trained to monitor and reward both 
adherence to safety rules and procedures and safety-related contextual behaviors.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The main limitation of the current study was a lower than optimal sample size 
at the supervisor-level (Level 2) of the model, which may have decreased the 
statistical power of for the regressions testing the relationship between supervisors’ 
personality and workgroup aggregated safety climate. The results suggest supervisors’ 
personality affects workers’ safety climate perceptions, and future research should 
examine these possible relationships with a larger sample size.  
A second limitation was the failure of most supervisors to provide ratings of 
their subordinates’ safety behaviors. Many of the supervisors refused to provide the 
ratings either verbally or by omission. Some expressed reluctance and discomfort, 
while others rated their workgroup as a whole, rather than rating individual workers. 
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This could be due to the length of the survey, which took about 30 minutes to 
complete, and even though the survey was filled out during the workday, participants 
may have been eager to begin working and not fall behind schedule. It could also be 
because supervisors were uncomfortable rating their subordinates and giving these 
ratings to an outside researcher. These supervisor ratings are potentially useful, 
especially for safety participation behaviors, as the supervisors ratings were negatively 
correlated with workers self-reports of safety participation behaviors. In the future, 
studies seeking to gather supervisor ratings of safety behaviors could employ shorter 
surveys, have separate sessions with supervisors for the sole purpose of obtaining 
these ratings, and address any concerns they may have about rating subordinates. 
The current study also did not directly compare the predictive utility of factor-
level Big Five measures with trait-level measures, because of concerns for the length 
of the survey. Some post hoc analyses were conducted, yet the results do not 
definitively weigh in on the fidelity vs. bandwidth question because trait-level 
measures were used to predict narrow constructs (safety climate, safety motivation, 
safety behaviors). However, this study did demonstrate some predictive utility of Big 
Five traits in the safety domain. Future studies should continue to explore these 
relationships and provide a direct test of the fidelity vs. bandwidth question. 
A final potential limitation pertains to the organization which was the focus of 
this research. The sample was composed of blue-collar workers, and overwhelmingly 
male. In addition, this organization has a strong safety management program already 
in place. Zohar and Luria (2005) have demonstrated that as supervisors’ discretion 
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over work processes decreases, they have less effect on the safety practices of their 
subordinates. A strong safety management program is likely to reduce supervisors’ 
safety-related discretion and result in more compliance with safety rules and 
procedures. This could necessitate greater power to detect an effect in this sample. 
Similarly, Graen (2007) suggests that we examine how leaders’ personal attributes 
interact with the situational properties to affect organizational outcomes. Therefore, 
the gender and work experience of this sample could affect the type of supervisor 
traits and behaviors that lead to a strong, positive safety climate. Future studies should 
explore these possibilities and attempt to determine which leader attributes are most 
likely to lead to desired organizational outcomes within and across settings. 
Conclusion 
This study examined the relationship between supervisors’ personality and 
workgroup safety climate perceptions, as well as the effect of workers’ personality on 
safety motivation and safety behaviors. While neither of the hypotheses regarding 
supervisors’ personality were supported, the evidence suggests that supervisors’ 
proactive personality and traits of agreeableness and extraversion accounted for 
incremental variance in workgroup safety climate. Similarly, for workers, cautiousness 
was a significant predictor of safety motivation. Replication analyses showed that 
safety motivation mediated the relationship between workers’ safety climate 
perceptions and personality traits, and safety behaviors. Finally, implications for 
practice are discussed and further research is proposed that could broaden our 
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understanding of the role of personality—especially in supervisors—in successful 
organizational safety management programs. 
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Table 1 
Safety Climate Studies by Country of Origin. 
 
Country Number of Studies Studies Cited 
United States 20 Cooper & Phillips (2004); DeJoy et al. (2004); 
Gaba et al. (2003); Goldenhar et al. (2003); 
Hofmann & Mark (2006); Hofmann & Morgeson 
(1999); Hofmann et al. (2003); Hofmann & Stetzer 
(1996, 1998); Huang et al. (2004, 2006); Huang, 
Ho, & Chen (2006); Janssens et al. (1995); 
McGovern et al. (2000); Prussia et al. (2003); Seo 
et al. (2004); Smith et al. (2006); Wallace & Chen 
(2006); Wallace et al. (2006); Watson et al. (2005) 
Israel 7 Katz-Navon et al. (2005); Naveh et al. (2005); 
Zohar (1980, 2000, 2002); Zohar & Luria (2003, 
2005) 
Australia 6 Coyle et al. (1995); Fogarty (2005); Fullarton & 
Stokes (2007); Griffin & Neal (2000); Neal & 
Griffin (2006);  Neal et al. (2000) 
United Kingdom 6 Cheyne et al. (1998, 2002); Mearns et al. (1998, 
2004); Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin (2001, 2003) 
Canada 4 Barling & Hutchinson (2000); Barling et al. (2002); 
Kelloway et al. (2006); Zacharatos et al. (2005) 
France 2 Cheyne et al. (1998); Janssens et al. (1995) 
Spain 1 Diaz & Cabrera (1997) 
Norway 1 Havold (2005) 
Denmark 1 Nielsen et al. (2002) 
Portugal 1 Silva et al. (2004) 
Finland 1 Varonen & Mattila (2000) 
Hong Kong 1 Siu et al. (2004) 
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Table 2 
Safety Climate Studies by Industrial Sector. 
 
Industrial Sector Number of Studies Example Studies 
Manufacturing 15 Brown & Holmes (1986); Cheyne et al. 
(1998, 2002); Clarke (2006b); Cooper & 
Phillips (2004); Griffin & Neal (2000); 
Hofmann & Morgeson (1999); Nielsen et 
al. (2006); Prussia et al. (2003); Watson 
et al. (2005);  Zacharatos et al. (2005); 
Zohar (1980, 2000, 2002); Zohar & 
Luria (2005) 
Construction 6 Dedobbeleer & Beland (1991); Gillen et 
al. (1997, 2002); Goldenhar et al. (2003);  
Matilla et al. (1994); Siu et al. (2004) 
Health Care 9 Gershon et al. (1998); Katz-Navon et al. 
(2005); Gaba et al. (2003); Hofmann & 
Mark (2006); McGovern et al. (2000); 
Naveh et al. (2005); Neal & Griffin 
(2006); Neal et al. (2000);Schaefer & 
Moos (1996) 
Offshore Oil Rigs 4 Mearns et al. (1998, 2004); Mearns, 
Whitaker, & Flin (2001, 2003) 
Shipping & 
Transportation 
3 Havold (2005); Huang et al. (2004); 
Wallace et al. (2006) 
Maintenance 2 Wallace & Chen (2006); Zohar (2002) 
High Reliability 
Industries 
2 Gaba et al. (2003); Hofmann & Stetzer 
(1996) 
Wood Processing 1 Varonen & Matilla (2000) 
Airport Ground Handling 1 Diaz & Cabrera (1997) 
Utilities 1 Hofmann & Stetzer (1998) 
Clerical/Service 1 Coyle et al. (1995) 
Retail 1 DeJoy et al. (2004) 
Road Administration 1 Niskanen (1994) 
Military 1 Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras (2003) 
Several Sectors 4 Huang et al. (2004, 2006); Smith et al. 
(2006) 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Internal Consistency and Validity between Trait and Factor Measures. 
 
Study Trait Measures Factor Measures Reliability Validity Reliability Validity 
Paunonen & Ashton (2001a) .54 to .88 .19 to .50 a All over .85. .17 to .48 a 
Paunonen (1998) .59 to .91 -.42 to .47 b .75 to .88 -.32 to .30 b 
Moon (2001) .62 to .72 -.12 to .15c .89 .02 c 
Stewart (1999) .71 to .78 -.13 to .27 d .91 -.13 to .16d 
 
Note. a) Multiple correlations; b) Partial correlations; c) βs in hierarchical regression;  
d) Zero-order correlations. 
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Table 4 
NEO-PIR Trait Descriptions.a 
NEO-PIR Trait Adjective Checklist Correlates 
Neuroticism traits: 
Anxiety Anxious, fearful, worrying, tense, nervous, 
 (-) confident, (-) optimistic 
Angry Hostility Anxious, irritable, impatient, excitable, moody, tense  
(-) gentle 
Depression Worrying, pessimistic, moody, anxious, (-) contented, (-) 
confident, (-) self-confident,   
Self-consciousness Shy, timid, defensive, inhibited, anxious,  
(-) self-confident, (-) confident 
Impulsiveness Moody, irritable, sarcastic, self-centered, loud, hasty, 
excitable 
Vulnerability Anxious, careless, (-) clear-thinking, (-) self-confident,  
(-) confident, (-) efficient, (-) alert 
Extraversion traits: 
Warmth Friendly, warm, sociable, cheerful, affectionate, outgoing, 
(-) aloof 
Gregariousness Sociable, outgoing, pleasure-seeking, talkative, 
spontaneous, (-) aloof,  (-) withdrawn 
Assertiveness Aggressive, assertive, self-confident, forceful, enthusiastic, 
aggressive, active 
Activity Energetic, hurried, quick, determined, enthusiastic, 
aggressive, active 
Excitement Seeking Pleasure-seeking, daring, adventurous, charming, 
handsome, spunky, clever 
Positive Emotions Enthusiastic, humorous, praising, jolly spontaneous, 
pleasure-seeking, optimistic 
Openness traits: 
Fantasy Dreamy, imaginative, humorous, mischievous, idealistic, 
artistic, complicated 
Aesthetics Imaginative, artistic, original, enthusiastic, inventive, 
idealistic, versatile 
Feelings Excitable, spontaneous, insightful, imaginative, 
affectionate, talkative, outgoing 
Actions Interests wide, imaginative, adventurous,  optimistic, 
talkative, versatile, (-) mild 
Ideas Idealistic, interests wide, inventive, curious, original, 
imaginative, insightful   
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Values Unconventional, flirtatious, (-) conservative,  
(-) cautious 
Agreeableness traits:  
Trust Forgiving, trusting, peaceable,  (-) wary, (-) suspicious, (-) 
hard-hearted 
Straightforwardness (-) complicated, (-) demanding, (-) clever,  
(-) flirtatious, (-) charming, (-) shrewd, (-) autocratic 
Altruism Warm, soft-hearted, gentle, generous, kind, tolerant,  
(-) selfish 
Compliance (-) stubborn, (-) demanding, (-) headstrong,  
(-) impatient, (-) intolerant, (-) outspoken,   
(-) hard-hearted 
Modesty (-) show-off, (-) clever, (-) assertive,  (-) argumentative, (-) 
self-confident, (-) aggressive, (-) idealistic 
Tender-Mindedness Friendly, warm, sympathetic, soft-hearted, gentle, kind, (-) 
unstable 
 Conscientiousness traits: 
Competence Efficient, self-confident, thorough, resourceful, confident, 
intelligent, (-) confused 
Order Organized, thorough, efficient, precise, methodical,  
(-) absent-minded, (-) careless 
Dutifulness Thorough, (-) defensive, (-) distractible, (-) careless,  
(-) lazy, (-) absent-minded,  (-) fault-finding 
Achievement Striving Thorough, ambitious, industrious, enterprising, 
determined, confident, persistent 
Self-Discipline Organized, efficient, energetic, thorough, industrious, (-) 
lazy, (-) absent-minded 
Deliberation Thorough, (-) hasty, (-) impulsive, (-) careless,  
(-) impatient, (-) immature,       (-) moody 
 
Note. a) From McCrae & Costa (1992) 
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Table 5 
Safety Motivation Items from Griffin, Neal, and Colleagues. 
Griffin & Neal (2000)–Two Factor Version 
Motivation to Comply 
1. I feel that adhering to tagout/lockout procedures is worthwhile. 
2. I believe that it is important to always use safe/standard work procedures. 
3. I believe that it is important to consistently use the correct personal protective 
equipment. 
4. I feel that it is worthwhile using my personal protective equipment in the defined 
areas. 
5. I feel that adhering to safe/standard procedures is important in my job. 
 
Motivation to Participate 
6. I feel that it is worthwhile to be involved in the development of safe/standard work 
procedures. 
7. I believe that it is important to promote the safety program. 
8. I feel that it is important to encourage others to use safe practices. 
9. I believe that it is worthwhile to put extra effort into maintaining safety. 
10. I believe that it is worthwhile to volunteer for safety related tasks. 
11. I believe that it is important to help my coworkers in unsafe or hazardous 
conditions. 
 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart (2000)–Single Factor Version 
1. I believe that workplace health and safety is am important issue. 
2. I feel that it is worthwhile to put in effort to maintain or improve my personal safety. 
3. I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times. 
4. I believe that it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the  
    workplace. 
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Table 6 
Study Measures. 
Measure (Hypothesis) 
Self-
Report 
Supervisor-
Report Archival 
Proactive Personality (1)a S   
Extraversion Traits    
Cheerfulness (2a) S   
Friendliness (2b) S   
Gregariousness S   
Assertiveness S   
Activity Level S   
Excitement-seeking S   
Agreeableness Traits    
Altruism (2c; 4a) S, W   
Trust (4b) S, W   
Morality S, W   
Cooperation S, W   
Modesty S, W   
Sympathy S, W   
Conscientiousness Traitsb    
Cautiousness (3a) W   
Orderliness (3b) W   
Self-efficacy W   
Dutifulness W   
Self-discipline W   
Achievement-striving W   
Safety-Related Measures    
Safety Climatec W   
Safety Motivationd W   
Safety Compliance Behaviorse W W  
Safety Participation Behaviorse W W  
Demographics (age, gender, job 
tenures) S, W 
  
Safety Outcomes (Accidents, 
injuries) 
W  W 
 
Note. a) Siebert, Crant & Kraimer (1999); b) Goldberg (1999); c) Zohar (2000); d) 
Truxillo, et al. (2006, 2007); e) Griffin & Neal (2006);  
S = Supervisors; W = Workgroup members. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level Study Variables. 
Variable n M SD Lower Upper
Age 143 44.16 10.72 42.39 45.93
Gender 146 .91 .28 .86 .96
Organizational Tenure 145 9.66 7.37 8.45 10.87
Safety Climate 146 3.63 .61 3.53 3.73
VIES (safety motivation) 146 4.18 .53 4.09 4.26
Safety Compliance Behaviors 146 4.12 .66 4.02 4.23
Safety Participation Behaviors 146 3.69 .77 3.57 3.82
Supervisor Rated Safety Compliance Behaviors 40 4.12 .79 3.86 4.37
Supervisor Rated Safety Participation Behaviors 40 3.70 .85 3.43 3.97
Self-Efficacy 146 4.33 .50 4.25 4.42
Orderliness 146 4.09 .60 3.99 4.19
Dutifulness 146 4.46 .46 4.39 4.53
Achievement-Striving 146 4.12 .62 4.02 4.23
Self-Discipline 146 3,87 .68 3.76 3.98
Cautiousness 146 3.90 .74 3.78 4.02
Trust 146 3.60 .73 3.48 3.72
Morality 146 4.00 .82 3.86 4.13
Altruism 146 3.94 .68 3.83 4.05
Cooperation 146 3.66 .81 3.53 3.79
Modesty 146 3.59 .70 3.47 3.70
Sympathy 146 3.51 .77 3.39 3.64
Self-Reported Minor Injuries 146 3.44 6.50 2.38 4.50
Self-Reported Major Injuries 146 .69 1.66 .41 .96
Self-Reported Missed Days 146 .56 1.81 .27 .86
95% CI
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Supervisor-Level Study Variables. 
Variable n M SD Lower Upper
Age 28 46.96 7.38 44.10 49.83
Gender 28 .93 .26 .83 1.03
Organizational Tenure 28 14.80 7.82 11.77 17.84
Aggregated Safety Climate 28 3.68 .42 3.52 3.85
Organizational Safety Climate 28 3.49 .49 3.30 3.68
Proactive Personality 28 5.00 .73 4.72 5.28
Emotional Stability 28 3.66 .60 3.43 3.90
Trust 28 3.56 .55 3.35 3.77
Morality 28 4.00 .84 3.68 4.32
Altruism 28 3.90 .58 3.68 4.12
Cooperation 28 3.49 .78 3.19 3.79
Modesty 28 3.45 .80 3.14 3.76
Sympathy 28 3.80 .69 3.54 4.07
Friendliness 28 3.59 .66 3.34 3.85
Gregariousness 28 3.14 .79 2.83 3.44
Assertiveness 28 3.84 .61 3.60 4.07
Activity Level 28 3.92 .60 3.70 4.15
Excitement Seeking 28 2.84 .71 2.57 3.12
Cheerfulness 28 3.67 .56 3.46 3.89
95% CI
 
 Table 9 
 
Intercorrelations and Internal Consistencies for Workers (Level 1). 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Age
2. Gender .08
3. Organizational Tenure .59** .05
4. Safety Climate -.09 -.06 -.09 .88
5. VIES (safety motivation) .00 -.03 -.23** .28** .93
6. Safety Compliance Behaviors -.15 .07 -.24** .12 .51** .89
7. Safety Participation Behaviors .05 .02 -.08 .25** .47** .62** .87
8. Supervisor Rated Safety Compliance Behaviors -.14 -.06 -.30 .16 .44** .20 .03 .96
9. Supervisor Rated Safety Participation Behaviors -.08 -.09 -.22 .14 .27 .13 .08 .73** .93
10. Self-Efficacy -.06 .09 -.11 .01 .23** .33** .24** .16 .11 .88
11. Orderliness -.05 -.02 -.17* .17* .26** .34** .15 .07 .12 .45** .83
12. Dutifulness -.10 -.04 -.17* .12 .25** .42** .29** .11 .10 .62** .54** .73
13. Achieve-Striving -.08 -.01 -.17* .10 .32** .48** .36** .24 .23 .59** .60** .63**
14. Self-Discipline -.06 .12 -.20* .10 .38** .54** .41** .19 .20 .56** .64** .62**
15. Cautiousness -.14 .06 -.28** .04 .39** .55* .34** .42** .28 .51** .51** .57**
16. Trust -.19* -.02 -.12 .18* .18* .26** .20* .14 -.03 .13 .23** .33**
17. Morality -.09 .00 -.21* .05 .34** .39** .24** .20 .01 .35** .40** .47**
18. Altruism -.35** -.09 -.24** .18* .26** .40** .38** .00 -.05 .20* .21* .40**
19. Cooperation -.17* -.01 -.21* .22* .20* .36** .20* -.04 -.15 .00 .25** .17*
20. Modesty .02 .13 -.08 .19* .17* .21* .03 .18 .06 .00 .28** .05
21. Sympathy -.02 -.23** -.02 .12 .18* .23** .34** -.01 -.15 .03 .09 .22**
22. Minor Injuries -.29** .01 -.11 .02 .00 .09 -.10 .04 -.08 .00 -.02 .-07
23. Major Injuries -.11 -.13 -.02 .11 -.16 -.18* -.18* -.05 -.07 -.02 -.03 -.12
24. Missed Days .02 -.06 -.05 -.15 .05 -.03 -.02 .09 .09 -.05 -.09 -.07
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Organizational Tenure
4. Safety Climate
5. VIES (safety motivation)
6. Safety Compliance Behaviors
7. Safety Participation Behaviors
8. Supervisor Rated Safety Compliance Behaviors
9. Supervisor Rated Safety Participation Behaviors
10. Self-Efficacy
11. Orderliness
12. Dutifulness
13. Achieve-Striving .90
14. Self-Discipline .81** .89
15. Cautiousness .64** .73** .81
16. Trust .25** .31** .34** .89
17. Morality .49** .58** .53** .27** .82
18. Altruism .39** .42** .37** .60** .44** .87
19. Cooperation .16 .21* .29** .43** .27** .41** .74
20. Modesty .22** .22** .24** .08 .20* .01 .35** .74
21. Sympathy .20* .15 .18* .32** .21* .56** .31** .09 .79
22. Minor Injuries .05 .04 .05 .07 -.01 .14 .16* .11 .03
23. Major Injuries .02 -.05 -.12 -.12 -.10 .02 -.03 .11 .03 .60**
24. Missed Days .03 .01 .05 -.11 .01 -.09 .02 -.05 -.09 .47** .35**
Note. Cronbach's α reliabilities on the diagonal. N = 146 except Nos. 8 and 9 where N = 40. Gender coded 0 = Female and 1 = Male.
*p  < .05; **p  < .01
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 Table 10 
 
Intercorrelations and Internal Consistencies for Supervisors (Level 2). 
 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. Age
2. Gender .06
3. Organizational Tenure .61** .20
4. Safety Climate a -.18 .36 .04
5. Proactive Personality -.31 -.02 -.46* .16 .87
6. Emotional Stability .18 -.11 -.02 -.17 .20 .77
7. Org. Safety Climate -.24 .09 -.20 .06 .43* .38* .90
8. Friendliness -.15 -.17 -.17 -.15 .21 .53** .47* .88
9. Gregariousness -.02 -.17 .15 .23 .19 .41* .19 .59** .86
10. Assertiveness -.24 .06 .01 .13 .44* .49** .44* .37 .32 .86
11. Activity Level -.11 -.04 -.15 .26 .43* .23 .35 .52** .54** .55** .78
12. Excitement Seeking -.36 -.21 -.24 .13 .27 .14 .29 .42* .49** .18 .46* .84
13. Cheerfulness -.10 -.48** -.21 -.19 .33 .44* .42* .76** .44* .37 .49** .47* .86
14. Trust -.34 -.10 -.22 .06 .35 .45* .47* .43* .15 .49** .22 .14 .36 .88
15. Morality -.36 -.08 -.22 -.20 .44* .30 .13 .06 -.11 .54** .11 .03 .15 .42* .90
16. Altruism -.15 -.25 -.31 -.18 .45* .38* .51** .57** .20 .37 .36 .11 .47* .75** .33 .81
17. Cooperation -.01 -.31 .03 -.32 -.18 .03 .15 .03 -.16 -.03 -.35 -.28 .16 .45* .04 .44* .74
18. Modesty -.15 -.42* -.17 .00 .17 .13 .34 .15 -.03 .24 .19 -.14 .17 .50** .35 .55** .43*
19. Sympathy .20 -.34 .01 -.30 .20 .16 .12 .20 -.01 -.08 .08 -.14 .20 .46* .24 .67** .38*
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 Table 10 (continued) 
 
 
Scale 18 19
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Organizational Tenure
4. Safety Climate a
5. Proactive Personality
6. Emotional Stability
7. Org. Safety Climate
8. Friendliness
9. Gregariousness
10. Assertiveness
11. Activity Level
12. Excitement Seeking
13. Cheerfulness
14. Trust
15. Morality
16. Altruism
17. Cooperation
18. Modesty .78
19. Sympathy .58** .85
Note. Cronbach's α on the diagonal. N = 28. Gender coded 0 = Female, 1 = Male.
*p < .05; **p  < .01
a Aggregated safety climate score by workgroup.
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Table 11 
 
Predicting Workgroup Safety Climate with Proactive Personality and Organizational 
Safety Climate Perceptions: Hypothesis 1. 
 
Variable R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
β 
F 
Change Df p 
Step 1 .03 .03  .83 1, 26 ns 
Emotional Stability   -.26    
Step 2 .07 .04  .55 2, 24 ns 
Proactive Personality   .23    
Organizational Safety 
Climate 
  
.07    
Step 3 .09 .02  .46 1, 23 ns 
Proactive Personality X  
Organizational Safety 
Climate 
  
.15 
   
Note. N = 28. Betas are for the final equation. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05 one-tailed.  
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Table 12 
 
Predicting Workgroup Safety Climate with Altruism, Friendliness and  
Cheerfulness: Hypothesis 2. 
 
Variable R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
β 
F 
Change Df p 
Step 1 .03 .03  .83 1, 26 ns 
Emotional Stability   -.11    
Step 3 .06 .03  .22 3, 23 ns 
Altruism   -.13    
Friendliness   .11    
Cheerfulness   -.17    
Note. N = 28. Betas are for the final equation. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05 one-tailed.  
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Table 13 
 
Predicting Workgroup Safety Climate with Agreeableness and Extraversion 
Traits: Research Question 1. 
 
Variable R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
β 
F 
Change Df p 
Step 1 .03 .03  .83 1,26 ns 
Emotional Stability   -.34*    
Step 2 .63 .60*  1.89 12, 14 .13 
Trust   .81**    
Morality   -.37*    
Altruism   .05    
Cooperation   .05    
Modesty   -.64**    
Sympathy   -.43    
Friendliness   .31    
Gregariousness   -.43*    
Assertiveness   .01    
Activity Level   -.57*    
Excitement Seeking   .45*    
Cheerfulness   .01    
Note. N = 28. Betas are for the final equation. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05 one-tailed.  
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Table 14 
 
Predicting Safety Motivation with Four Big Five Traits: Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
 
Fixed Effect B Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
t Df p* 
Intercept B0 4.18 .04 104.23 27 .01 
Orderliness Slope B1 .08 .07 1.17 141 .24 
Cautiousness Slope B2 .21 .11 1.84 141 .07 
Trust Slope B3 -.02 .08 -.20 141 .84 
Altruism Slope B4 .11 .09 1.15 141 .25 
Note.  B coefficients calculated using robust standard errors. 
* Two-tailed probability.
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Table 15 
 
Predicting Safety Motivation with Workgroup Safety Climate: Hypotheses 5. 
 
Fixed Effect B Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
t Df p* 
Intercept B0 4.19 .03 123.40 26 .01 
Workgroup Safety 
Climate G01 .23 .12 1.97 26 .06 
Orderliness Slope B1 .06 .08 .81 140 .42 
Cautiousness Slope B2 .23 .12 1.96 140 .05 
Trust Slope B3 -.02 .08 -.22 140 .83 
Altruism Slope B4 .10 .10 1.04 140 .30 
Note.  B coefficients calculated using robust standard errors. 
* Two-tailed probability.
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Table 16 
 
Conscientiousness Traits Predicting Safety Motivation: Research Question 2.  
 
Variable R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
β 
F 
Change Df p 
Step 1 .07 .07**  4.92 2, 142 .01 
Organizational Tenure   -.13    
Survey Type   .07    
Step 2 .13 .07**  11.00 1, 141 .01 
Safety Climate   .25**    
Step 3 .25 .12**  3.48 6, 135 .01 
Self-Efficacy   .05    
Orderliness   -.03    
Cautiousness   .21    
Dutifulness   -.07    
Achievement-Striving   .00    
Self-Discipline   .21    
 Note. N = 145.  
Betas are for the final equation. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Table 17 
 
Agreeableness Traits Predicting Safety Motivation: Research Question 3. 
 
Variable R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
β 
F 
Change Df p 
Step 1 .07 .07**  4.92 2, 142 .01 
Organizational Tenure   -.15    
Survey Type   .09    
Step 2 .13 .07**  11.00 1, 141 .01 
Safety Climate   .23**    
Step 3 .22 .09*  2.60 6, 135 .02 
Trust   .01    
Morality   .26**    
Altruism   .00    
Cooperation   -.01    
Modesty   .07    
Sympathy   .07    
Note. N = 145.  
Betas are for the final equation. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Table 18 
 
Agreeableness and Conscientious Factors Predicting Safety Motivation. 
 
Variable R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
β 
F 
Change Df p 
Step 1 .05 .05**  8.08 1, 143 .01 
Organizational Tenure   -.13    
Step 2 .12 .07**  10.77 1, 142 .01 
Safety Climate   .20**    
Step 3 .22 .10**  9.27 2, 140 .01 
Agreeableness   .12    
Conscientiousness   .27**    
Note. N = 145 
Betas are from individual equations. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
 
 Figure 1 
 
Multilevel Model of Hypothesized Relationships. 
 
 
Note. a) E-extraversion; b) A-agreeableness 
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Figure 2 
A Multilevel Safety Climate Model from Zohar (2003a). 
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Figure 3 
Neal & Griffin (2004) Framework for Conceptualizing Safety Climate and  
Safety Behavior. 
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Figure 4 
Path Model from Griffin & Neal (2000) Study 1. 
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Figure 5 
Path Model from Griffin & Neal (2000) Study 2. 
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Figure 6 
Path Model from Neal, Griffin, & Hart (2000). 
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Figure 7 
Organizational Safety Climate as a Moderator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive 
Safety 
Climate 
Negative 
-1SD +1SD 
Positive Organizational 
Safety Climate 
Negative Organizational 
Safety Climate 
Proactive Personality 
 Figure 8 
 
Basic Level 1 Path Model.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
-.13 
-.25* 
.25* 
.51* 
Individual 
Safety 
Climate 
Safety 
Motivation 
 
Cautiousness 
 
Morality 
Safety 
Compliance 
Behaviors 
Safety 
Participation 
Behaviors 
 
Minor 
Injuries 
 
Major 
Injuries 
.26*
.28* 
.19* 
.44* 
.53* 
-.09 
P
erso
n
ality and S
afety 178 
 Figure 9 
 
Level 1 Mediation Model. 
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 Figure 10 
 
Study Model Showing Results of Hypothesis Tests. 
 
 
 
Note. Solid lines represent supported hypotheses and significant relationships. Dashed lines with arrowheads represent   
unsupported hypotheses. 
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Appendix A 
Supervisor Survey  
 
Informed Consent Cover Letter 
 
You are invited to participate in a study I am conducting with Leslie Hammer 
and Donald Truxillo at Portland State University. We are studying the factors affecting 
the work environment and safety conditions in the workplace. All maintenance and 
construction workers at the Water Bureau are invited to participate in the study.  
If you decide to participate, we ask that you complete a two-part questionnaire 
which should take about 30 minutes of your time. The first part asks for your 
information and about your opinions at work. The second shorter part asks about your 
workgroup members. After you have completed both parts of the questionnaire please 
place it in an envelope, seal it, and return it to the researcher.  
All information in this study that can be linked to you will be kept strictly 
confidential. We ask you to provide your name and the names of your workgroup 
members only so that we can analyze the data by workgroups. In addition, the names 
of all study participants will be entered into a gift card lottery. The names of all the 
research participants will be kept only in coded form, and only the researcher will 
have access to the master list of names and codes. The results of this research will only 
be reported in aggregate form (everyone’s information will be pooled together and 
summarized). No information on any individual or workgroup will be provided to 
management. 
  Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study. 
Your participation will not affect your standing as an employee at the Water Bureau. 
You may also withdraw from this study at any time without affecting your relationship 
with the Water Bureau. While you may not receive direct benefits from completing the 
survey, the information from this study may be used to improve safety programs and 
human resource practices at the Water Bureau. To express our appreciation for your 
participation, we will conduct a drawing and distribute six Visa gift cards worth $50 
(chances of winning about 1 in 60).   
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your 
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 600 Unitus Bldg., Portland 
State University, (503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400. If you have questions about the 
study itself, contact Michael Buck at (503) 464-6699 or mbuck@pdx.edu, or Dr. 
Donald Truxillo at (503) 725-3969 or truxillod@pdx.edu. 
 
Completion and submission of the questionnaire indicates that you consent to 
participate in the study. 
 
Please retain this letter for your reference. 
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Agreeableness Facets (Goldberg, 1999). 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
14. 1 2 3 4 5
15. 1 2 3 4 5
16. 1 2 3 4 5
17. 1 2 3 4 5
18. 1 2 3 4 5
19. 1 2 3 4 5
20. 1 2 3 4 5
21. 1 2 3 4 5
22. 1 2 3 4 5
23. 1 2 3 4 5
24. 1 2 3 4 5I suffer from others’ sorrows.
I seldom toot my own horn.
I sympathize with the homeless.
I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself.
I value cooperation over competition.
I hate to seem pushy.
I dislike being the center of attention.
I dislike talking about myself.
I consider myself an average person.
I am concerned about others
I have a good word for everyone.
I am easy to satisfy.
I can’t stand confrontations.
I stick to the rules.
I make people feel welcome.
I anticipate the needs of others.
I love to help others.
I believe that people are basically moral.
I believe in human goodness.
I think that all will be well.
I would never cheat on my taxes.
CIRCLE ONE
I trust others.
I believe that others have good intentions.
I trust what people say.
These phrases describe people's behaviors. Please use 
the rating scale below to describe how accurately each 
statement describes how you generally are.   For each 
statement please rate your level of agreement or 
disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Very Accurate 
Moderately Accurate 
Neutral 
Moderately Inaccurate 
Very Inaccurate
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Extraversion Facets (Goldberg, 1999). 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
14. 1 2 3 4 5
15. 1 2 3 4 5
16. 1 2 3 4 5
17. 1 2 3 4 5
18. 1 2 3 4 5
19. 1 2 3 4 5
20. 1 2 3 4 5
21. 1 2 3 4 5
22. 1 2 3 4 5
23. 1 2 3 4 5
24. 1 2 3 4 5
25. 1 2 3 4 5
26. 1 2 3 4 5
27. 1 2 3 4 5
28. 1 2 3 4 5
29. 1 2 3 4 5
30. 1 2 3 4 5
31. 1 2 3 4 5
32. 1 2 3 4 5
33. 1 2 3 4 5
34. 1 2 3 4 5
35. 1 2 3 4 5
36. 1 2 3 4 5I amuse my friends.
I laugh my way through life.
I love life.
I look at the bright side of life.
I laugh aloud.
I seek danger.
I radiate joy.
I have a lot of fun.
I express childlike joy.
I enjoy being part of a large crowd.
I enjoy being reckless.
I act wild and crazy.
I am willing to try anything once.
I react quickly.
I love excitement.
I seek adventure.
I love action.
I am always busy.
I am always on the go.
I do a lot in my spare time.
I can manage many things at the same time.
I try to lead others.
I can talk others into doing things.
I seek to influence others.
I take control of things.
I enjoy being part of a group.
I involve others in what I am doing.
I love surprise parties.
I take charge.
I act comfortably with others.
I cheer people up.
I love large parties.
I talk to a lot of different people at parties.
CIRCLE ONE  
I make friends easily.
I warm up quickly to others.
I feel comfortable around people.
These phrases describe people's behaviors. Please use 
the rating scale below to describe how accurately each 
statement describes how you generally are. For each 
statement please rate your level of agreement or 
disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Very Accurate 
Moderately Accurate 
Neutral 
Moderately Inaccurate 
Very Inaccurate
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Proactive Personality Siebert, Crant, and Kraimer (1999). 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Nothing is more exciting than seeing my ideas turned into reality.
I am always looking for better ways to do things.
If I believe in an idea, no obstacle will prevent me from making it 
happen.
I can spot a good opportunity long before others can.
If I see something I don't like, I fix it.
No matter what the odds, if I believe in something I will make it 
happen.
 I love being a champion for my ideas, even against others' 
opposition.
I excel at identifying opportunities.
CIRCLE ONE
I am constantly on the lookout for new ways to improve my life.
Wherever I have been, I have been a powerful force for constructive 
change.
The next set of statements describe common ways people  think, 
feel, and act. How well do these statements describe you? For each 
statement please rate your level of agreement or disagreement by 
circling the appropriate number. Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neutral
Somewhat Agree
Strongly Agree
Agree 
Strongly Disagree
 
 
Organizational Safety Climate Zohar and Luria (2005). 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
14. 1 2 3 4 5
15. 1 2 3 4 5
16. 1 2 3 4 5
17. 1 2 3 4 5
18. 1 2 3 4 5
Regularly holds safety-awareness events like presentations and ceremonies.
Gives safety personnel the power they need to do their job.
Believes workers’ safety practices are important for the management of the 
bureau.
Supervisors and top management seem to care about workers’ safety.
Uses any available information to improve existing safety rules.
Listens carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety.
Considers safety when setting production speed and schedules.
Provides workers with a lot of information on safety issues.
Provides detailed safety reports to workers (e.g., injuries, near accidents).
Considers a person’s safety behavior when moving–promoting people.
Requires each manager to help improve safety in his or her department.
Invests a lot of time and money in safety training for workers.
Tries to continually improve safety levels in each department.
Provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely.
Is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedule.
Quickly corrects any safety hazard (even if it’s costly).
“Top management in this bureau…” CIRCLE ONE
Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards.
Insists on thorough and regular safety audits and inspections.
These statements describe how managers in your bureau enact safety 
policies and respond to safety concerns. Please remember your 
answers will be kept confidential. For each statement please rate your 
level of agreement or disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate 
number.
Completely Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Completely Disagree 
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Neuroticism Factor (Goldberg, 1999). 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
These phrases describe people's behaviors. Please use 
the rating scale below to describe how accurately each 
statement describes how you generally are. For each 
statement please rate your level of agreement or 
disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Very Accurate 
Moderately Accurate 
Neutral 
Moderately Inaccurate 
Very Inaccurate
I am not easily bothered by things.
I am very pleased with myself.
CIRCLE ONE
I rarely get irritated.
I seldom feel blue.
I feel comfortable with myself.
 
 
 
Supervisor Ratings of Workers’ Safety Compliance and Participation Behaviors 
Adapted from Neal and Griffin (2004). 
 
Please write down YOUR name ________________________________________ 
 
Work group member name ________________________________________ 
 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2.
1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
The worker puts in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace.
The worker voluntarily carries out tasks or activities that help to 
improve workplace safety.
The worker uses all the necessary safety equipment to do his/her job.
The worker uses the correct safety procedures for carrying out his/her 
job.
The worker ensures the highest level of safety when he/she carries out 
his/her job.
The worker promotes the safety program within the organization.
Strongly Disagree 
CIRCLE ONE
These statements refer to the work behaviors of your 
workgroup members.   For each statement please rate 
your level of agreement or disagreement by CIRCLING 
the appropriate number.
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
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Appendix B 
 
Worker Survey 
Informed Consent Cover Letter 
 
You are invited to participate in a study I am conducting with Leslie Hammer 
and Donald Truxillo at Portland State University. We are studying the factors affecting 
the work environment and safety conditions in the workplace. All maintenance and 
construction workers at the Water Bureau are invited to participate in the study.  
If you decide to participate, we ask that you complete the questionnaires on the 
following pages. This survey should take about 30 minutes of your time. While you 
may not receive direct benefits from completing the survey, the information from this 
study may be used to improve safety programs and human resource practices at the 
Water Bureau. To express our appreciation for your participation, we will conduct a 
drawing and distribute six Visa gift cards worth $50 (chances of winning about 1 in 
60).  
All information in this study that can be linked to you will be kept strictly 
confidential. We ask you to provide your name and the name of your lead person only 
so that we can analyze the data by workgroups. In addition, the names of all study 
participants will be entered into a gift card lottery. The names of all the research 
participants will be kept only in coded form, and only the researcher will have access 
to the master list of names and codes. The results of this research will only be reported 
in aggregate form (everyone’s information will be pooled together and summarized). 
No information on any individual or workgroup will be provided to management. 
After you have completed of questionnaire place it in an envelope, seal it, and 
return it to the researcher. This information will be kept confidential. Your 
participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study. Your 
participation will not affect your standing as an employee at the Water Bureau. You 
may also withdraw from this study at any time without affecting your relationship with 
the Water Bureau.  
  If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your 
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 600 Unitus Bldg., Portland 
State University, (503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400. If you have questions about the 
study itself, contact Michael Buck at (503) 464-6699 or mbuck@pdx.edu, or Dr. 
Donald Truxillo at (503) 725-3969 or truxillod@pdx.edu. 
 
Completion and submission of the questionnaire indicates that you consent to 
participate in the study. 
 
Please retain this letter for your reference. 
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Conscientiousness Facets (Goldberg, 1999). 
 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
14. 1 2 3 4 5
15. 1 2 3 4 5
16. 1 2 3 4 5
17. 1 2 3 4 5
18. 1 2 3 4 5
19. 1 2 3 4 5
20. 1 2 3 4 5
21. 1 2 3 4 5
22. 1 2 3 4 5
23. 1 2 3 4 5
24. 1 2 3 4 5
25. 1 2 3 4 5
26. 1 2 3 4 5
27. 1 2 3 4 5
28. 1 2 3 4 5
29. 1 2 3 4 5
30. 1 2 3 4 5
31. 1 2 3 4 5
CIRCLE ONE
I complete tasks successfully.
I excel in what I do.
I handle tasks smoothly.
These phrases describe people's behaviors. Please 
use the rating scale below to rate how accurately 
each statement describes how you generally are. For 
each statement please rate your level of agreement or 
disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Very Accurate 
Moderately Accurate 
Neutral 
Moderately Inaccurate 
Very Inaccurate
I am sure of my ground.
I come up with good solutions.
I know how to get things done.
I like order.
I like to tidy up.
I want everything to be “just right.”
I love order and regularity.
I do things according to plan.
I try to follow the rules.
I keep my promises.
I pay my bills on time.
I tell the truth.
I listen to my conscience.
I go straight for the goal.
I work hard.
I turn plans into actions.
I plunge into tasks with all my heart.
I do more than what’s expected of me.
I set high standards for myself and others.
I demand quality.
I get chores done right away.
I am always prepared.
I start tasks right away.
I get to work at once.
I carry out my plans.
I avoid mistakes.
I choose my words with care.
I stick to my chosen path.
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Agreeableness Facets (Goldberg, 1999). 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5
14. 1 2 3 4 5
15. 1 2 3 4 5
16. 1 2 3 4 5
17. 1 2 3 4 5
18. 1 2 3 4 5
19. 1 2 3 4 5
20. 1 2 3 4 5
21. 1 2 3 4 5
22. 1 2 3 4 5
23. 1 2 3 4 5
24. 1 2 3 4 5
CIRCLE ONE
I trust others.
I believe that others have good intentions.
I trust what people say.
These phrases describe people's behaviors. Please use 
the rating scale below to describe how accurately each 
statement describes how you generally are.   For each 
statement please rate your level of agreement or 
disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Very Accurate 
Moderately Accurate 
Neutral 
Moderately Inaccurate 
Very Inaccurate
I believe that people are basically moral.
I believe in human goodness.
I think that all will be well.
I would never cheat on my taxes.
I stick to the rules.
I make people feel welcome.
I anticipate the needs of others.
I love to help others.
I am concerned about others
I have a good word for everyone.
I am easy to satisfy.
I can’t stand confrontations.
I hate to seem pushy.
I dislike being the center of attention.
I dislike talking about myself.
I consider myself an average person.
I seldom toot my own horn.
I sympathize with the homeless.
I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself.
I value cooperation over competition.
I suffer from others’ sorrows.
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Safety Climate from (Zohar, 2000). 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5As long as work remains on schedule, he/she doesn't care how this has been achieved.
Pays less attention to safety problems than other lead persons in this 
bureau.
Only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine 
problems.
Gets annoyed with any worker ignoring safety rules, even minor rules.
Watches more often when a worker has violated some safety rule.
Doesn't care how the work is done as long as there is no accident.
Whenever the pressure builds, he/she wants us to work faster rather 
than by the rules.
CIRCLE ONE
Says a good word whenever he/she sees a job done according to safety 
rules.
Seriously considers any worker's suggestions for improving safety.
Approaches workers during work to discuss safety issues.
       My lead person…
These statements refer to your work group LEAD PERSON'S 
focus on safety.  Please remember that your answers will be 
kept confidential. For each statement please rate your level of 
agreement or disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate 
number.
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
 
Safety Motivation (Truxillo et al., 2006, 2007). 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
7. 1 2 3 4 5
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 2 3 4 5
12. 1 2 3 4 5
13. 1 2 3 4 5If I put forth effort, I am able to comply with safety procedures.
The more safety procedures I perform, the more likely I am to avoid 
accidents.
I can perform the safety procedures if I try.
In my work setting, I can actually perform the suggested safety 
procedures.
If I put in the effort, I am able to engage in safe behaviors at work.
If I perform all necessary safety procedures, it will lead to a safe work 
environment.
If I stick to the safety rules, I can avoid accidents.
How accurately I perform given safety procedures will affect whether 
my workplace will be safe.
I can create a safe work environment if I carry out safety procedures.
Safety on the job is something I value highly.
It is important to avoid accidents at work.
Job safety is important to me.
Safety is an important work goal.
CIRCLE ONE
These statements refer to your thoughts and feelings about 
safety.  For each statement please rate your level of agreement 
or disagreement by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
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Safety Compliance and Participation Behaviors (Neal and Griffin, 2004). 
1. 1 2 3 4 5
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5
4. 1 2 3 4 5
5. 1 2 3 4 5
6. 1 2 3 4 5
These statements refer to YOUR  work behavior.   For each 
statement please rate your level of agreement or disagreement 
by CIRCLING the appropriate number.
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
CIRCLE ONE
I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job.
I use the correct safety procedures for carrying out my job.
I ensure the highest level of safety when I carry out my job.
I promote the safety program within the organization.
I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace.
I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve workplace 
safety.
 
 
Accidents & Injuries 
• How many times in the last 6 months have you experienced each of 
these injuries at work?   
• Please enter the number of injuries and near misses experienced in the 
boxes provided. 
• A “near miss” is an accident at work that almost occurred. 
     
Type of Injury INJURY NEAR MISS 
Burns or scalds   
Contusions, crushing bruises   
Scratches, abrasions (superficial wounds)   
Sprains, strains   
Concussions   
Cuts, lacerations, punctures (open wounds)   
Fractures   
Hernia   
Tendonitis   
Slips, trips and falls   
 
 In the last 6 months how many days of work have you missed  
 after being hurt (injured) at work? _______________  
 
 
